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Abstract 
The publication of Sein und Zeit in 1927 by the very young Martin 
Heidegger, a mere thirty-eight at the time, radically changed philosophy in a fashion 
that made returning to the ways of doing philosophy prior to Sein und Zeit 
impossible.  Heidegger‘s new way of understanding Being was through 
understanding the ways humans exist, as worldly beings.  Any future philosophy 
would have to repudiate, argue in favour or against Heidegger‘s analysis, but on 
whichever side a particular philosophy fell with regard to Heidegger they would 
have to acknowledge the importance of his work.  Like many philosophy students I 
was intrigued by Heidegger, but felt that something was lacking in his analysis.  
This ‗lack‘ I could only call a ‗sense of Life‘, that in the insistence on the worldly 
and on death something equally fundamental had been lost, that human beings have 
Life and are living.  Where in Heidegger is the notion of human beings as living 
animals?  As I read Heidegger‘s early lectures and those given just after the 
publication of Sein und Zeit, Heidegger shows himself to be quite concerned with 
the issue.  His early lectures are replete with reference to ‗Life‘ and his lecture 
courses after its publication often make references to the issue of animality, as if he 
were trying to correct an issue left unresolved in Sein und Zeit.  
 
 In this thesis I shall argue not only that those thinkers Heidegger took 
himself for the most part to be disagreeing with: Descartes, Kant and Husserl, could 
have helped him answer the issue of Life; but that there is in Sein und Zeit itself a 
chance to reintroduce the notion of Life, a chance to which the early Heidegger was 
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either blind or simply ignored. In the final chapters I will show how 
phenomenology may develop without rejecting Heidegger‘s thinking, so the 
concept of Life can return to phenomenological philosophy.  
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Bob Dylan 
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Introduction 
 
Painful Beginnings 
 
My interest in Heidegger grew out of my BA dissertation which was on the 
phenomenology of pain, an attempt to give a phenomenological description of 
chronic pain, a subject close to my heart as I have chronic back pain.  To give this 
description I used the resources of philosophers inspired by phenomenology such as 
Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Martin Heidegger and it was at this 
point in my philosophical development that I began to question Heidegger‘s ideas, 
ideas I had hitherto accepted. Whilst I accepted and applauded Heidegger‘s idea of 
‗Being-in-the-world‘ as a vast improvement on his predecessors, allowing the 
‗problem of the external world‘ to be revealed as mistake, since human beings are 
‗in-the world‘, it is simply is not an issue.  Like many before me I read Being and 
Time for the first time, in my early years as an undergraduate, in awe of its depth 
and breadth and originality.  However, when I returned to Being and Time whilst 
writing my undergraduate dissertation, of course I still found it exciting to read, but 
I now approached it with a sense of dissatisfaction and caution, a dissatisfaction that 
grew from a sense that the ‗payoff‘ for Dasein‟s ‗worldliness‘ was too great.  I felt 
that in order to develop his notion of Dasein as ‗Being-in-the-world‘, placing the 
human being ‗back in the world‘ and as public being, a being amongst others, 
something was sacrificed, that with his emphasis on worldliness and publicness, 
Heidegger has lost the notion of ‗inner‘ or interiority of the self.  There are 
experiences ‗I‘ have that are my own, but not just in the sense that they are ‗mine‘, 
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not that they are private, but they are personal, they are experienced as being 
particularly ‗mine‘.  Others will have similar experiences, they can be reported on 
but they will not be my experiences.  Surely any thorough analysis of what it is to 
be a human being, which is after all a large part of Heidegger‘s project, would have 
to account for this sense of ‗interiority‘ or personal experience?  Yet I felt such an 
account was lacking from Being and Time. 
 
At this point in my philosophical education I did not have the resources to 
develop this line of inquiry.  However, whilst researching for my Masters thesis I 
came across Japanese philosophy and in particular the work of the Kyoto School, a 
group of academics working in Kyoto from the late 1800‘s to the present day and 
all highly influenced by Heidegger and German Idealists.  They seem, at times, to 
read phenomenologists such as Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty as simply variations 
on Hegel, as if they were German Idealists in disguise.  I was initially highly 
sceptical of their approach, but after a while I thought that their reading of 
Heidegger, being informed through German Idealism, particularly Fichte and 
Schelling combined with Zen Buddhism, could provide a way to work ‗the inner‘ 
back into phenomenology.  Whilst I do not just apply their ideas alone in this thesis 
they provided me with a way of reading and situating Heidegger‘s work, in relation 
to Kant and Post-Kantian thinkers; asking whether or not Heidegger really truly 
succeeded in going ‗beyond‘ those thinkers and ‗overcoming‘ the subject, as he 
promised. 
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Structure and Argument of the Thesis 
 
The thesis is divided into six chapters.  In the first three I examine the 
philosophies of Descartes, Kant and Husserl, the early
1
 Heidegger‘s critique of 
them, and possible interpretations of them which differ from that of Heidegger.   
For the early Heidegger, it is because of the failure of these philosophers to 
adequately address the problem of being or deal with the problem of the external 
world; and their allegiance to subjectivity, an allegiance, which in Heidegger‘s view, 
leads to an ‗incorrect‘ analysis of ‗Man‘; that he is justified in carrying out his 
project of Being and Time.  In the first three chapters I try to cast doubt upon this 
justification by showing that there may be alternatives to Heidegger‘s critique of 
these philosophers.  These alternative readings also point to gaps within 
Heidegger‘s own work. 
 
In chapter four I look at Heidegger‘s own philosophy, both in Being and 
Time and in notes from lectures given up and just after its publication.  Through an 
exegesis of the first Division of Heidegger‘s Being and Time I attempt to show that 
Heidegger‘s notion of Dasein is perhaps more indebted to Kant than Heidegger 
would care to admit; and that, with his account of conscience, Heidegger falls back 
into the first-personal language of subjectivity, a language that he was trying to 
avoid.  My intention here is to show that Heidegger is vulnerable to the very notion 
                                                 
1
 This is a commonly used way of dividing Heidegger‘s career see Kisiel, T (1995). The Genesis of 
Heidegger‟s “Being and Time”. University of California Press. pxiii 
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he is trying to escape, that of subjectivity.  In the following chapters I attempt to 
show how Heidegger‘s project could be salvaged in the light of my criticisms.  
 
In chapter five, I begin the process of mapping out the road Heidegger could 
have taken by comparing his thinking to that of the Kyoto School, a group of 
Japanese philosophers and Zen Buddhists, headed by one Nishida Kitarô, whose 
book Zen no kenkyu ‗Inquiry into the Good‘ was considered the finest work of 
philosophy in its time.  The group was strongly influenced both by Buddhism, 
German Idealism and the work of Heidegger; Heidegger having taught many of 
them in the early 1920‘s.2  From the Kyoto School a conception of the self and 
subjectivity emerges that shows that there can be a more fundamental way of 
relating to the world than through intentionality.  Advocates of Kyoto School 
philosophy believe we can speak of individual selves, endowed with the possibility 
of self-consciousness, without falling back into radical individualism or being 
subsumed by a Leviathan-like community.  To achieve this, Kyoto School thinkers, 
especially Nishida and Nishitani, presents the self as self-affective, positing itself in 
a primordial experience of the world. For the Kyoto School, the experience of 
nothingness, far from being the negative experience it is for Heidegger, is a positive 
experience.  It is still an experience of being temporarily separated from the 
community as a whole, but this separation is not necessarily negative and can in 
                                                 
2 See Yusa, M. (1998) ‗Philosophy and Inflation. Miki Kiyoshi in Weimar Germany, 1922- 1924‘. Monumenta 
Nipponica Vol. 53, No. 1. (Spring, 1998), pp. 45-71. Sophia University for  this interesting part of Heidegger‘s 
biography.  It is curious that a Japanese philosopher named Kuki Shuzo who was taught by Heidegger may have 
been the one to teach Phenomenology to Jean-Paul Sartre prior to his famous encounter with Raymond Aron 
that lead him to read Levinas.  For this, see Stephen Light‘s 1987 work Shuzo Kuki and Jean-Paul Sartre: 
Influence and Counter-Influence in the Early History of Existential Phenomonology Political Communication 
Yearbook Southern Illinois University. 
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fact be a spiritual experience revealing a new way of relating to the world, a way 
which is more fundamental, more primordial than intentionality or the ‗towards-
which‘. 
 
Finally, we arrive at chapter six.  In this chapter I present a discussion of 
two ‗French‘ 3  phenomenologists, Michel Henry and Emmanuel Levinas.  Both 
thinkers give an account of selfhood not dissimilar to that of the Kyoto School in 
that it is one where the self is conceptualised as auto-affective.  I use their ideas and 
the idea of the Kyoto School to develop a phenomenology of self-experience which 
deals with the criticisms I had put to the early Heidegger, but does not lose the 
essence of the idea of Being-in-the-world. 
 
Closing Remarks 
 
In this thesis it is my intention to show that the early Heidegger in his 
attempt to escape the language of subjectivity, with its talk of ‗inner‘ experiences, 
not only misses a fundamental aspect of what it means to be human, but falls back 
into the language of subjectivity in the process, the very language he was attempting 
to avoid.  However, as I made clear above, this thesis is not meant to be a 
‗philosophical assassination‘ of the early Heidegger.  With help from the Kyoto 
School and French Phenomenology the important parts as of his ‗existential analytic 
of Dasein‘ can be retained, returning phenomenology back to lebensphilosophie or 
life-philosophy, one of the schools of thought phenomenology Heidegger rejected. 
                                                 
3 French here refers to a certain way of doing phenomenology and not necessarily to their nationality, although 
both wrote in French. 
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Chapter One: Heidegger and Descartes 
 
Introductory Remarks 
 
The early Heidegger, the Heidegger of Being and Time, discusses his project 
in remarks he had made on Descartes in his Nietzsche lectures of 1939 (Nietzsche 
I,II,III & IV).  The remarks about Descartes are made in Nietzsche IV: Nihilism.  
Aside from Being and Time, this is the only work published during his lifetime in 
which in he mentions Descartes at length, albeit discounting lectures notes. The 
main aim of this chapter is examine Heidegger‘s view of the notion of subjectivity, 
which, in any positive sense, is absent from Being and Time. A ‗subject‘ is 
everything that Dasein is not, even though it is fair to say that with the notion of 
Dasein, Heidegger is attempting to account for all of the characteristics that 
‗Modern Philosophy‘ would attribute to the ‗subject‘. 
 
In this chapter I shall outline Descartes‘ philosophy and Heidegger‘s critique 
of it.  I will then attempt to cast doubt on Heidegger‘s critique, not to prove 
Descartes right but to cast doubt on Heidegger‟s critique, and to show this critique 
to be ill-founded. If Heidegger‘s interpretation of Descartes can be shown to be ill-
founded or at least questionable then the idea of subjectivity remains a respectable 
philosophical notion.  Despite Heidegger‘s protestations, it does need to be 
accounted for in Heidegger‘s ‗fundamental ontology‘.  In other words, Heidegger 
retains Cartesian elements since with the notion of Dasein, Heidegger is trying to 
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‗replace‘ subjectivity and all its characteristics (save substantialism) therefore 
Dasein is ‗Cartesian‘ in nature.  
 
In order to argue this I shall present an outline of Descartes‘s philosophy, 
followed by Heidegger‘s reading of it and then I will present an alternative 
phenomenological reading of Heidegger‘s critique of Descartes. 
 
Heidegger and Descartes 
 
Heidegger treated both Descartes (and Kant) as guilty of endorsing the 
substantiality conception of the subject - that the subject qua self is a substance, and 
for the same reasons.  Whilst this particular criticism is justified if made of 
Descartes
4
, Heidegger goes on to claim that the cogito should be read as ‗I represent 
my self‘ 5, and as such my self has to be re-presented, given to me (and the world) 
as an object.  Thus as a representational object of one‘s own thought and the world, 
the Cartesian cogito will always exist for itself and to the world in a deficient mode 
of being: part of, but never quite in the world.  In this chapter I will critique 
Heidegger‘s interpretation just briefly outlined. Heidegger‘s interpretation bears 
                                                 
4
 Descartes certainly held this view, but one can argue that Kant‘s view of the subject is not so clear.  
Heidegger seems to conflate the metaphysical with the transcendental as if there was no difference 
between them - in Basic Problems wherever he mention Descartes, he almost always mentions Kant 
in the same sentence.   For example: 
  
―Kant fundamentally, retains Descartes definition [of the subject].  As essential as Kant‘s own 
investigations in the ontological interpretation of subjectivity have been and forever remain the I, the 
ego, is for him, as for Descartes, res cogitans, res, something that thinks, i.e represents, perceives, 
judges, affirms, denies….and the like‖ (BP, p.177). 
 
5
NIV, p.107 
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some similarity to Kant‘s Transcendental Unity of Apperception.  Firstly, however, 
I will outline some of Descartes philosophy with regards to the self and the cogito. 
 
Descartes: Self as Substance 
 
The main concern here is to outline Descartes philosophy in Meditations on 
the First Philosophy, published in 1641.  In this work Descartes argues that other 
than the existence of God, the only truth of which he can be certain is his own 
existence.  This is, of course, his famous Cogito or cogito ergo sum - I think, 
therefore I exist.  From this apparently self-evident truth he argues that he must by 
nature be a thinking thing or substance - a res cogitans.  This is the one of the key 
points of Descartes philosophy of mind - for Descartes the ‗I‘, that is the ‗self‘, 
could only be a mental substance and a thinking thing.  This is its nature.  Descartes 
states his famous principle at the beginning of the Second Meditation: 
 
I have convinced myself that there is absolutely nothing in the 
world, no sky, no earth, no minds, no bodies. Does it now follow 
that I too do not exist? No: if I convinced myself of something 
then I certainly existed. But there is a deceiver of supreme 
power and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiving 
me. In that case I too undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving me; 
and let him deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it 
about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something. 
So after considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally 
conclude that this proposition, I am I exist, is necessarily true 
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whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind. (AT 
VII:25). 
 
If the cogito - that is, stating ‗I think therefore I am‘, is to affirm a person‘s 
existence it must be said in the first person ‗I (Michael Peckitt) think therefore I 
exist‘ (in my own case).  By stating ‗My brother thinks therefore he exists‘ I cannot 
affirm his existence in the same way since I cannot be certain that he is actually 
thinking.  Secondly, the grammar of cogito must be structured in the present tense if 
it is to ensure the certainty of one‘s own existence.  One cannot state ‗I will exist in 
the future‘ because one may cease to be, and whilst it seems commonsensical to 
claim that ‗I‘ existed in the past, such a claim relies on memory (perhaps given to 
me by the evil genius and as such is a deceiver), and therefore it is not reliable.  
Therefore the cogito can only ensure one‘s existence in the present, where the 
present is defined as the moment one utters it.  Thirdly, only the cogito can affirm 
my existence and must do so in terms of my cogitatio - my thinking.  Any mode of 
thinking will suffice ‗I doubt,‘ ‗I affirm‘, ‗I reason‘, but non-mental activities could 
not affirm one‘s existence, stating ‗I walk therefore I exist‘ is not sufficient since I 
could be dreaming I have legs.  Once there is room for doubt one is forced into 
conceding that one only seems to be walking, and one‘s existence is no longer 
certain. 
The fourth feature is one disputed by Descartes scholars, including 
Heidegger himself. This is a question of whether the cogito should be understood as 
an inference, the result of a logical syllogism or as a performance, or as something 
else. I will not go into this in great detail here, but I shall briefly outline the main 
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positions.  Certainly, one can arrange the cogito into a logical form. However, 
Descartes states: 
When someone says ‗I am thinking, therefore I am, or I exist‘, 
he does not deduce existence from thought by means of a 
syllogism, but recognizes it as something self-evident by a 
simple intuition of the mind. (AT VII:140)  
 
Finally, Descartes, in his employment of the cogito does not presuppose any 
ontological claims about the nature of the ‗I think‘. In particular, it does not 
presuppose any claims about the ‗I think‘ as being a substance.  The cogito is 
designed only to affirm as certain that because ‗I think‘, ‗I exist‘, when Descartes 
first states it in the Meditations  he has yet to make any ontological claims about the 
nature of that ‗I‘, the cogito originally only affirms one‘s existence whatever the 
nature of the ‗I‘ might be.  Investigating the nature of the ‗I‘ is Descartes next task. 
 
Descartes goes on to argue that the ‗I‘ or the self is a mental substance.  
However, before I outline his arguments, these terms need to be explained. 
 
The term ‗substance‘ comes from the Latin substantia and it means ‗Thing‘ 
and for Scholastics and Aristotelians
6
 (whom Descartes was attacking) it refers to 
concrete entities. For example, individual human beings such as ‗Rene Descartes‘ 
or an object such as ‗Michael Peckitt‘s copy of Being and Time‘.  For Scholastics 
                                                 
6
 For this issue see Kenny, A. (1968/95) Descartes a Study of his Philosophy. Thoemmes Press.  The 
following works: Cottingham, J. (1986). Descartes. Blackwell and Baker, G. & Morris,  K.J. (1996) 
Descartes‟ Dualism. Routledge. both give a good overview of Desacartes‘ philosophy. 
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and Aristotelians it could not refer to types such as ‗human beings‘ or ‗paper‘, and it 
is on this point that Descartes parts company with them. For Descartes the concept 
applied to abstract entities, namely to physical (or extended) things and mental (or 
non-extended) things.  The ‗I‘ as the self is a mental substance, or a thinking thing. 
 
Descartes main argument for ‗I‘ being a mental substance is that he can 
doubt the existence of all physical substance but he cannot doubt the fact that he is 
thinking. From this Descartes concludes that he is a thing that thinks, a sum res 
cogitans.  He gives three arguments for this: the first is an argument from doubt, the 
second from clear and distinction perception and the third is from divisibility. 
 
The argument from doubt, as stated above, is simple.  When he employs his 
method of doubt Descartes finds that he can doubt the existence of his body, but not 
of his mind, therefore the fact that he is thinking must mean that he is a mental 
substance: 
 
….I saw that while I could pretend that I had no body, and that 
there was no world and no place for me to be in, I could not for 
all pretend that I did not exist….From this I knew that I was a 
substance whose whole essence or nature is simply to think, and 
does not require…any material thing, in order to exist. (AT 
VI:33) 
 
Secondly, he provides the argument from clear and distinct perception. Descartes 
argues that since he can know he exists without knowing he has a body, his mind‘s 
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existence and that of his body are distinct and separate. Since he believes can have a 
clear and distinct idea of himself that does not involve his body, he concludes that 
he must be essentially a mental substance. 
 
Finally, Descartes sets out his argument from divisibility.  Descartes argues 
that not only is his mind distinct from his body, but that the mind operates in a 
different fashion, and responds to a different logic.  This argument is as follows: the 
body is divisible whilst the mind is indivisible, and we can identify a part of our 
body such as a hand when separated from our body, but we cannot partition the 
mind in the same way. 
 
Having outlined the main points of Descartes philosophy I will now give 
Heidegger‘s critique of it. 
 
Heidegger’s Opposition to‘Nietzsche’s’ Descartes 
 
In his 1939 lecture course Nietzsche IV: Nihilism, Heidegger criticises 
Nietzsche for viewing Descartes‘ cogito ergo sum as a logical syllogism.  
Heidegger states: 
 
At the outset, Nietzsche agrees with the familiar interpretation of 
the principle, which takes ego cogito, ergo sum as a logical 
deduction, underlying the logical deduction is the intention of 
proving that ―I‖ am, that a ―subject‖ is.  Nietzsche believes it is 
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self-evident that man may be defined as ―I‖ and that ―I‖ may be 
defined as ―subject‖ (NIV, p.124) 
 
Heidegger berates Nietzsche, reminding him and us that Descartes had already 
defended himself against this fallacious understanding of his work in advance in the 
Principles of Philosophy when he states:  
 
And when I have said that this proposition, I think, therefore I 
am is the first and most certain of all…I have not denied that 
one must know in advance of this principle what ‗thinking‘, 
‗existence‘ and ‗certitude‘ are. (AT: VIII, 8)  
 
Descartes contra Nietzsche, as Heidegger tells us, does state that of course, the 
ideas of thinking, existence and truth would have to be known prior to the 
‗realisation‘ of the cogito.  This defence, that any ‗truth‘ about ‗existence‘ 
presupposes knowledge of ‗truth‘ and ‗existence‘, is a notion congruent with both 
the project of Being and Time and the Meditations.  But what exactly is Heidegger‘s 
opposition to Nietzsche‘s Descartes, the only Descartes worth considering for 
Heidegger?  The answer begins with Heidegger‘s own interpretation of the cogito. 
 
Heidegger interprets the principle of cogito as cogito me cogitare, which he 
renders as ‗I represent myself‘: ―When Descartes grasps cogitatio and cogitare as 
perceptio, he wants to emphasise that bringing something to oneself pertains to 
cogitare.  Cogitare is the presenting to oneself of what is representable‖ (NIV, 
p.105).  And later states: ―…[E]very ―I represent something‖ simultaneously 
represents a ―myself‖, me, the one representing (for myself in my representing)‖ 
(NIV, p.106) 
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When Heidegger talks about ―representing‖ he does not mean representing 
an object to oneself, such as Freiburg cathedral, to use Heidegger‘s own example, or 
the computer I am looking at now.  It is rather that ‗I‘ am co-present with all ‗my‘ 
re-presenting that the cogito or ‗I‘ is present in re-presenting, that in the ―re-
presentation‖ that ‗I‘ itself is represented.  Hence subjectivity is the representation 
of Ipesity, the ‗I‘ present in the re-presenting: 
 
Rather, the representing I is far more essentially and necessarily 
co-represented in every ―I represent‖, namely as something 
toward which, back to which, and before every represented thing 
is placed (NIV, p.107) 
 
Heidegger appears to be offering a reading of Descartes that is Kantian in spirit, 
since his idea of cogito me cogitare as representation (Vorstellung), bears a striking 
similarity to Kant‘s transcendental unity of apperception.  The ‗I‘ or human 
subjectivity must be present ―in all my representations‖ that ―I‖ am ―involved‖ or 
present in all of ―my‖ experiences.  However, despite Heidegger‘s quasi-Kantian 
arguments against Nietzsche, he has yet to show that Nietzsche‘s idea of cogito 
ergo sum is mistaken.  Heidegger now goes on to show that it is mistaken based on 
his own interpretation of Descartes.  Heidegger‘s argument is that since cogito ergo 
sum is to be understood as ‗I represent‘, where the ‗I‘, the ―subject‖ is necessarily 
involved in the ‗representing‘ of the ‗I‘.  Since it is not that we have the ‗I‘ which 
then goes on to represent itself, as far as logical form is concerned the term ―ergo‖ 
is redundant, since the ‗I‘ is involved in all representing: 
26 
 
 
The ―I‖ in its ―I am‖, or to be more specific, the one 
representing, is known in and for such representing no less than 
the represented object.  The I-as ―I am the one representing‖- is 
so certainly present in the representing that no syllogism, no 
matter how logical, can attain the certainty bound up with this 
presenting to himself of the one representing….Hence we see at 
once why the ergo cannot be understood as the joining elements 
of a syllogism.  The supposed premise- Is quo cogitate est- can 
never be the ground for the cogito sum, because that premise is 
derived from the cogito sum…The ―I am‖ is not first produced 
from the ―I represent‖; rather the ―I represent‖, according to its 
essence, is the ―I am‖ – that is the one representing-has already 
presented to me.  With good reason, we might now omit the 
confusing ergo from the Cartesian principle. (NIV, p.113) 
  
Heidegger‘s second objection to Descartes, outlined in his Nietzsche lectures 
concerns the status Descartes accords Man qua subject.  Man as the subject, 
therefore the ―thinking thing‖ is now the most important entity in philosophical 
arguments.  ‗Man‘ is now the foundation and creator of all things, man is the 
subject, everything else is an object.  In some philosophical systems ‗Man‘ is even 
on a par with the Deity since ‗Man‘ is ens creatum and ens perfectissimum the 
creator and created.  This may indeed be because of the zeitgeist Descartes lived in; 
it was the time of Galileo and the birth of the New Science.  Either way, this new 
status bestowed on ‗Man‘ had a negative effect on philosophical debates: most 
importantly the debate about Being: 
 
Man is the distinctive ground underlying every representing of 
being and their truth, on which every representing and its 
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represented is based and must be based if it is to have status and 
stability. Man is subiectum in the distinctive sense.... Being is 
representedness secured in reckoning representation, through 
man is universally guaranteed his manner of proceeding 
(Vorgehen) in the midst of beings, as well as scrutiny, conquest, 
mastery and disposition of beings in such a way that man, 
himself, can be the master of his own surety and certitude on his 
own terms. (NIV, p.119-20) 
 
‗Man‘ not God or Being is now the measure of all things, whether we are dealing 
with truth, beings or Being, ‗Man‘ qua subject determines the essence of every 
entity, of every notion.  ‗Man‘ literally becomes the measure of all things, and 
Heidegger disagrees with this idea: 
 
Because man essentially has become the subiectum, and 
beingness has become equivalent to representedness, and truth 
equivalent to certitude, man now has disposal over the whole of 
beings as such in an essential way, for he provides the measure 
for all beingness of every individual being.  The essential 
decision about what can be established as being now rests with 
man as subiectum. (NIV, p.121) 
 
Heidegger‘s displeasure at this conception of Man, of Man as subject in virtue of 
being a thinking thing or cogito is made clear at the beginning of Being and Time 
when he states:  
 
With the „cogito sum‟ Descartes had claimed that he was putting 
philosophy on a new and firm footing.  But what he left 
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undetermined when he began in this ‗radical‘ way, was the kind 
of Being which belongs to the res cogitans, or-more precisely- 
the meaning of the Being of the „sum‟. (BT:24) 
 
By being the measure of all things Descartes can state that ‗Man‘ is a thinking thing 
or res cogitan, that is what ―I am‖ and if one asked ―What is the meaning of the am 
or sum?‖  Descartes can respond that it is to have thoughts.  This is enough for 
Descartes but not for Heidegger who wants to know what it means to be that 
thinking thing. 
 
These are the two main concerns underpinning Heidegger‘s critique of 
Descartes in Being and Time; this will be discussed later, in Chapter Four.  What I 
have presented above are Heidegger‘s concerns about the notion of subjectivity, that 
appear in Descartes, and which Heidegger wants to refute, in particular the notion 
of subjectivity, as Dasein is not a subject. 
 
Critique of Heidegger’s Descartes 
 
In this section, I aim to show that Heidegger‘s interpretation of Descartes, 
whilst original, is ultimately flawed.  My main claim is that Heidegger falls foul of 
the very fallacy that he berated Nietzsche for: interpreting the cogito ergo sum as 
something which is reliant on the notion of reflective thought and also possibly in 
agreement with the logical syllogism interpretation that he claims to disagree with.  
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However, before delivering this critique, there are a few preliminary aspects of 
Heidegger‘s critique that I would like to make explicit. 
 
To return to the deconstruction of Descartes that he did give, we must recall 
that Heidegger is giving a Kantian reading of Descartes by viewing the cogito 
argument as cogito me cogitare, and that he sees Descartes as committed to 
something akin to Kant‘s Transcendental Unity of Apperception. Kant states: ―It 
must be possible for the ‗I think‘ to accompany all my representations; for 
otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, 
and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible, or at 
least, nothing to me.‖ (B131- 2). 
 
Now certainly, Heidegger‘s interpretation of Descartes cogito me cogitare as 
‗I represent‘ bears some resemblance to this line of thought, but Heidegger does 
make some remarks that muddy the waters.  Firstly he does at one point use the 
―deliberative action‖ when referring to representation as the statement cogito ergo 
sum as conscious act, under our control, which we can choose not to perform.  Even 
if it is not what he means, Heidegger suggests this when he states: 
 
….cogitare is always ―thinking‖ in the sense of ―thinking over,‖ 
and thus deliberation that thinks in such a way as to only the 
indubitable as securely fixed and represented in the proper sense.  
Cogitare is essentially a deliberative representing, a representing 
that examines and checks…(NIV, p.105-6). 
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Heidegger‘s use of the terms ‗thinking over‘ and ‗deliberative representing‘ suggest 
that he may be reading the cogito as a syllogism.  Both ‗Thinking over‘ and 
‗deliberative representing‘ suggest that the one who recites the cogito, thinks slowly, 
deliberating until they come to the conclusion that the fact of their thinking proves 
their existence and that the agent goes through the practical syllogism.  This 
appears at odds with Heidegger‘s quasi-Kantian reading of the cogito as cogito me 
cogitare, as manifested in his insistence that the ―I is far more essentially and 
necessarily co-represented in every ―I represent‖….‖(NIV, p.107)  However, the 
idea that he is ultimately reading the cogito as a practical syllogism is consistent 
with his ideas in Being and Time.  In this text Heidegger uses the term ‗deliberation‘ 
when referring to the type of intentionality marked by the practical syllogism during 
times of breakdown, where one has to think about one‘s actions as opposed to being 
involved with the world.  Deliberation is contrasted with non-representational 
intentionality, when one ‗deliberates‘ in the ordinary sense of the word, one has to 
‗think‘ about what one is doing: 
 
The scheme peculiar to [deliberating] is the ―if-then‖; for 
instance, if this or that is to be produced, put to use, or averted, 
then some ways and means, circumstances, or opportunities will 
be needed. (BT: 359) 
 
There is certainly room to interpret Heidegger in this way, especially if one reads 
his Nietzsche lectures in the light of Being and Time, indeed in these lectures he is 
partly reflecting on the project of Being and Time and attempting to clear up 
confusions regarding his project.  However, the question of whether he views ‗I 
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represent‘ as deliberative is not the only question of importance, there is also the 
question of ‗I am‘ being read as ‗I represent‘ if at all?  Being charitable to 
Heidegger, let us assume the ‗I represent‘ has nothing to do with deliberative action 
and try to look at Heidegger‘s interpretation on its own terms. 
 
Jean-Luc Marion in his book On Descartes‟ Metaphysical Prism puts 
forward the view that the ‗I‘, or the represented object cannot be simply represented 
but: 
 
…if it does represent what it cognizes, it does so by reflecting it, 
like a converging mirror that reflects rays by focusing them on a 
single point so as to render its object perfectly visible and at the 
same time appropriate it-as in the classical view (Marion, 1999a 
p93-94)  
 
Reflection, which need not be deliberative (it could be immediate) is the only way 
that the ‗I‘ could be represented, indeed Descartes supports this idea when he states 
―When the mind imagines or turns towards those impressions its operation is a 
thought‖. (AT III: p.361 & p.13-15)  Of course, it is neither Marion‘s intention or 
mine to defend Descartes, I (and Marion) merely use Descartes to challenge 
Heidegger‘s argument that the ‗I am‘ as ‗I represent‘ could be achieved in a way 
where the I is just ―involved‖ in the action, that is, in a way similar to Kant‘s 
transcendental unity of apperception.  It cannot be that representations are simply 
there for me, the ‗I‘ must do some work, whether it is reflecting or deliberating. 
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I will now look at Heidegger‘s second critique, in which his worries about 
‗Man‘ are now being viewed as subject and the foundation of all things.  What one 
needs to respond to is that we are sceptical of Heidegger‘s telling of History of 
Western Metaphysics, and of the importance that the notion of the Ego Cogito holds 
for his history.  Whilst this is not my point here, it is worth noting that few thinkers 
of the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries devote tomes to Descartes‘ (in)famous principle.  
Whilst many thinkers mention Descartes, he is not necessarily the main focus of 
their inquiry.  However the more significant point here is that just as Heidegger is 
accused of reinventing the notion for his own ends with ‗Man‘ as the subject, 
Heidegger himself is guilty of a similar crime.  Michel Henry in his book The 
Genealogy of Psychoanlysis, states that far from a place at the centre of the world, 
indeed of ‗his‘ world, man is excluded from much of Cartesian thought: 
 
This exclusion is accomplished in the reduction: what subsists 
has no eyes or ears, no body or worldly connection, nothing of 
the sort. The idea of man in established Cartesianism, comes to 
light only after its gaze has already slipped from the cogito to 
cogitatum; when, in the system of representation ―cogito-
cogitata,‖ the consideration of one of the cogitate (the idea of 
God) and its strange character lead to the thought that the system 
is, precisely, not a system and is not self-supporting.  Man 
intervenes in Cartesianism only at the moment when he is 
discovered to be finite, ens creatum, and thus nothing like a 
foundation. (Henry, 1993, p.71)  
 
It is possible to ―tell the story‖ another way. The Cartesian has to doubt his senses 
and the existence of his senses, his body and his world, and despite debates about 
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the nature of Being (Man is ens creatum) man is a created being, since God exists 
and is more powerful. For Descartes, it is God and not Man that is foundation of all 
things.  Man is merely a created, thinking thing.  Whilst Heidegger has other 
worries about God being the founder of all things these will be discussed in Chapter 
five, Heidegger‘s fears concerning Man‘s foundational status were ill founded. 
 
One question remains and it concerns the critique of Descartes in which 
Heidegger left the question of Being ―undetermined‖.  Whilst this is not the place 
for a full defence of Descartes, it worth trying to create doubt by showing a little of 
why one could see Descartes as justified, that Descartes did not need to answer this 
question. 
 
To make this argument I will again use the work of Michel Henry, a 
phenomenologist who offers such an interpretation of the cogito.  In The Genealogy 
of Psychoanalysis Henry begins by reminding us of one the formulations of the 
cogito as it occurs in the Second Mediation; it is stated just after he has doubted 
everything - the videre videor: “At certe videre videor, audire, calescere” (Yet 
certainly I seem to see, to hear, and to be warmed).‖ (Descartes in Henry, 1993, 
p.17)  
 
For Henry, Descartes is not affirming intentional subjectivity that would 
take the form ‗I considering my doubt, I seem to see‘.  Rather, for Henry, Descartes 
is offering a non-intentional subjectivity that is self-affective and absolute.   Henry 
begins his argument by pointing out that at the stage of the Second Mediation, 
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Descartes has performed epoché, he doubts everything, the sky, the earth and all 
things in it, except his own existence: 
 
I have convinced myself that there is absolutely nothing in the 
world, no sky, no earth, no minds, no bodies. Does it now follow 
that I too do not exist? No: if I convinced myself of something 
then I certainly existed. But there is a deceiver of supreme 
power and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiving 
me. In that case, I too undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving me; 
and let him deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it 
about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something. 
So after considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally 
conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true 
whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind. (AT 
VII: 25). 
 
Even after doubting that everything may not exist, his own existence remains. 
Henry then asks, how a person that doubts the existence of the world and their own 
body make intelligible the thought, ‗Yet certainly I seem to see, to hear, and to be 
warmed…‘  Henry argues that even after this ‗bracketing‘ does not vision, the 
simple ‗seeing of things‘ remain?  Therefore what is seen indubitably exists: 
 
[V]ision remain[s], pure vision considered in itself, reduced to 
itself, to its pure self-experiencing, from every relation to any 
presumed eyes, supposed body, or putative world?  But if pure 
vision subsists as such, as a ―phenomenon,‖ doesn‘t what is seen 
also remain….as indubitable givens? (Henry, 1993, p.17)  
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Descartes responds of course, in the negative.  There are no ‗indubitable givens‘ the 
world may not be as it seems to appear, perhaps because of some evil genius, or it 
may not exist at all.  For Henry, however, the consequence of this move is that 
‗Seeing‘, the videor, is essentially ‗rejected‘, because of the truth of one‘s ‗seeings‘. 
Yet Henry reminds us, vision persists as the certe videre videor, vision ―is given its 
true nature, the pure fact of seeing‖. (Henry, 1993, p.18)  And ‗seeing‘ presupposes 
that there is a ―…horizon of visibility, a transcendental light that Descartes calls 
―natural light.‖ ‖ (Henry, 1993, p.18).  Therefore, we return to the problem of 
whatever exists, there has to be field of vision for objects to have the possibility of 
manifesting themselves, no matter how doubtful or false the object‘s existence is 
vision must remain. 
 
Descartes has to agree that vision and particular visions do exist, that they 
are seen to exist however false they may be.  Henry now asks, what is existing?  
Henry claims that Descartes has already supplied the answer: 
 
According to Cartesianism existing (being) means appearance, 
self-manifestation.  Videor designates nothing but that. Videor 
designates the primal semblance, the original capacity to appear 
and give through which vision originally presents and manifests 
itself, regardless of what veracity is accorded it as vision, 
regardless of what it sees or believes itself to see, even 
regardless of seeing itself. (Henry, 1993, p.19) 
 
In Cartesian philosophy the term ontology means to exist, it means to appear, to 
self-manifest, and videor from the Latin ‗to see‘, is our original capacity as human 
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beings to appear with the possibility of vision, regardless of whether that vision is 
true or false.  
 
An issue remains unresolved, how does videre the ‗seems‘ of the ‗Yet I 
seem to see‘ manifest itself.  It cannot be immanent to the videor, that is to say it 
cannot reside in vision, since Descartes has displayed doubts about the certainty of 
vision.  But again, Descartes supplies his own answer: 
 
‗It seems to me that I see, that I hear, that I warm myself, and 
this is properly what in me is called sensing (sentir), and this, 
taken precisely, is nothing but thinking‘. (Descartes in Henry, 
1993, p.20)  
 
We sense our thought and whilst particular thoughts can be doubted there is, 
nonetheless, thought.  For Henry, this sensing is: 
 
pure self-identical appearance, identical to the being defined by 
the sensing.  I sense that I think, therefore I am. (Henry, 1993, 
p.21) 
 
It is I that is sensing, thus ‗seeing‘ should be understood as sensing that I see, as a 
self-sensing or self-affection and that this self-sensing cannot be doubted, since the 
ego cannot deceive itself. 
 
We ‗sense‘ or affect ourselves in the act of performing or reciting the cogito 
ergo sum.  This ‗affection‘ is not one that occurs within the subject, such as ‗feeling 
sad‘, but one which constitutes the subject.  The idea of self-affection is not new, it 
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did not appear with Henry; it can be found as early as Enlightenment thinker Maine 
de Biran (arguably Henry‘s predecessor) and in Heidegger, in Kant and the 
Problem of Metaphysics.  In his exegesis of Kant, Heidegger: 
 
  
takes the essence of time to be pure self-affection.  And as 
Heidegger points out, the concept of self-affection does not 
merely designate a process in which something affects itself, but 
a process that involves a self.  Not in the sense that self-affection 
is effectuated by an already existing self, but in the sense that… 
(Zahavi in Gron, Damgaard and Overgaard,2007, p.138) 
 
When he states: 
 
―….time as pure self-affection forms the essential structure of 
subjectivity.‖ (KPM, p.132) 
 
However, it should be made clear that Descartes never supported the move to self-
affection, to reduce the immanent sensing of thought i.e., affectivity to videre.  He 
makes motions towards it other works, for example in Principles of Philosophy in 
which he states ―By the term thought, I understand everything which we are of as 
happening within us, in so far as we have awareness of it.  Hence, thinking is to be 
identified here not merely with understanding, willing and imagining, but also 
sensory awareness.‖ (CSM I, p.195).  Also in the same section: 
 
….if we take ‗seeing‘ or ‗walking‘ to apply to actual sense or 
awareness to apply to actual sense or awareness of seeing or 
walking, then the conclusion is quite certain, since it relates to 
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the mind, which alone has the sensation of thought that it is 
seeing or walking.(CSM I, p.195) 
 
Here Descartes does seem to be locating sensation and affectivity as immanent to 
the mind; however, ultimately he does separate thought from sensations. As Henry 
puts it he was unable to ―understand that affectivity can belong to the essence of 
pure thought.‖ (Henry, 1975, p 141)   Whilst Henry may not be true to the letter of 
Descartes, he may certainly be close to the true spirit of Cartesian Philosophy when 
he proclaims ‗Cartesianism is a phenomenology…a material phenomenology‘ 
(Henry in Marion, 1999b, p.105). 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
In this chapter I have outlined Heidegger‘s debate with Descartes in an 
attempt to do two things.  Firstly, I have tried to show why Heidegger (although he 
hardly wrote about Descartes) was engaged in an attempt to move as far away from 
Descartes as possible.  This was due to the fact that Heidegger wanted no part in the 
Cartesian concept of subjectivity.  Secondly, I attempt to demonstrate through a 
critique of Heidegger‘s reading of Descartes in his Nietzsche lectures how 
Heidegger may have failed in this task because he failed to give a positive account 
of subjectivity.  Indeed it is illuminating that in those Nietzsche lectures, Heidegger 
muses that subjectivity may be in the end inevitable when he muses on the project 
of Being and Time: 
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…the past thirty years have not succeeded in awakening at least 
a preliminary understanding of the question that was posed. On 
the one hand, the reason for such non-comprehension lies in our 
habituation, entrenched and ineradicable, to the modern mode of 
thought: man is thought as subject, and all reflections on him are 
to be understood to be anthropology.  On the other hand, 
however, the reason, for such non-comprehension lies in the 
attempt itself, which, perhaps because it really is something 
historically organic and not anything ―contrived,‖ evolves from 
what has been heretofore; in struggling loose from it, it 
necessarily and continually refers back to the course of the past 
and calls on it for assistance, in the effort to say something 
entirely different.  Above all, however, the reason, the path 
taken terminates abruptly at the decisive point.  The reason for 
the disruption is that the attempt and the path it chose confront 
the danger of unwillingly becoming merely another 
reinforcement of subjectivity.  (NIV, p.141 modified by 
J.Taminiaux)  
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Chapter Two: The Early Heidegger’s Kant 
 
Introductory Remarks 
 
 In the previous chapter, I examined Heidegger‘s engagement with Descartes 
and his critique of Descartes‘ conception of the subject.  In this chapter I will look 
at Heidegger‘s engagement with and critique of Immanuel Kant.  As with Descartes, 
Heidegger finds fault with Kant‘s conception of subjectivity.  However, 
Heidegger‘s relationship with Kant is more complex than the one he has with 
Descartes because, whilst he deplores his conception of the subject, Heidegger 
recognises that he may require the resources of Kant‘s Critique of Pure Reason in 
order to formulate his own project of Being and Time.  In this chapter I shall outline 
the elements of Kant‘s Critical Philosophy that Heidegger criticises.  I shall also 
outline certain points of agreement between the two thinkers.  In the final section I 
shall examine Heidegger‘s reading of Kant.  I should make it clear that in this 
chapter I will be making use of the work on Kant that appears after Being and Time, 
such as Heidegger‘s The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (originally given in 
1928) and also his work in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (originally given 
in 1929).  I realise that it might appear unfair to Heidegger to interrogate his ideas 
in Being and Time by using work that appeared after its publication.   However, I 
think I am justified in using these texts on the basis that Heidegger promised a 
‗destrucktion‘ of Kant, along with Descartes and Aristotle in the final part of Being 
and Time, which was to have three divisions.  Of course, this part never appeared; 
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however it is thought that the books named above, do at least make up some of that 
unwritten material. 
 
The ‘Special Relationship’ between Heidegger and Kant 
 
Theodore Kisiel, in his book The Genesis of Heidegger‟s Being and Time 
(1995) suggests that to inquire about a time when Heidegger was not a Kantian is 
akin to asking when Heidegger was a German.  Whilst this statement is partly made 
in jest, there is a serious intent behind the joke.  When he was working at Freiburg 
and Marburg, Heidegger was not just exposed to but rather was saturated with the 
Neo-Kantianism that dominated the German universities in Heidegger‘s time as a 
young scholar.  For example, he was a student under Heinrich Rickert, a member of 
the Baden or Southwest German school of Neo-Kantianism.  Heidegger also spent 
time at a Seminary, where Kantian morality (whilst not entirely popular in Kant‘s 
own time) was popular.  To Heidegger, the son of a pastor, it expressed the German 
Zeitgeist, in much the same way that a certain conception of Humean ethics might 
be said to express the British Zeitgeist of the late 19
th
 and 20
th
 Centuries.
7
 
 
However, Heidegger‘s Kantianism is more than just cultural exposure.  Do 
the projects undertaken by Heidegger and Kant share any similarities and if so, 
would Heidegger accept that this might be the case?  The short answer to these 
questions is yes, there are similarities and Heidegger would accept them although 
                                                 
7
 For Heidegger‘s Kantian inheritance see  Steven Crowell‘s & Jeff Malpas‘  2007 collection 
Transcendental Heidegger  published by Stanford University Press, in particular Cristina Lafont‘s  
‗Heidegger and the Synthetic A Prori‘, pp104-118. 
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he does go to great lengths to point out the dissimilarities, and he sees his project as 
an improvement on Kant‘s work.  In order to explore this claim I must begin by 
outlining some key points of Kant‘s Critical Philosophy from Critique of Pure 
Reason (hereafter Critique), in so far as they relate to Kant‘s reading of 
Transcendental Subjectivity and Selfhood, as well as to the aim of his overall 
project. 
 
Kant’s Critique 
 
The first issue I want to outline in Kant‘s Critique is arguably the issue that 
makes the rest of the Critique possible: the notion of the synthetic a priori. 
 
Kant begins his Critique stating that his mission is to find a middle ground 
between the rationalism of Leibniz (and Descartes) and the radical empiricism of 
Hume. The reason for a middle ground is that it is necessary to the resurrection of 
metaphysics as a respectable discipline.  Kant considers that Leibniz allows too 
much to fall under the auspices of metaphysics, God would be one such example, 
whilst Hume allows too little if anything at all to be the proper object of 
metaphysical study.  For Hume, metaphysical propositions about God, the self and 
causal terms must be given anchorage in empirical experience. Kant begins his 
Critique with one short statement that marks the beginning of what he terms 
Transcendental Idealism, his ‗middle ground‘.  ―But though all our knowledge 
begins with experience it does not follow that all arises out of experience.‖ (B1). 
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Kant raises the possibility that contra Hume, knowledge, what we know, can 
be obtained through means other than experience.  At the same time he warns 
Leibniz, that rationalist techniques alone, techniques that place a lesser importance 
on experience will not enable respectable metaphysics.  However, beyond this 
opening warning to Hume and Leibniz, Kant has a far more serious challenge for 
both of them, which goes to the very heart of the question ‗What is knowledge?‘  
To appreciate this one has to know a little about the views of Hume and Leibniz on 
knowledge. 
 
Regardless of their differences regarding the method of acquiring 
knowledge, as an empiricist and a rationalist respectively, Hume and Leibniz are 
united on one point. Knowledge, however it is obtained, is either necessary and 
therefore a priori, or contingent and therefore a posteriori: what Leibniz calls truths 
of reasons and truths of fact.  The former, truths of reasons, are necessary truths and 
as such are known a priori, such as two plus two equals four: the truths of 
mathematics or ‗Natural Philosophy‘ are all such truths.  Truths of fact are known 
through experience, such as ‗the table is in the dining room‘.  To establish whether 
this statement is true or not we must have experience and because it is dependent on 
experience such knowledge is contingent and a posteriori.   
 
According to Leibniz, we as humans can have a priori knowledge not just 
about mathematics and the sciences, but about God and the afterlife; for Kant, this 
seems to allow metaphysics too much scope.  On the other hand, Hume limits all a 
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priori knowledge to relation of ideas and this seems to make the scope of 
metaphysics too limited.  Kant has found a middle ground, by suggesting that whilst 
empiricists such as Hume are right to insist on their criticism that all knowledge 
―begins with‖ experience, rationalists such as Leibniz are also right to insist that this 
does not mean that all knowledge must always be produced by experience. 
  
It is here that Kant introduces his notion of the synthetic a priori.  For Kant 
all a priori truths are necessary or generalisable, and therefore must be true.  There 
is, however, a difference between what Kant called analytic judgements, where (as 
Kant describes it) the predicate is ―thought in‖ the concept of the subject and 
synthetic judgements where the connection between subject and predicate is 
―thought without identity‖.  Thus that all ‗bodies are heavy‘ is synthetic since the 
concept of ‗heavy‘ is not contained within the concept of ‗body‘.  Where Kant 
differs from Hume is in claiming that there can be synthetic, necessary a priori 
judgements.  That ‗7 plus 5 equals 12‘ is a priori but also synthetic since there is 
nothing in the concept of ‗seven‘, ‗plus‘, ‗five‘ or ‗equals‘ which means twelve, a 
synthesis is need, a combination of the concept of ‗seven‘ and ‗five‘ with the 
operation of ‗plus‘ to give us ‗twelve‘.  However, it is a priori because it is 
necessarily true (B15).  Kant goes on to claim that our knowledge of geometry is 
also synthetic and a priori. 
 
Kant‘s project was partially generated by the need to explain the possibility 
of a priori knowledge.  Kant argued that synthetic a priori knowledge would only 
be possible if the world we experienced was required to conform to the nature of the 
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knowing mind.  This was his Copernican revolution.  Not only does knowledge 
have to conform to the world but also any world we can know has to be susceptible 
to the organising principles of the knowing mind. ―Our explanation is thus the only 
explanation that makes intelligible the possibility of geometry, as a body of a priori 
synthetic knowledge.‖ (B41). 
 
It is the possibility of synthetic a priori judgements that enabled Kant to 
establish a firm ground for metaphysics.  This firm ground was to be established by 
showing that any claimed synthetic a priori propositions are ones that are necessary 
if experience is to be possible for us.  It allows him to show that the spatio-temporal 
nature of the world we experience is known a priori.  And, more controversially, to 
suggest that space and time are ‗in us‘. 
 
 Kant goes on to argue that the human mind has two faculties.  Firstly 
‗sensibility‘, which is our ability to ‗sense‘ or be affected by objects.  Secondly 
‗understanding‘, this faculty conceptualises the impressions that the faculty of 
sensibility receives. I see the computer before me because the faculty of 
understanding arranges or conceptualises a particular set of impressions under the 
concept ‗computer‘. (B33-B34).  The human subject has essentially two faculties.  
One deals with sense impressions or ‗intuitions‘ and the other deals with the way in 
which understanding helps us to conceptualise these intuitions: both faculties are 
necessary to the subject if it is to be faced with a world it can make sense of.  
However, before I outline our main concern in this chapter, Kant‘s explicit views on 
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subjectivity and selfhood, I also need to outline his distinction between Phenomena 
and Noumena. 
 
The Distinction between Phenomena and Noumena 
 
Kant makes the distinction between phenomena and noumena in his 
‗Transcendental Analytic,‘ where he is discussing the scope and limits of the faculty 
of understanding.  To demonstrate its limits Kant discusses the difference between 
phenomena and noumena; a term Kant himself introduces. 
 
The phenomenal world is the world as we experience it.  It consists of two 
elements that we cannot experientially disentangle, intuitions and concepts: the 
deliverance of the faculties of sensibility and understanding respectively.  Kant 
introduces the concept of the noumena to signal that the world as experienced is not 
the whole of what there is.  The noumenal world, the world of things as they are in 
themselves, is outside the scope of our knowledge.  However, we can say that 
noumena, unlike phenomena, if they were represented, would be ―represented as 
they are‖ and not as phenomena which would be represented ―as they appear‖ 
(A249-50).  Not being an object of sensibility, the human mind cannot see them, or 
gain access to them via any sense, so they do not appear to us as large, heavy, small 
or light nor do they seem to posses any properties.  Only God could experience the 
noumena. 
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However, noumena and things in themselves should not be understood as 
being the same concept.  The ‗thing in itself‘ is an ontological concept that refers to 
entities whereas ‗noumena‘ is an epistemological concept.  It signals something that 
it is not possible for us to know.  The concept of things in themselves is 
theoretically useful, for whilst they are non-sensible and non-empirical, they serve 
to secure empirical objects as a respectable ontological notion. Phenomena are 
possible, they are represented ―as they appear‖, because they are an appearance of 
something, but what is that something?  That something is the thing in itself. It 
secures the object, outside of its appearance as a respectable notion.  Or as Kant 
puts it: ―…if the senses represent to us something, merely as it appears, this 
something must also in itself be a thing, and an object of non-sensible intuition.‖ 
(A249). 
 
I will now go on to outline Kant‘s revision of the cogito in his account of the  
‗Transcendental Unity of Apperception‘ from within this framework of the 
distinction between phenomena and noumena and his project of securing synthetic a 
priori truths as universal conditions of the possibility of experience. 
 
Kant is not saying that things or objects only exist if a human subject exists 
but that they can only be understood as objects of such and such a kind if the human 
subject categorises them in a certain way.  For Kant, as human beings we can only 
understand the world from the human perspective.  
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Some philosophers are not convinced that Kant does not really fall back into 
an inadvertent Berkeleyan idealism.  By arguing that the experience of the world is 
dependent on the existence of a human subject to make sense of it, some 
philosophers come close to Berkeley‘s famous argument that ‗to be is to be 
perceived‘.  However, this is to overlook the fact that Kant does not say that things 
about which the unified consciousness makes sense can have no existence outside 
of our perceptions.  He merely states that ‗things‘ will appear to us as human beings 
in the way that our human minds conceptualise and make sense of them.  What the 
thing itself really is can only be available to one with a different mode of cognition 
than that possessed by humans: for example God.  For Kant, to be is not simply to 
be perceived it is to exist independently of our cognition, but that any understanding 
or experience is dependent on our (human) cognition.  Within this framework of his 
distinction between phenomena and noumena and his project of securing synthetic a 
priori truths as universal conditions of the possibility of experience, I will now go 
on to outline Kant‘s revision of the cogito in his account of the ‗Transcendental 
Unity of Apperception‘. 
 
Transcendental Unity of Apperception 
 
Kant introduces the Transcendental Unity of Apperception to avoid both 
Descartes‘ equation of the self with substance. However, perhaps a more obvious 
and pressing concern was Hume‘s empirically motivated scepticism, and his 
argument that since experience is simply a succession of ideas that can make sense, 
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when he looks for the self, he finds no such entity, simply a ‗bundle of perceptions‘.  
Kant argues that if a succession of ideas is to be experienced, it must be combined 
or ‗synthesised‘ into a unified whole: Kant calls this the ‗manifold of intuitions.‘ 
Unless experience is synthesised or combined into a unified whole, it cannot be 
understood as an experience at all.  For example, as you read this piece of paper, 
you recognise the black marks as ‗words‘ and the white parts as ‗paper‘ and you 
know that what you are seeing is a ‗piece of paper with written word‘.  Kant would 
explain this as you ‗receiving‘ the impressions thanks to the faculty of sensibility, 
and the faculty of understanding, which orders or makes sense of the ‗messy‘ 
impressions by subsuming the impressions under categories such as ‗Quantity‘ and 
‗Plurality‘.  Thus you come to see this as ‗a collection of A4 papers‘.  However, this 
process, this unifying of experience is only possible if the different elements are 
held within a single consciousness.  Therefore a unified succession of ideas requires 
a unified consciousness thus one cannot exist without the other.  Such a 
consciousness could not be given empirically for even though one can take one‘s 
self as an object: taking one‘s self as an object is an experience which requires an a 
priori synthesis of impression and therefore requires a unified consciousness as a 
condition of its own possibility.  For Kant, there must be then a ―pure original 
unchangeable consciousness‖ (A107) or self.  Thus, Kant introduces the ‗original 
and synthetic Transcendental Unity of Apperception: 
 
It must be possible for the ‗I think‘ to accompany all my 
representations; for otherwise something would be represented 
in me which could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to 
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saying that the representation would be impossible, or at least, 
nothing to me. (B131-2) 
 
Here, Kant appears to be saying that in order for ‗I‘ to experience objects it must be 
possible that my consciousness is not only unified but also that I have some 
awareness of this unity.  ‗I‘ could recognise them as ‗mine‘, that is to recognise a 
unified consciousness as their condition of possibility.  It seems that it is not that 
one has to actually to reflect in such a way every time one sees something, in order 
to be able to say ‗I‘ am experiencing this or seeing that object, but that it must at 
least be possible to do so.  
 
The Transcendental Unity of Apperception is synthetic and a priori, since it 
is necessary to the condition of experience.   It is synthetic for it presupposes the 
possibility of synthesis between two objects or representations (B134).  Kant calls it 
pure apperception or original apperception because it not empirical, rather it is the 
form that the subject‘s relationship to the objective world must take.  Kant on 
occasion refers to the Transcendental Unity of Apperception as the ―transcendental 
unity of self-consciousness‖ (B132) to show that it is universal a priori condition of 
the possibility of knowledge.  This is ensured by the fact that all my representations 
must be able to belong to a unified self-consciousness, that is, ‗my‘ self-
consciousness.  If this were not the case there would be no ‗experience‘ or 
‗consciousness‘ at all.  
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Kant goes on to say something about how his position differs from 
Descartes.  Since transcendental apperception, because it is transcendental, is a 
formal unity, the unity of representations available to the ‗I think‘, it excludes 
knowledge of any particular representation.  Transcendental apperception could not 
be equated with the self as material or immaterial substance, since these substantial 
selves are phenomenal, part of the world of experience.  They involve intuitions 
unavailable to the ‗I think‘ in its formal sense.  Rather the ‗I think‘ is a condition of 
their possibility.  As Kant states:  
 
This principle [transcendental apperception] is not, however, to 
be taken as applying to every possible understanding, but only to 
that understanding through whose pure apperception, in the 
representation ‗I am‘, nothing manifold is given. An 
understanding which through its self-consciousness could supply 
itself to itself the manifold of intuition - an understanding, that is 
to say, through whose representation the objects of 
representation should at the same time exist- would not require, 
for the unity of consciousness, a special act of synthesis of the 
manifold.  For the human understanding, however, which thinks 
only, and does not intuit, that act is necessary. (B139) 
 
I shall now turn in more detail to Kant‘s critique of Descartes conception of the self 
as outlined in the Paralogisms. 
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The Paralogisms 
 
In the Paralogisms (paralogisms means invalid syllogism) Kant is attacking 
Descartes‘ Metaphysics - here renamed that of the ‗Rational Psychologist‘.  He 
attacks four tenets of this metaphysics: 
A) The view that the self is a substance. 
B) The view that this substance is indivisible. 
C) The view that this substance is a person (and thus has self-consciousness 
over time). 
D) The view that this person‘s mind is independent of its body. 
 
Here I will be primarily concerned with the first paralogism: the claim that the self 
is a substance. 
 
Rational Psychology, or Cartesian Philosophy, according to Kant, must 
ground itself on the cogito - the ‗I think‘, it is its ‗sole text‘ (B401).  And because 
the ‗I think‘ is non-empirical, Cartesian Philosophy is therefore attempting to 
answer the question ‗What is the constitution of a thing which thinks?‘ (A398) on a 
priori grounds.  According to Kant, the Rational Psychologist‘s reasoning behind 
the view that the subject is substance is as follows: 
 
That which is the subject of a judgement and cannot be 
predicated of anything else is substance.  2  I as a thinking being 
am always the subject of my thoughts.  3  Therefore I am a 
substance. (Gardner, 1999, p.225). 
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The logic of the Rational Psychologist‘s argument is compelling.  The 
subject or ‗I‘ is only something of which things are predicated - I think, I feel, I am 
and so on.  So it is correct that the ‗I‘ must be viewed as the subject of thought.  But, 
according to Kant, there is a flaw. There is equivocation on the notion of substance. 
As Kant points out, the ‗I‘ occupying the category of ‗subject‘ in any judgement 
should only be regarded in a logical sense. It makes no claim about such a subject 
as a thing.   It is a statement about the formal conditions of thought, what needs to 
be in place for thinking to be possible, it does not claim that there is a real 
underlying substance or object or thing that is ‗the subject‘. 
 
Descartes believes that our knowledge of ourselves as substance with 
permanence is given a priori. ‗I‘ is a subject, therefore a substance, and a substance 
is something that has permanence. Kant‘s argument rests on a claim about concept 
application.  Simply being a subject, experiencing one‘s thoughts or thinking is not 
enough to provide us with knowledge of this subject as a thing, as an object, a 
substance in that sense.  Thus, Gardner states: 
 
The rational psychologist‘s conclusion would be justified…if 
and only if the concept of substance were employed in 
synthesising the ‗I‘.  But all that is involved in synthesising the 
self is the ‗I think‘, transcendental apperception.  And 
transcendental apperception is a condition for application of the 
concept of substance…not conditional upon it. (Gardner, 1999, 
p.225-226) 
 
54 
 
The ‗I-think‘ is purely formal; the necessary conditions for the application of the 
concept of substance, but is itself a substance.  In short the mistake made by the 
Rational Psychologist is to read premise one ‗That which is the subject of a 
judgement cannot be predicated of anything else is substance‘ as stating that the 
subject (S) actually exists and therefore we can assume that S is a substance.  For 
Kant, Descartes was simply making a ‗category mistake‘ by assuming that by 
definition the ‗I think‘ had to be a substance.   
 
For Kant, although we know that the role of subject has to be occupied for 
experience to be possible, we know nothing about what it is that fulfils this role. 
Consequently speculations about whether what fulfils this role is material or 
immaterial cannot be entered into. 
 
Heidegger’s Critique of Kant 
 
Heidegger‘s attitude to Kant‘s philosophy is far more ambivalent than his 
view of Descartes in the previous chapter.  Whereas Heidegger appears simply to 
separate or demarcate his own philosophy from Descartes, his attitude towards Kant 
is one of both demarcation and appropriation.  Heidegger rejects what he disagrees 
with and incorporates those parts he agrees with into his own philosophy. 
 
The first of the ‗appropriations‘ I will outline concerns Heidegger‘s 
realignment of Kant‘s project in his Critique.  Heidegger attempts to align Kant‘s 
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project with his own project on fundamental ontology in which he has the 
beginnings of an answer to the question ‗What is Being?‘  Heidegger differs from 
contemporaries such as Cassirer by situating Kant as writing about the field of 
metaphysica generalis which is concerned with ontology and not metaphysica 
specialis which is concerned with rational theology, rational cosmology and rational 
psychology.  Kant is concerned with the possibility of ontology and his arguments 
about the possibility of experience, of consciousness, and of the subject are simply 
instrumental to this goal: 
 
The intention of the Critique of Pure Reason, therefore, remains 
fundamentally misunderstood, if it is interpreted as a ―theory of 
experience‖ or even as a theory of the positive sciences.  The 
Critique of Pure Reason has nothing to do with a ―theory of 
knowledge‖.  If one generally could allow the interpretation of 
the Critique of Pure Reason as a theory of knowledge, then that 
would be to say that it is not a theory of ontic knowledge 
(experience), but rather a theory of ontological knowledge.  But 
even with this conception, already far removed from the 
prevailing interpretation of the Transcendental Aesthetic and 
Analytic, we have not encountered what is essential, namely that 
ontology as Metaphysica Generalis, i.e., as the basic part 
[Grundstuck] of metaphysics as whole, is grounded [begrundet]. 
And here for the first time it is seen for what it is.  With the 
problem of transcendence, a ―theory of knowledge‖ is not set in 
place of metaphysics, but rather the inner possibility of ontology 
is questioned. (KPM, p.11) 
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Heidegger is recasting Kant as an ‗ontologist‘ similar to Heidegger himself by 
asking ‗How is General Ontology Possible?‘  According to Heidegger, Kant‘s 
search for the conditions of experience and knowledge should be viewed as a search 
for answers to the question of how knowledge or experience in general is possible, 
but not as giving a theory of knowledge.  This was in conflict with the Marburg 
school of Neo-Kantianism, a school of thought largely formulated by Ernst Cassirer 
that does hold Kant‘s Critique to have produced a theory of knowledge. Thus 
Heidegger sees Kant as having begun the project of fundamental ontology. I will 
now go on outline Heidegger‘s treatment of Kant‘s a priori. 
 
Heidegger and Kant’s A Priori 
 
In the footnotes of Being and Time, whilst paying a rare tribute to his former 
mentor Edmund Husserl, Heidegger makes the following statement about the a 
priori: 
 
But to disclose the a priori is not to make an ‗a-prioristic‘ 
construction.  Edmund Husserl has not only enabled us to 
understand once more the meaning of any genuine philosophical 
empiricism; he has also given us the necessary tools. ‗A-
priorism‘ is the method of every scientific philosophy that 
understands itself.  There is nothing constructivistic about it. 
(BT: 50 ft x) 
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It is informative that along with intentionality, Heidegger credits the discovery of 
the a priori to Husserl.  Heidegger must have been aware that Kant had introduced 
the a priori in the Critique, and Heidegger‘s talk of the a priori as a method 
belonging ―to every scientific philosophy that understands itself‖ seems to suggest 
that the a priori in its transcendental or Kantian reformulation is necessary to 
phenomenology.   And yet Heidegger seems to want avoid associating the a priori 
with Kant.  In History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena (originally given in 
1925) Heidegger defines the a priori in Kant: 
 
The a priori in Kant‘s sense is a feature of the subjective sphere.  
The coupling of the a priori with subjectivity became especially 
pertinacious through Kant, who joined the question of the a 
priori with his specific epistemological inquiry and asked, in 
reference to a particular a priori comportment, that of synthetic a 
priori judgements, whether and how they have transcendent 
validity. (HCT, p.73-74) 
 
For Heidegger, the a priori is not simply something to do with the conditions of 
possibility for experience or knowledge, all of which are ontic claims, to do with 
‗the subject‘. ―Against this, phenomenology has shown that the a priori is not 
limited to subjectivity, indeed that in the first instance it has primarily nothing to at 
all to do with subjectivity.‖ (HCT, p.74). 
 
To what then, would Heidegger apply the a priori?  Heidegger goes on to 
argue that phenomenology, if it is to do any work, must be the ―…analytic 
description of intentionality in its a priori.‖ (HCT, p.79).  Since phenomenology is 
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the only way to conduct ontology for Heidegger, phenomenology must be a 
description of our understanding of entities, that is our ‗being towards‘ entities, or 
intentionality, therefore intentionality must be a priori.  
 
The issue of phenomenology and the role and status of intentionality and a 
priori will be further discussed in the next chapter on Husserl and in chapter four on 
Heidegger.  Heidegger contra Kant does not consider or at least does not primarily 
consider subjectivity a priori.  His claim is that there is something upon which the 
project of phenomenology rests that is a priori and is more fundamental than the 
subject.  It rests instead on Dasein, which is not a subject but something which is 
prior to or beyond the subject; hence the a priori and subjectivity are divorced from 
each other. Dasein, with its ek-stasis, is put in place of the subject.  For Heidegger, 
Dasein constitutes the ‗something more fundamental‘ upon which phenomenology 
is based.  
 
Heidegger approaches Kant in Being and Time, and his remarks are both 
positive and negative.  He applauds Kant for beginning the investigation into 
temporality, indeed Heidegger believes Kant to be the first philosopher to take this 
issue seriously, but ultimately he feels that Kant ―shrinks back‖ from the task (BT: 
23).  In Heidegger‘s view Kant‘s allegiance to the philosophical methods of his time 
- the need for ‗deduction‘ meant that he never quite grasped the link between 
Dasein and temporality.  Instead, Kant emphasised time and space, and of course, 
he believed in the Enlightenment notion of deduction: the belief that logical 
argument will lead us to the truth of the matter.   Heidegger, on the other hand, only 
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emphasises time and believes in the ‗reduction‘ or the ‗leading back‘.  Instead of 
logically deducing his argument, Heidegger shows how ‗world‘, ‗selfhood‘ and 
‗temporality‘ all lead back to Dasein, and Dasein‟s existence ensures their 
ontological possibility.  In attributing the notion of the a priori to Husserl rather 
than to Kant, Heidegger may well having been trying to distance his work from 
Kant‘s transcendental philosophy. However, it could be argued that the very notion 
of the transcendental (as opposed to the transcendent) does not go against the idea 
of Being-in-the-World.  Indeed, at one point, early on in Being and Time, Heidegger 
states: ―Every disclosure of Being as transcendens is transcendental knowledge. 
Phenomenological truth (the disclosedness of Being) is veritas transcendentalis.‖ 
(BT: 38). 
 
Heidegger objects to the Kantian idea of the ‗I am‘, as the transcendental 
ground.  I think Heidegger was wrong to dismiss the notion of the transcendental in 
the Kantian sense, which is something he most certainly did. I will suggest that 
Heidegger needs the notion of the transcendental ground to develop of his notion of 
Dasein, even if he radically reinvents the idea of ground.  I will look at this in 
chapter four.  
Heidegger and the Kantian Subject 
 
Heidegger treated both Descartes and Kant as though each was guilty of 
endorsing the substantiality conception of the subject - that the subject qua self is a 
substance, and for the same reasons.  Descartes certainly held this view, but one can 
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argue that Kant‘s view of the subject is not so clear.  Heidegger seems to conflate 
the metaphysical and transcendental as if there were no difference between them. In 
Basic Problems wherever he mention Descartes, he almost always mention Kant in 
the same sentence.   For example: ―Kant presupposes these basic ontological theses 
of Descartes without further ado.‖ (BP, p.148).  What is it about the concept of 
subjectivity in modern philosophy that Heidegger is so opposed to? To understand 
Heidegger‘s view we must return to look at Being and Time when he first launches 
his attack on Kant. 
 
Heidegger‘s main critique of Kant‘s conception of the subject is as follows: 
despite his best effects to avoid a substance based conception of the subject, one 
certainly held by Descartes, Kant never quite escapes it.  Kant simply ―…shows that 
the ontic theses about the soul-substances inferred from specific characteristics 
[simplicity, substantiality, personality] are without justification.‖ (BT: 318). 
 
For Heidegger, Kant has simply shown that Descartes‘ attribution of specific 
characteristics to the substance which is the ‗I‘ is wrong, but Kant has not shown 
that the idea of the substantiality of the subject is in itself wrong.  Indeed, 
Heidegger believes that Kant adopts the substance view of the subject when he 
―…slips back into the same inappropriate ontology of the substantial, whose ontic 
foundations he has theoretically denied to the I.‖ (BT: 18-9). 
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The idea of Kant endorsing the substantiality of the subject in his discussion 
of the ‗I think‘ seems to sit at odds with his explicit criticisms of Descartes in the 
Paralogisms, so how does Heidegger make such a charge stick? 
 
Firstly, Heidegger reminds us that the transcendental unity of apperception, 
or the ‗Kantian I think‘ is the basis or ground for us being able to experience the 
world. Moreover, the ‗I think‘ is conceived by Heidegger in terms of mental 
representation, in a way that parallels his reading of the Cartesian ‗cogito‘. Thus 
transcendental apperception forms ―…the ultimate ground of our relation to entities, 
a relation Kant still conceives in terms of mental representation.‖ (Carman, 2003, p. 
303).  It is both the idea of transcendental apperception as grounding and the ‗I 
think‘ as representing an object to thought to which Heidegger objects.   
 
As far as Heidegger was concerned, for Kant, the ‗I think‘, is a subject, 
something that always underlies – hupokeimenon.  Heidegger‘s use of the Greek 
term hupokeimenon is significant. It means underlying ground, or simply ground.  
Its Latin equivalent is substantia from which we derive the English term substance. 
For Kant (unlike Descartes) the ‗I‘ might not be something given in empirical 
intuition.  However, when Heidegger argues that Kant‘s ‗I‘ is a hupokeimenon, 
something which underlies, or supports and unifies its attributes, his claim is that 
Kant endorses substantiality, just like Descartes.  
 
Kant fundamentally retains Descartes definition [of the subject].  
As essential as Kant‘s own investigations in the ontological 
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interpretation of subjectivity have been and forever remain the I, 
the ego, is for him, as for Descartes, res cogitans, res, something 
that thinks, i.e., represents, perceives, judges, affirms, 
denies…and the like. (BP, p.177) 
 
Heidegger continues his critique of the Kantian subject with an analysis of the 
Refutation of Idealism.  Heidegger points out, that when Kant starts the refutation 
from the ‗Consciousness of my existence‘ what Kant means is the consciousness of 
my being, res cogitans, or a thinking thing in Cartesian sense. Kant simply did not 
escape the Cartesian baggage of substantiality. However, Heidegger does make one 
concession to Kant in the following line: 
 
… he [Kant] has denied that the ontical foundations of the 
ontology of the substantial apply to the ―I‖ (BT: 319) 
 
Heidegger is implying that Kant does see the incoherence of Descartes‘ idea of 
simply equating the individual or particular ‗I‘, such as ‗I, Michael‘ with a 
substance, known a priori.  However, Kant has only avoided equating a subject 
with a substance on the ontic or individual level.  On the general or ontological 
level however, that is, the ‗I‘ qua human beings in general, Heidegger maintains 
that Kant still takes transcendental apperception, the ‗I think‘ as ―substantial‖ (BT: 
320-1).  Heidegger‘s point is that Kant like Descartes still regards the general or 
ontological ‗I-think‘ as a substance since it is that which grounds the form for the 
possibility of experience.  It is that which provides such grounding is ‗something‘. 
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Are Heidegger‘s criticisms of Kant, in fact justified?  One point to make 
here is that Heidegger seems to run together discussions of the self or the subject 
that are kept distinct in Kant.  The Refutation of Idealism starts with our empirical 
self, as encountered in our stream of consciousness.  This is not the ‗I think‘ which 
forms a transcendental condition of experience.  Rather the ‗I think‘ is a condition 
of our encountering such an empirical self.  Kant also discusses the ‗noumenal‘ self, 
about which we can have no knowledge, but which we need to assume if we are to 
make sense of the moral law. The need to assume such a ‗noumenal self‘ only 
becomes absolutely necessary in Kant‘s works on morality.  In Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology, Heidegger evidences that he is not just working from the Critique 
and that he is aware of a Kantian self that is: ―…immanent in its own thinking 
activity as a kind of ever-present normative guide or governing agency.‖ (Carman, 
2003, p.307). It is something which ―…informs my actions and thoughts by 
legislating the norms according to which I conduct myself at all times.‖ (Carman, 
2003, p.306).   Thus Heidegger maintains that Kant simply rejects the: 
 
res cogitans as an intuitable object in consciousness and then 
reinstating it as the self-legislating agency immanent in free 
thought and action as such.  The self thus retains a kind of 
abiding presence to itself, not as a thing with properties but as a 
normative guide constantly informing its own cognitive and 
practical behaviour. (Carman, 2003, p.306) 
 
For Heidegger, Kant has simply rejected one unsatisfactory picture, that of the 
cogito, and replaced it with an equally unsatisfactory picture with his ‗I think‘ as 
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something present to itself.  Although Heidegger is rightly criticising the 
assumption of such a noumenal self he has not necessarily shown problems with the 
transcendental unity of apperception. For Kant, it is this, rather than the noumenal 
or empirical self that is a necessary condition of experience. 
  
Subjectivity and Singularity 
 
In the Paralogisms Kant seems to address explicitly Heidegger‘s criticism 
that the ‗I think‘ as a precondition of experience is a thinking ‗thing‘ in the 
Cartesian sense of that term. 
 
Kant‘s argument is that thinkers such as Descartes have made a fundamental 
error in that they have mistaken the ‗I-think,‘ a formal condition of thought, for 
knowledge of the self, with empirical knowledge of one‘s self. The Rational 
Psychologist has conflated substance with self; by equating these two entities he has 
come to the conclusion that one has knowledge of oneself as a thing or object.  As 
Kant states: 
 
The identity of the consciousness of myself at different times is 
therefore only a formal condition of my thoughts and their 
coherence, and in no way proves the numerical identity of the 
subject.  Despite the logical identity of the ‗I‘ such a change 
may have occurred in it as does not allow of the retention of its 
identity, and yet we may ascribe to it the same-sounding ‗I‘, 
which in every different state, even in one involving change of 
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the [thinking] subject, may still retain the thought of the 
preceding subject and hand it other to the subsequent subject. 
(A364)  
 
Kant uses the example of an elastic or rubber ball that hits another thereby 
transmitting its potential energy to it, and then to another, and another and so on.  
Similarly, one can imagine that the unity of the ‗I think‘ is retained even when there 
is no identity of things. Whether the ‗I think‘ is realised in one or many things is not 
something that we can know a priori.  From the unity of apperception we can draw 
no conclusions concerning the identity of any thing. In this sense, we cannot lay any 
claim to anything transcendentally, but a formal unity or condition of thought for 
the self, not to knowledge of the self (A365). 
 
The fact that Heidegger attributes to Kant a substantial subject grounding 
the possibility of experience, derives in part from Heidegger reading the ‗I think‘ as 
he read the cogito: as a representation of self to itself.  However, it is worth 
considering whether we need to interpret Kant‘s account in this way. Certainly Kant 
provides a deduction of the Transcendental Unity of Apperception and Heidegger is 
in disagreement with him about the need for this.  As stated above Heidegger would 
prefer a ‗reduction‘, an analysis of Dasein that can show time, self (and all 
representations that would ‗accompany‘ it in Kantian language).  Kant also talks of 
the ‗I-think‘ as an accompaniment to all our experiences.   Of course, we might read 
this (as Heidegger seems to) as reflective, as treatment of the self as an object and 
this would lead to the problems Heidegger raises.  I believe that the move to treat it 
the self as an object would be a mistake.  It is also possible to read the ‗I-think‘ as 
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reflexive, as a phenomenological awareness of the ‗mineness‘ of experience.  In this 
way it is much closer to aspects of Heidegger‘s own thinking specifically his idea of 
the self ‗dealing‘ with the world.  Whilst Heidegger might reject a deduction of a 
unified consciousness as the a priori condition of experience, the phenomenological 
‗mineness‘ seems much closer to the phenomenological a priori that he seems to 
accept.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The young Heidegger‘s relationship to Kant is a complex one.  As stated 
above, Heidegger believed that at the ontological or general level Kant was guilty of 
endorsing a substantial conception of subjectivity as a transcendental ground.  I 
have suggested this is not justifiable.  In Chapter Four I will further discuss whether 
making the transcendental unity of apperception ‗phenomenological‘ is a move 
Heidegger himself might need to endorse.  I will also return to the issue of 
Heidegger‘s replacement of the Kantian a priori with a phenomenological one. 
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Chapter Three: Husserl & Heidegger: Reduction, 
Affectivity and Subjectivity 
 
 
Introductory Remarks 
 
In the first chapter I gave an exegesis of Heidegger‘s critique of Descartes.  I 
argued against Heidegger‘s critique of Descartes‘ cogito as representationalist.  This 
critique is based on his claim that the statement cogito ergo sum should be 
understood as ‗I represent (my self), I exist.‘  Despite Heidegger‘s argument to the 
contrary, I also argued that the phrase ego cogito is not necessarily referring to 
‗Man‘; indeed ‗Man‘ seems to be have been inserted into this framework by 
Heidegger himself.  I offered an alternative interpretation of Descartes based on the 
work of Michel Henry.  For Henry, the subjectivity that the cogito ergo sum affords 
is self-affective life, in which no representationalism is involved.  This is a reading 
of Descartes that I would endorse, though not uncritically, and it will be further 
explored in the final two chapters.  At this juncture, the alternative reading of 
Descartes illustrates just one way in which Heidegger might be wrong or mistaken 
about the notion of subject, whether this means the alternative reading is indeed 
correct will be discussed later.   
 
In the second chapter, I discussed Heidegger‘s relationship to Kant.  As with 
the chapter on Descartes this was to show that Heidegger‘s attack on Kant‘s notion 
of the subject might also be wrong and it was also to raise the question of how far 
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the notion of Dasein in Heidegger differs from the concept of the subject in Kant.  I 
also intended to highlight parts of Kant‘s transcendental philosophy that have 
parallels in Heidegger‘s own philosophy.   
 
In this chapter, I shall turn to Heidegger‘s critique of Husserl.  Edmund 
Husserl is, of course, Heidegger‘s mentor.  As the ‗founder of phenomenology‘, he 
has had a great influence on Heidegger‘s thinking.  Yet, as with Descartes, 
Heidegger devotes little time to Husserl in Being and Time.  In this chapter I will 
examine Husserl‘s thought and Heidegger‘s critique of it.  My aim is to illustrate 
Heidegger‘s relation to another philosopher who, like himself, is trying to capture 
the everyday life that we live. 
 
The Two Husserls  
 
The first volume of Logical Investigations was published in 1900; following 
on from the time spent by the Early Heidegger as Husserl‘s assistant in the 1920s, 
scholarship on Husserl has continued to grow and change throughout the century.  
Thus two camps have now emerged.  The first I will refer to the ‗Standard 
Interpretation‘ camp.  This group believes that Husserl is an internalist regarding 
mental states: a philosopher of consciousness who uses a Cartesian framework.  
Indeed, the strongest exponents of this interpretation believe that despite his use of 
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Kantian terminology Husserl remained an ‗unrepentant Cartesian‘ through his 
whole philosophical career.
8
   
 
The second camp
9
 is a mix of Husserlian and Heideggerian scholars with 
varied interests.  This group includes Steven Galt Crowell as well as Lilian Alweiss 
and Søren Overgaard.  They argue against the internalist reading of Husserl.  In 
some cases they suggest that this is Heidegger‘s reading in the sense that it 
emphasises the Kantian aspects of Husserl‘s thought.  It is important to mention 
these two schools of Husserlian scholarship when attempting to give a faithful 
account of Husserl‘s Phenomenology as this always raises the question of which 
Husserl one is outlining.  The interpretation of Husserl I ultimately agree with does 
not fall neatly into either camp; for whilst I find some criticisms of Husserl‘s 
internalism or Cartesianism unfounded, this does not necessarily mean that I accept 
all of Husserl‘s Cartesian characteristics as welcome.  Nor would I ignore his 
Kantian side.  However, before presenting my own analysis, I will present the 
Husserl I believe Heidegger was reading based on his own critique. 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
  Keller, P. (1999) Husserl and Heidegger on Human Experience. Cambridge University Press.  Is 
an example of such a view. 
9
 Crowell, S, G. (2001) Husserl, Heidegger and Space of Meaning: Paths toward Transcendental 
Phenomenology. Northwestern University Press. 
Alweiss, L. (2003) The World Unclaimed: A Challenge to Heidegger's Critique of Husserl (Series in 
Continental Thought). Ohio University Press. 
Overgaard, S.(2004) Husserl and Heidegger on Being in the  World. Kluwer Academic Publishers 
are examples of the alternative view. 
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Husserl’s Transcendental Phenomenology 
 
Husserl wrote many works during a period of thirty years.  He began with 
Logical Investigations: the first volume of this was published in 1900.  He wrote 
until his death in 1938, and much previously unpublished work has appeared after 
his death.  My chronological analysis of his work starts in 1913, with the 
publication of Ideas I.  This is the point at which Husserl‘s thinking took a 
transcendental turn, and this is the aspect of his work that comes under sustained 
attack from Heidegger.  Husserl had concluded that phenomenology should enable 
us not only to describe or see ‗the essential structures of all conscious experiences 
and their intentional objects‘.  It should also enable us to describe or see ―the 
rootedness of these essences in a transcendental realm and in the transcendental ego 
as their ―absolute source‖. ‖   (Moran, 2000, p.125). 
 
The fact that I am seeing a computer is self-evident, it is a conscious 
experience I am having now, but this is not Husserl‘s main question.  His main task 
is not to simply delineate experience in terms of what it is but rather to determine 
how such experience is possible. How is it possible that I am having this experience 
of the computer? As Husserl now conceives it, phenomenology should not only 
allow the practitioner to describe the infamous ‗things themselves‘ or the essence of 
things, it should explain the how of the thing‘s existence.  Husserl asks: what are the 
grounds of existence?  This ground must be found in the transcendental realm.  This 
is what Husserl called the question of constitution: determining how the world 
appears as an object of possible experience.  Or, as Søren Overgaard states: 
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Husserl, in other words, wants to understand how the world and 
worldly entities come to be given in our experience, a question 
that he identifies with the question concerning the constitution 
of the objects.  The world does exist, it is revealed to us in our 
experiences, but we need to understand how this can be so.  That 
our experience of the world is beyond all reasonable doubt does 
not entail that we already understand how our experiences 
―perform‖ this, how they can present an existing world, with 
existing objects to us… (Overgaard, 2004, p.36) 
 
The question of constitution or determining the ‗how‘ of experience becomes the 
fundamental task of phenomenology.   Husserl now needed to find the method for 
answering this question.  
 
The Search for the Phenomenological Method 
 
What is called for is a scientific method that would explain the nature of 
experience.  How is it possible to have experiences such as those described above?  
No one disputes the need for some method.   However one might object that a 
perfectly good scientific method for determining the ‗how‘ of experience exists and 
is to be found in the ‗non-phenomenological‘ sciences such as physics, biology, 
chemistry and mathematics.  For example, we know that wine goes off because it 
reacts with oxygen for too long, or that objects are pulled to the ground by gravity.  
We do not need phenomenology to help us here.  Neurophysiology and cognitive 
science have an explanation for why we experience the world the way we do.  This 
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explanation describes the nature of experience without reference to phenomenology.  
In view of this we might, ask why is transcendental phenomenology necessary? 
 
According to one of Husserl‘s supporters, Eugen Fink, we need Husserl‘s 
phenomenology because it is not primarily concerned with the constitution of 
particular objects such as sour wine.  As stated above, it must be remembered that 
Husserlian phenomenology is concerned with the constitution of the world; it offers 
explanations not just for particular kinds of experience but for how experience is 
possible at all.  Whilst Husserl believes phenomenology to be a science, this does 
not mean that he views the other sciences as failing, or that phenomenology is 
necessary to connect all the sciences together, thereby creating one science.  
However, he does view phenomenology as the foundation for all the sciences.  A 
phenomenological science is needed as a foundation for all the sciences because 
whilst each science will explain how particular objects exist (including the world), 
none will explain how the world exists for us, how does it appear at all.  No science 
will explain how I can experience ‗wine‘ as a thing to be experienced, and how such 
a phenomena can appear ‗sour‘ or ‗gone off‘ to me at all. Science can explain why 
wine goes off, but how it is that wine appears to me as ‗sour‘, only phenomenology 
can do this.  I shall now outline the method of phenomenology: the transcendental 
reduction. 
 
Husserl ‗discovered‘ the transcendental reduction in 1901 whilst he was 
studying Locke, Leibniz, Hume, Berkeley, Kant, Fichte and Mach; this was shortly 
after the publication of Logical Investigations. Husserl had already identified 
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Descartes as the one who discovered the transcendental sphere. The method of 
Cartesian doubt influenced his formulation of reduction in terms of the suspension 
of actuality or the epoché.  Husserl considered that Descartes had covered up or 
failed to understand the importance of the transcendental for arriving at the truth of 
the cogito.  In Husserl‘s view this meant that Descartes had simply agreed with 
scholastics about the status of the ‗I‘ as a metaphysical substance, a thinking thing.   
Husserl turned to Hume whom he considered as the first proper transcendental 
philosopher.  Husserl found in Hume someone who had understood and applied the 
idea of the Cartesian transcendental ego by taking it to its logical conclusion.  
Hume‘s argument was that he found the position of the sceptic to be ultimately 
untenable with a problem such as the existence of the external world; yet at the 
same time there is no justification for believing that the world actually exists.  By 
arriving at this formulation Hume had anticipated and applied what Husserl called 
the epoché - the suspension of our ‗natural attitude‘, that is, our ordinary way of 
experiencing the world.   
 
For Husserl, phenomenology must be without presuppositions but it has to 
start with the world.  As he learnt from Hume, to deny that you are at least 
experiencing a world is senseless when it presented to you.  But one can suspend, 
that is to say hold back on any judgement about whether the world actually exists.
10
  
Thus Phenomenology remains true to the requirement of being a pure science 
without presuppositions.  Husserl‘s transcendental turn brings him into discussion 
with Kant.  Like Kant he is involved in a project that aims to provide the conditions 
                                                 
10
 Husserl famous „principle of principles‟ Ideas I p.24 
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of possibility for knowledge, but unlike Kant ―Husserl‘s concern was not so much 
with the constitution of objectivity, as with the constitution of the world…‖ (Moran, 
2000, p.61). 
 
Husserl rejected Kant‘s conception of ‗the thing itself‘ as something 
unknowable.  For Husserl, all that appears to consciousness is all that there could 
possibly be, ‗reality‘ is as it appears to consciousness. I have outlined Husserl‘s 
route to discovering the transcendental reduction.  It is important to understand 
Husserl‘s own reading of philosophy in order to appreciate the significance the 
transcendental reduction had for him as a necessary basis for phenomenology.  
Phenomenology must be without presuppositions if it to be a ‗rigorous‘ science.  
Since nothing may be assumed, whatever method is employed, and whatever results 
from this particular application there can be no claims made about the actuality of 
objects as they appear to consciousness.  Also, as stated above, Husserl wants not 
only to describe the essence of particular conscious experiences, but also to describe 
consciousness itself.  I will now go through the epoché and the transcendental 
reduction.   
 
The Epoché 
 
Since the natural sciences will not give us ‗the things themselves‘ the 
transcendental reduction is necessary.  The performance of the epoché is part of that 
reduction. Husserl offered different characterisations of the epoché throughout his 
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career, consequently philosophers differ as to how Husserl‘s ideas on the epoché 
should be read.  For example, what is the role of the epoché?  Husserl recognised 
that the ‗natural facts‘ discovered by science form the metaphysical and 
epistemological assumptions with which we approach the world: Husserl called this 
the natural attitude.  He now needed some method of ensuring that such beliefs do 
not play a part in constitutive phenomenology.  Husserl begins to explain the new 
method of the epoché in Ideas I: 
 
We put out of action the general thesis which belongs to the 
essence of the natural standpoint, we place in brackets whatever 
it includes respecting the nature of Being: this entire natural 
world therefore which is continually ―there for us‖, ―present to 
our hand‖ and will ever remain there, is a ―fact-world‖ of which 
we continue to be conscious, even though it pleases us to put it 
in brackets.  (Ideas I, p.110) 
 
As Søren Overgaard points out, ―Few philosophical notions are as controversial as 
Husserl‘s ‗epoché‘ ‖ (Overgaard, 2004, p.42) and it is has been prone to much 
misinterpretation.  This misinterpretation arises from an overemphasis being placed 
on the similarity between Husserl‘s concept of the epoché and Descartes‘ method of 
doubt.  This similarity is all too easily made by Husserl‘s use of the world 
Ausschaltung (German for ―switching off‖).  It is as if one were ―switching off‖ the 
world in the same way one switches off a CD player: the music has stopped and it is 
no longer there.  Husserl‘s own comparisons between his method and Descartes 
method do not help and Husserl does make many, although there is a question as to 
how far Husserl wanted to take this comparison.  For example, ―We can now let the 
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universal epoché in the sharply defined novel sense we have given it step into the 
place of Cartesian doubt.‖ (Ideas I, p.110).  Or from Cartesian Meditations, where 
he aligns his project with Descartes‘: 
 
As one who is meditating in the Cartesian manner, what can I do 
with the transcendental ego philosophically?  Certainly his being 
is, for me, prior in the order of knowledge to all Objective being: 
in a certain sense he is the underlying basis on which all 
Objective cognition takes place.  But can this priority rightly 
signify that the transcendental ego is, in the usual sense, the 
knowledge-basis on which all Objective knowledge is grounded? 
Not that we intend to abandon the great Cartesian thought of 
attempting to find in transcendental subjectivity the deepest 
grounding of all sciences and even of the being of an Objective 
world.  If we were to abandon that thought, we should not be 
following Cartesian paths of mediation at all; our divergences 
would be more than modifications prompted by criticism.  But 
perhaps, with the Cartesian discovery of the transcendental ego, 
a new idea of the grounding of knowledge also becomes 
disclosed: the idea of it as a transcendental grounding. (CM, 
p.27) 
 
Despite all this it would be inaccurate to assume that Husserl‘s argument is simply 
Cartesian.  Broadly speaking, there are two readings of the epoché which are based 
on an overly Cartesian reading of Husserl.  The first claims that in performing the 
epoché, Husserl rejects the existence of the world:  
 
The epoché is a unique reduction over against every other.  To 
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underscore its radicality, Husserl says that the epoché 
―annihilates‖ the world.  After affecting this reduction, the world 
is no longer there for us as it was in the natural attitude; strictly 
speaking, it no longer exists. (Brainard, 2002, p.69) 
 
This is simply not true as the beginning of the quote from Ideas I given at the 
beginning of this section clearly states, ―…this entire natural world therefore which 
is continually ―there for us‖, ―present to our hand‖, and will ever remain there, is a 
―fact-world‖ of which we continue to be conscious, even though it pleases us to put 
it in brackets.‖ (Ideas I, p.110).  Husserl elaborates: 
 
I do not then deny this ―world‖, as though I were a sophist, I do 
not doubt that it is there as though I were a sceptic; but I use the 
―phenomenological‖  reduction , which completely bars me 
from using any judgment that concerns spatio-temporal 
existence (Dasein). (Ideas I, p.110-111) 
 
However, Husserl‘s attempt to clear up the matter and defend himself against 
Cartesian scepticism leaves him open to attack from another argument, that by 
‗suspending judgement‘ he does not deny the existence of the world, but he does 
deny belief in the existence of the world. Husserl is not saying that by bracketing 
one denies the existence of the natural world.  For methodological reasons, ‗the 
world‘ is ‗excluded‘ or ‗ignored‘, and yet even the idea of a denial of belief seems 
counterintuitive to some.  What then, is the best way to understand the epoché? 
 
The best way to understand the epoché is to focus on the idea of bracketing: 
bracketing is to parenthesise, to put aside, it is not to deny.  As such once the epoché 
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is performed, the world does not cease to exist, nor does our belief in it.   One does 
not ‗bracket‘ or ‗lock up‘ the world‘s existence, this is not the point of the 
annihilation. It is to deny that one can constitute the phenomenological world on 
those grounds, using those beliefs.  One does not deny the beliefs of the ‗natural 
attitude‘, they simply cannot do the job of constituting the world as a 
phenomenology would describe it, they cannot describe the ‗how‘.  Marcus 
Brainard states: ―However, the target of the reduction is primarily not the spatio 
temporally, psychophysically or physicalistically existent world, not some thing-in-
itself, but rather the thesis of or the belief in the Being of the natural world.‖ 
(Brainard, 2002, p.69). 
 
In this way there is a similarity between Husserl‘s epoché and Hume‘s 
argument for the external world.  If Husserl is to be associated with anybody it 
should be Hume and not Descartes.  As Lilian Alweiss points out in her book The 
World Unclaimed: A Challenge to Heidegger‟s Critique of Husserl (2003) just as 
Hume can neither deny scepticism nor justify his beliefs, ―Husserl argues that true 
skepticism does not doubt the world but our capacity to judge whether or not there 
is a world.‖ (Alweiss, 2003, p.16), or least whether there is a world that is 
phenomenologically justified.  Having performed the epoché, Husserl now has to 
explain exactly what is placed ‗in the brackets‘ and this requires the transcendental 
reduction. 
 
Before I go on to explain what Husserl considered as the function of the 
reduction there is the possible confusion left by the epoché that needs to be cleared 
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up.  This confusion is caused by the idea that following the epoché, whatever is 
‗discovered‘ by the transcendental reduction is that which is ‗left outside of the 
brackets‘. There is a misconception that after we have bracketed all our assumptions 
based on science or ‗common sense‘ we have found or ‗discovered‘ the proper area 
of study: the ‗non-bracketed‘ or transcendental subjectivity.  As Overgaard points 
out, ―[I]n a way this is quite correct.  However, I believe that there are some 
important qualifications that we need to make, in order to truly understand what 
Husserl‘s so-called transcendental reduction is, and by implication, what Husserl‘s 
project is…‖(Overgaard, 2004, p.47). 
 
The first qualification that must be made is that we need to be wary of a 
phrase such ‗that which is left outside the brackets‘.  It is true that in Ideas I, 
Husserl saw the epoché as ‗annihilating the world‘ but he came to see this 
manoeuvre as problematic, since it presents one with a conception of subjectivity 
where subjectivity is cut off from the world.  It would be a mistake to draw a close 
comparison between Descartes and Husserl on this issue.  For Husserl, the epoché 
does not remove the world from the picture.  The epoché: 
 
…places the world (and the entities belonging to it) where it 
belongs, viz. in the center of our research, and as that which has 
to be explained…As that explanandum, it must never be lost 
sight of, it must continue, to guide us as, so to speak, that upon 
which we must aim.  Therefore we are not left simply with 
whatever escapes the brackets; we will always be left with what 
is in the brackets as well. (Overgaard, 2004, p 48). 
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Secondly, it cannot be over-emphasised that Husserl‘s phenomenology is not based 
on introspection.  For Husserl, all phenomenological investigations involve the 
world.  Forgetting the world and describing one‘s ‗inner experiences‘ does not 
make one a phenomenologist, such a manoeuvre would contravene Husserl‘s 
principle of phenomenology as that which constitutes the world.  
 
Thirdly, as Søren Ovegaard points out, ―one should not over-emphasise the 
reflective character of Husserl‘s phenomenology‖ (Overgaard, 2004, p.49).  It is not 
the case that Husserl‘s phenomenology is non-reflective, it is simply that one should 
distinguish transcendental reflection (which of course is not a reflection based on 
introspection) from natural reflection as being of a different character.  As 
bracketed, the world appears differently, it is still present to us, but we reflect on it 
in a different way than we would in the natural attitude - if we would reflect on it at 
all: since in the natural attitude one is meant to accept scientific assumptions.  As 
bracketed ―the world‖ is no longer reflected upon naively, it is simply accepted for 
what it is. Rather, we reflect on our beliefs aware that they are just beliefs about the 
world and have no more validity than would a different set of beliefs.   
 
Finally, there is one possible misunderstanding that must be avoided before 
we are in a position to say exactly what the transcendental reduction is doing.  The 
transcendental ego, constituted by the transcendental reduction is not something that 
comes into existence after the epoché and the transcendental reduction is performed. 
Whilst it is correct to distinguish between a ―pre-transcendental‖ attitude whilst 
working within the natural attitude and transcendental attitude after the epoché, it 
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would be wrong to look at the epoché as a kind of baptism where one becomes. 
Transcendental subjectivity always exists as long as there is a world to appear to it, 
and yet in a sense we are ―made aware‖ of our transcendental nature by the 
reduction. It may help if we look at the original Latin meaning of reduction. 
‗Reduction‘, means ‗to lead back‘ - from the Latin reducere.  Thus, in performing a 
transcendental reduction, just as one might walk back down the street to get home, 
back to where one belongs, Husserl is trying to go back to the essence of things.  
Since the reduction is transcendental, this means the essence of oneself as a 
transcendental subject.  As Husserl states: 
 
Transcendental subjectivity, which is inquired into in the 
transcendental problem….is none other than again ―I myself‖ 
and ―we ourselves‖; not, however, as found in the everyday 
natural attitude, or of positive science - i.e., apperceived as 
components of the objectively present world before us - but 
rather as subjects of conscious life - in which this world and all 
that is present - for ―us‖ - ―makes‖ itself through certain 
apperceptions (Husserl in Overgaard, 2004 p.46). 
 
Thus ‗we‘ are transcendental subjects all along, the reduction simply revealed our 
nature as transcendental subjects, so what is the nature of transcendental 
subjectivity? 
 
 
 
 
82 
 
Transcendental Subjectivity 
 
We are now in a position to elucidate the nature of transcendental 
subjectivity, as Husserl saw it.  I will be focussing on the most important aspect of 
transcendental subjectivity, the concept of intentionality.   
 
From the beginning Husserl has argued that his phenomenological 
investigations will reveal the essence of consciousness as that which belongs to 
transcendental subjectivity and is the essence of the cogito.  Now the reduction has 
been performed he can reveal that essence as intentionality.  Intentionality is the 
idea that all consciousness is consciousness-of something: 
 
We understood under Intentionality the unique peculiarity of 
experiences to be the consciousness of something.  (Ideas I, 
p.242) 
 
One is always conscious of something, yet this ‗something‘ that is the ‗object‘ of 
consciousness can be real (or actual) or potential, in the sense there are intentional 
acts that could be performed, ‗objects‘ that could become the ‗object‘ of intentional 
analysis:  
 
Husserl takes the term ―consciousness‖ to cover the sphere of 
the ―cogito‖ in the Cartesian sense of the term: I think, I 
understand, I conceive, I deny, I want, I do not want, I imagine, 
etc.  The characteristic that necessarily belongs to the sphere of 
consciousness -both actual (attentive) and potential (the whole 
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sphere of consciousness‘s possible acts, without which actual 
consciousness would be unthinkable)-is to be always 
―consciousness of something.‖  Every perception is perception 
of the ―perceived‖; every desire is desire of the ―desired,‖ etc.  
Husserl calls this fundamental property of consciousness 
intentionality (Levinas, 1998, p13). 
 
With intentionality, Husserl is able to break with Descartes because Husserl is 
laying grounds for the absolute ego, that is the transcendental ego or the ‗I think‘ in 
defining its essence as always conscious of something.  In so doing Husserl has 
definitely broken with Descartes whose methodological scepticism never allowed 
him to make such a move.  For Husserl, the cogito is not a substance, and is not, 
indeed cannot, be separate or separated from the world.  As Gaston Berger states in 
his work The Cogito in Husserl‟s Philosophy (1972): 
 
Consciousness is not a substance whose accidents would be 
feelings and ideas, and thinking is not simply unravelling 
successive episodes of an internal dream.  Thought has a bearing 
on things.  Its own nature is such that it never closes in upon 
itself but goes outside itself to rush toward its objects; it is the 
thought of something (Berger, 1972, p.72-3). 
 
Once he has introduced the idea of intentionality, Husserl now has to explain how 
the objects, which are the ‗objects of consciousness‘, appear at all. How is it that 
there is a world to be experienced?  Furthermore, Husserl must explain the possible 
existence of the world to be experienced without making reference to a pre- epoché 
‗knowledge and terms‘.  Thus he cannot refer to causal explanation, or to some 
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natural disposition towards a belief in externality.  To explain the existence of 
objects Husserl introduces another term, noemata.  Noemata refers to the way the 
world and its objects are, when viewed from the phenomenological attitude. 
 
For Husserl, thought is immanent to consciousness because intentionality is 
the essence of consciousness, thus one can claim that there is an object being 
experienced.  For example, at the moment I can see a ‗computer monitor‘, so 
already there is an ‗object-as-experienced‘: what Husserl calls the noema.  One 
must be careful here as I (following Husserl‘s reasoning) cannot and do not claim 
when I see the computer monitor that the ‗computer monitor‘ is ‗really there‘ or that 
what I experience is the ‗real object‘.  All that is claimed is that I am experiencing 
the ‗computer monitor‘ in as much I am experiencing an object there is an object 
that is there for me. And yet, it could not be another object, it is not case that 
scepticism is invited back in because it is ‗only an experience‘ whereas in reality it 
may be a bottle of wine.  Nor can there be no object there at all.  The object-as-
experienced, must bear some resemblance to the ‗real‘ object, in as much as it is 
merely the ‗real‘ object understood through a particular aspect, through experience. 
Also the noema, whilst inseparable from an individual act of consciousness, must be 
distinguished from the act of consciousness itself, the noesis to which it correlates. 
The desired object has to be separated from the desiring or the bracketing effect is 
removed and the natural existing world would return with its numerous unproven 
assumptions. 
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In this section I have presented Husserl‘s initial theory regarding the 
subject/world relation.  I have used work that forms the ‗Husserl‘ of Ideas I.  This is 
the Husserl who is the subject of Heidegger‘s attacks.  In the next section I will give 
an overview of some of Husserl‘s later ideas.  Whilst these are theories and notions 
that occurred to Husserl later in his life, they still relate to his pre-occupation with 
the subject/world relation and as such there is a certain continunity between his later 
and early work. 
 
The Later Husserl 
 
The prominence given to the Body is the most striking aspect of Husserl‘s 
work after Ideas I .  The body had played some role ever since Husserl‘s Thing and 
Space lectures of 1907, but it is only with his later work after 1920, that the body 
takes on such a central role.  Why does Husserl begin to talk about the body? To an 
extent it a continuation and an attempt to resolve some problems he was working on 
concerning the nature of the subject/world relation.  For example, how are we to 
understand notions such as ‗here‘ and ‗there‘, or more fundamentally how can we 
make sense of a subject experiencing the world, without attention being paid to the 
body?  This reformulation of the problem of how the subject relates to the world, 
however brought up new issues; once Husserl had attempted to answer questions 
regarding the body, questions regarding perspectivity arose, which in turn invited 
questions of their own, questions that went beyond the question of perspectivity.  
Despite this, the problems the ‗Later Husserl‘ faces are the essentially the same as 
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the Husserl of Ideas I, but now Husserl has a clearer focus on the issues that need to 
be resolved. 
  
The Body and the ‘Paradox of Subjectivity’ 
 
In The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology 
Husserl outlines what he calls ‗the paradox of human subjectivity‘.  The paradox is 
that the human subject is both a subject in the world and simultaneously an object in 
the world or as Husserl puts it: 
 
Can we be simply satisfied with the notion that human beings 
are subjects for the world (the world for consciousness which is 
their world) and at the same time objects in this world?...the 
juxtaposition of ―subjectivity in the world as object‖ and at the 
same time ―conscious subject for the world,‖ contains a 
necessary theoretical question, that of understanding how this is 
possible.  (Crisis, p.180-181). 
 
To answer this question, Husserl emphasises the Janus nature of the body, its 
double aspect.  There is the body that I experience and through which I act (the 
Leib) and the body qua object (the Korper).  It is necessary to have both aspects, 
since it would be nonsensical to ground our spatial awareness in a spatial object, i.e. 
the Korper, or to say that an object is endowed with subjective awareness.  For 
Husserl, one must be clear about the dual-aspect of the body and its foundation: 
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Here it must also be noted that in all experience of things, the 
lived body is co-extensive with the functioning lived body (thus 
not a mere thing), and that when it is experienced as a thing, it is 
experienced in a double way-i.e., precisely as an experienced 
thing and as a functioning lived body together in one (Husserl 
p14 - 57 in Zahavi 2003, p.101). 
 
As Dan Zahavi goes on to explain in Husserl‟s Phenomenology (2003), Husserl 
argues that the human subject does not originally experience its body as an object in 
objective space.  In fact, originally we do not have consciousness of our body at all, 
one simply is one‘s body.  Originally: ―…my body is experienced as a unified field 
of activity and affectivity, as volitional structure, a potentiality of mobility, an ‗I do‘ 
and ‗I can‘ ‖ (Zahavi, 2003, p.101). 
 
I will now turn to look at the body as it ‗originally‘ is, with regard to 
Husserl‘s notions of affectivity and intentionality for an embodied subject.  The 
self-experiencing, the subjective body or Leib leads us to the objective body or 
Korper (though not as the conditions of its possibility).  Husserl‘s ideas on 
affectivity and the embodied subject directly affect Heidegger‘s critique of him and 
my counter-critique. 
 
To help us understand Husserl‘s philosophy of the body, let us consider two 
scenarios.  In the first one I am in my house and I want to open a bottle of wine.  I 
find a corkscrew and a bottle of wine and whilst holding the bottle in my left hand I 
insert the corkscrew and I try to extract the cork.  But the cork seems to resist.  At 
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the moment of resistance I become consciously aware of how I am holding the 
bottle and corkscrew and I can feel the resistance.  Now consider this scenario.  I 
am walking down the street and all of a sudden I feel a pain in my back and I 
crumble to the floor, I cannot get up because the pain is so bad.  It is so bad that it is 
almost as though only my back exists. Husserl is drawing attention to the ‗two-sided 
aspect of the body‘.  In the case of the resistant wine bottle I am aware of gripping 
the bottle and the corkscrew; I am conscious of an experiencing organ, in this case 
my hand and the objects involved.  However in the case of the back pain I am 
conscious of an experienced organ, my back.  Our bodies supply us with interior 
and exterior experiences, but what is the nature of those experiences and what is the 
relation between the interior and exterior? 
 
Self-Awareness, Self-Affection & Self-Objectification 
 
As stated above, for Husserl: 
 
Originally my body is experienced as a unified field of activity 
and affectivity, as volitional structure, a potentiality of mobility, 
an ‗I do‘ and ‗I can‘. (Zahavi, 2003, p.101)  
 
And Zahavi, following Husserl also states: 
As a ‗unified field of activity and affectivity‘ embodied 
subjectivity ‗[o]ur primarily bodily awareness can consequently 
be described as self-sensation, self-affection or impressional 
self-manifestation‘. (Zahavi, 1999, p. 215)  
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It is because ‗I‘ am aware of myself as embodied being.  
However, it is not to be reflectively or thematically aware of 
one‘s being-in-the-world, rather it is to be pre-reflectively or un-
thematically aware of one‘s own experiences.   If I were 
thematically aware, ‗I‘ would already be reflecting on an object 
and a prior affection, which brought the object to my attention 
would have to be presupposed, affectivity would have already 
‗done its work‘. (Zahavi, 1999, p.116)  
 
Our bodies, or rather an awareness of our bodies, is an awareness which is self-
affective, that is, it is an awareness of our self in which the self is itself constituted 
and pre-reflective.  It is an awareness we have prior to the reflection and for Husserl, 
it is through self-affection, our as bodily existence lays the ground for reflection, 
Thus: 
 
[t]o be affected by something is not yet to be presented with an 
object, but to be invited to turn one‘s attention toward that which 
exerts the affection.  If it succeeds in calling attention to itself, 
that which affects us is given, whereas it is only pregiven as long 
as it remains unheeded. (Zahavi, 1999, p.116) 
 
Finally, we arrive at the issue of how the body becomes to be experienced as an 
object, as exterior.  For Husserl the answer partly lies with self-affection.  Since we 
are embodied, whilst we do not primarily experience ourselves as an object in space, 
as embodied beings we are worldly beings.  Self-affection opened up the body to 
the world, it allowed it to be affected by other things, other objects and other people, 
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or as Husserl put it: ―We perceive the lived body but along with it also things 
perceived ―by means of it‖ ‖ (Husserl in Zahavi, 2003, p. 105). 
 
For Husserl the body is primarily self-affective bodily awareness for that 
bodily awareness is interdependent with the ‗flip side of the body‘, the objective 
body, which self-affection opens it to.  Thus self-affection is interdependent with 
hetero-affection, the affecting of the self by the world. 
 
Having outlined Husserl‘s initial work on the transcendental reduction and 
his later work on the body and self-affection, I shall now turn to Heidegger critique 
of Husserl. 
 
Heidegger’s ‘Destrucktion’ of Husserl 
 
I will now turn to Heidegger‘s critique of Husserl.  I will outline 
Heidegger‘s three interrelated objections against Husserl‘s work.  Firstly, Heidegger 
objects to Husserl‘s Cartesian philosophy of consciousness.  Secondly, Heidegger 
objects to Husserl‘s employment of the concept of the ‗subject‘, viewing it as 
inadequate.  Finally, he argues that Husserl‘s Cartesian turn leads him to avoid the 
question of being. 
 
One has to be careful when outlining Heidegger‘s criticisms against Husserl 
on the grounds of Husserl‘s Cartesianism.  As Lilian Alweiss points out, whilst 
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Heidegger is attempting to reproach Husserl for returning to a philosophy of 
consciousness ―…it would be a mistake to interpret that accusation in terms of the 
internalism/externalism debate.‖ (Alweiss,  2003, p.3). 
 
Contrary to Pierre Keller in his book Husserl and Heidegger on Human Experience 
(1999), Heidegger‘s argument with Husserl is not because ―…Husserl is strongly 
attracted to the Cartesian conception of mind as a kind of inner theatre in which 
mental events can be observed to come and go‖ (Keller, 1999, p.43).  Indeed, in his 
History of the Concept of Time, Heidegger praises Husserl for overcoming 
Cartesian representationalism, by arguing that any mode of representation, our 
seeing an object, thematically presupposes intentionality which is non-thetic: 
 
The interrelation of these modes of representation is a functional 
interrelation which is always prefigured in their intentionality.  
Empty intending, envisaging, sense perception are not simply 
co-ordinated as species in a genus, as when I say that apples, 
pears, peaches and plums are fruits. Rather these modes stand to 
one another in a functional relation and the fulfillment itself is of 
an intentional character. (HCT, p.49) 
 
It is simply a mistake to think that Heidegger objects to Husserl on the grounds that 
Husserl regards the lived experiences of our knowledge of objects as reducible to 
mental content.  It is true that for Husserl objectivity is made possible only through 
bracketing the world, so that consciousness becomes our only means of accessing 
the object. However, as Søren Overgaard points out, this might mean that for 
Husserl the subject is worldless, albeit in the sense that after the epoché one can 
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neither affirm nor deny the world,
11
 but it is not objectless
12
.  This is Heidegger‘s 
objection - by affirming I qua consciousness as that which provides the absolute 
ground of all appearances - all objects, Husserl abandons or ‗leaps over‘ the 
phenomenon of the world. It is difficult to defend Husserl here, for as Lilian 
Alweiss points out, in the first book of Ideas Husserl states ―Absolute 
Consciousness as the Residuum After the Nullifying of the World‖ (Ideas I,  p.50). 
 
The title of the sub-section (49) itself seems to suggest something counter to 
that expressed by Heidegger.  Husserl goes on to argue after the reduction, is 
performed the world is ‗nullified‘, consciousness would still exist, or as Husserl 
puts it ―…the Being of consciousness, of every stream of experience generally, 
though it would indeed be inevitably modified by  a nullifying of the thing-world, 
would not be affected thereby in its own proper existence.‖ (Ideas I, p.150). 
 
Husserl argues that the being of consciousness or the ego remains untouched 
by the bracketing of the world, and as such it, consciousness, is the absolute ground 
for our experience of objects.  To Heidegger, the idea that one can separate oneself 
from the world is unacceptable, and far too Cartesian for his taste: 
 
In principle the possibility exists that consciousness itself is ―not 
affected in its own existence‖ by an ―annihilation of the world of 
                                                 
11
 Indeed one question is whether Husserl has a notion of world, outside the succession of spatio-
temporal events. 
12
 The objectless/worldless distinction is one made by Overgaard in Husserl and Heidegger on Being 
in the World.  As similar objection is made by Lilian Alweiss‘ 2003 work in The World Unclaimed:  
A Challenge to Heidegger‟s Critique of Husserl. Ohio University Press. 
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things‖ - a consideration which, as well known, Descartes had 
already employed. (HCT, p.104-5) 
 
Moreover in Heidegger‘s view Husserl adheres to the Cartesian program, not just in 
utilising a philosophy of consciousness, but in the privileged place he gives 
consciousness by making it an object of inquiry for an absolute science:  
 
Husserl‘s primary question is simply not concerned with the 
character of the being of consciousness.  Rather he is guided by 
the following concern: How can consciousness become the 
possible object of an absolute science. This idea, that 
consciousness is to be the region of an absolute science, is not 
simply invented; it is an idea which occupied philosophy ever 
since Descartes. (HCT, p.107) 
 
In Heidegger‘s view Husserl conceives of the being of consciousness as something 
that ‗can be defined independently of the phenomenon of the world‘ (Alweiss, 2003, 
p.24).  This can be evidenced by the following passage from Ideas I: 
 
[N]o real being, none that consciously presents and manifests 
itself through appearance presented and legitimated in 
consciousness by appearances, is necessary to the Being of 
consciousness itself (in the widest sense of the stream of lived 
experiences).  Immanental being is therefore without doubt 
absolute in this sense that in principle by immanental being 
nulla„re‟ indigent ad existendum  (Ideas I altered for clarity, 
p.152) 
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That there may be things outside of consciousness that are not constitutive of 
consciousness itself; in this sense consciousness is immanent, and does not depend 
on anything but itself for its existence.  Thus, like Descartes, Husserl believed that 
one needs only thought and not extension in order to be certain of one‘s own 
existence.  The world comprising of ‗things outside of me‘ simply does not play a 
part in constituting my being.  Heidegger, on the other hand, cannot conceive of 
Being as separable from the world, since for him: 
 
The basic constitutive state of being-in-the-world is a necessary 
structure of Dasein. (HCT, p.157) 
 
Thus Heidegger begins his attack upon Husserl.  Husserl is no different from 
Descartes in that he claims consciousness as the absolute ground for the subject‟s 
existence where only thought is necessary to be certain of the subject‟s existence, 
and he is engaged in a program of rigorous, absolute science.  I will now go on to 
Heidegger criticism of Husserl‘s conception of subjectivity. 
 
Ontology - The Hermeneutics of Facticity, are the published notes from a 
lecture course Heidegger gave in 1923, (also coincidentally they constitute the first 
major attack on Husserl) because they discuss the notion of ‗Man‘ in philosophy.  
Here Heidegger does not mention Husserl by name, rather he looks at the concept of 
Man in biblical writings - Paul, Tatian, Augustine, Aquinas, Zwingli and Calvin, 
and also as it occurs in the phenomenology of Scheler.  However, his critique of the 
way in which these thinkers understand the concept ‗Man‘ is equally applicable to 
Husserl‘s writing on the same subject matter. Heidegger‘s critique is that 
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philosophy has conceived the human being as ―…a living being endowed with 
reason (animal rationale), or as God‘s creation…‖ (Overgaard, 2003, p.164). 
 
Heidegger argues that it is a mistake to conceive the concept ‗human being‘ 
in this way because either of these conceptions presupposes that there is this ‗thing 
of nature‘, the human being, which then has values and attributes put upon it 
whether it be ‗reason‘, ‗consciousness‘ or ‗created by God‘.  Whatever attributes we 
give it, there is always this ‗pre-given‘ thing called Man, or as Heidegger states: 
 
Both conceptual definitions are concerned with defining the 
terms with which a thing, having been given in advance, comes 
to be furnished. A definite mode of being is subsequently 
ascribed to pre-given thing, i.e., the latter is indifferently 
allowed to remain as being-real. (OHF, p.17) 
 
Thus Heidegger begins a critique of the subject that he will make much clearer and 
bolder in Being and Time, notions such as ‗ego‘ or ‗subject‘ and ‗person‘ are 
questionable unless they are without ontological presuppositions: 
 
Every idea of ‗subject‘ - unless it is purified by a previous 
ontological basic characterization - still ontologically invokes 
the position of subjectum (hypocheimenon) no matter how 
emphatically one ontically resists the ‗soul substance‘ or 
thingification of consciousness. (BT: 46 trans Overgaard in 2003)  
 
Two points should be made clear here.  Firstly whilst he hardly ever mentions 
Husserl by name, this attack is consistent with Husserl‘s work and the critique in 
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Ontology and Being and Time is intended to apply to Husserl.  Heidegger made this 
clear in correspondence, firstly in correspondence with Karl Lowith on his Ontology 
lectures: 
 
…strikes the main blows against phenomenology.  I now stand 
completely on my own two feet…There is no chance of getting 
an appointment now. And after I have published, my prospects 
will be finished.  The old man [Husserl] will then realize I am 
wringing his neck - and then the question of succeeding him is 
out.  But I can‘t help myself. (Heidegger in Carman, 2003, p.58) 
 
He would also later write to Karl Jaspers that if Being and Time was written 
―against anyone …it‘s against Husserl, and he saw it immediately but clung to the 
positive from the outset.  What I write against, only indirectly of course, is pseudo 
philosophy.‖ (Heidegger in Carman, 2003, p.59).  
 
It seems that Husserl held to the conception of human being qua subjectum 
that Heidegger attacks.  As Husserl states in Cartesian Meditations: 
 
Since, by his own active generating, the Ego constitutes himself 
as identical substrate of Ego-properties, he constitutes himself 
also as ―fixed and abiding” personal Ego - in the maximally 
broad sense, which permits us to speak of sub-human ―persons‖ 
(CM, p.67) 
 
Husserl‘s view on the relationship between transcendental and empirical 
subjectivity is far more complex than can be conveyed in one paragraph.  However, 
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by defining the pure ego as ―fixed and abiding‖ as that which gives grounds for the 
personal ego or persons, he does seem to be committed to the idea of human being 
qua subjectum.  I am arguing that this is the very thing that Heidegger finds him 
guilty of. 
 
I will now outline the third and final criticism that Heidegger levelled 
against Husserl; this is essentially an extension of the last criticism.  Heidegger has 
been arguing that in Husserl the focus is on the subject; the subject is understood as 
that which justifies and gives certainty to one‘s knowledge.  Heidegger accepts that 
Husserl‘s transcendental reduction does acknowledge the question of being ‗On the 
basis of this pure region [consciousness] it now first becomes possible to define the 
suspended being, reality.  The question of being is thus raised, it is even answered‘ 
(HCT, p.112). 
 
However, as Lilian Alweiss points out, despite his appreciation for Husserl‘s 
transcendental turn ―…he [Heidegger] nonetheless objects to Husserl‘s 
Cartesianism and insists that ‗the question of being itself is left undiscussed.‟ ‖ 
(Alweiss,2003, p.19).  Alweiss goes on to point out that Heidegger is not saying that 
Husserl fails to raise the problem of Being, but that because his method of dealing 
with being is epistemologically, as opposed to ontologically motivated, despite his 
phenomenology it fails to question the ―...ontological meaning of performance[.]  
How is the kind of Being which belongs to a person to be ascertained in a positive 
way?‖ (BT: 48) 
 
98 
 
Since his inquiry into Being is epistemologically motivated, Husserl 
commits himself to the idea that Man is a ‗thinking thing‘, but still he has not risen 
to the ontological level because he does not ask ‗What does it mean to be person 
who performs intentional acts?‘  Thus, for Heidegger, Husserl ultimately fails to 
discuss the question of Being.  As a result Heidegger makes a threefold criticism of 
Husserl: for his commitment to a philosophy of consciousness, his commitment to a 
certain conception of subjectivity and for his failure to discuss the question of Being.  
In the next section I will give a counter-critique of Heidegger‘s view. 
 
Critique of ‘Heidegger’s Husserl’ 
 
My criticisms of Heidegger‘s view of Husserl are informed by the work of 
Michel Henry.  Henry has objections to both Husserl and Heidegger and these 
objections are based on phenomenological grounds.   I will offer a counter-critique 
of the first two objections: Husserl‘s commitment to the philosophy of 
consciousness and his commitment to subjectivity.  
 
For Henry, Heidegger is right to take Husserl to task over his commitment to 
a Cartesian inspired philosophy of consciousness which inevitably leads to a 
‗leaping over‘ of the world, but for different reasons.  Whereas Heidegger objects to 
a philosophy of consciousness, indeed he objects to the phenomenological reduction 
because it makes impossible any exterior to the conscious ‗I‘, Henry objects to both.  
He objects on the grounds that such a reduction commits Husserl to what he calls 
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ontological monism; Henry also views Heidegger as being committed to some form 
of this.  He feels that with the phenomenological reduction, Husserl ignores 
important features of the subject. According to Dan Zahavi, ontological monism is 
―The assumption that there is only one kind of manifestation, only one kind of 
phenomenality.   It has thus been taken for granted that to be given is to be given as 
an object.‖ (Zahavi, 1999, p.51).  Phenomena appear or manifest as objects for us.  
Ontological monism is the doctrine that phenomena only manifest themselves in 
one way, as objects.   
 
Husserl falls foul of ontological monism because his conception of 
consciousness is bound up with his notion of intentionality. If consciousness is 
always consciousness of an object, then ―Consciousness is actually nothing other 
than the relationship to the object.‖ (Henry, 1973, p.85).  Thus consciousness is 
representational: it represents phenomena that will only appear in one way, as 
objects.   Hence Hussserl‘s conception of consciousness falls foul of ontological 
monism.   
 
Consciousness signifies the essence of manifestation according 
to the fundamental presuppositions of monism… Consciousness 
is thus understood in the light of the central concept of 
intentionality.  Every consciousness is consciousness of 
something.  Insofar as it is intentional, consciousness is the 
surpassing which give access to things.  Final progress in the 
ontological determination of the concept of consciousness 
resides in the affirmation that consciousness is nothing other 
than this surpassing.  Thus the Being of consciousness is truly 
identified with the ontological process of reality it ceases to be 
100 
 
the determined Being of a subject opposed, as a given reality, to 
the reality of the object, so that it may become the principle of 
reality as such. Consciousness is no longer predicate nor even 
the essential attribute of the substantiality Being of a subject. 
(Henry, 1973, p.76 & 88-9) 
 
Consciousness understood through the idea of intentionality becomes that which 
gives the subject access to objects, as stated above it is nothing but relationship 
between itself and the represented object.  The idea that there is a human being that 
has the special feature, that of consciousness is devalued since for Husserl it 
becomes simply a means of connecting the subject to an object.  It is on this back of 
this critique of the philosophy of consciousness that Henry goes on to critique 
Heidegger‘s criticism of Husserl.  In Heidegger‘s view, Husserl‘s philosophy lacks 
an exteriority, it lacks a world.  For Henry, this is simply the wrong move.  To make 
this move is to overlook more worrying problems with Husserl‘s phenomenology.  
For Henry: 
 
 
…Husserl plays with different and incompatible forms of 
immanence and transcendence in order to stabilise 
phenomenalisation into an object and a subject, thus missing its 
radicalism.  The transcendence suspended by the epoché is only 
of one, special variety, namely the ‗empirical world‘, with the 
‗psychical ego [moi] inscribed within it‘.  An outside, albeit 
empty, world as such remains – one that Henry emphasises as a 
specular, as a ‗view‘.  The idea of immanence concomitant to 
this empty but still present outsideness becomes that which is 
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not the empirical world but which aims at it emptily.  This is a 
mitigated, half-immanence, not immanent enough. (Mullarkey, 
2006, p.51) 
 
For Henry, Heidegger‘s focus on the exterior or ‗the world‘ is wrong because it 
ignores problems within Husserl‘s own phenomenology.  Even though the 
‗empirical world‘ has been suspended by the epoché, another world remains: the 
transcendental world, empty of objects, but there nonetheless, immanent to the 
transcendental I.  This seems unsatisfactory to Henry, because it posits an 
unnecessary ‗outside‘, committing the ‗sin‘ of ontological monism rather than 
focusing on subjectivity. Given this, Heidegger‘s rush to form a conception of the 
exterior is premature: simply forming a conception of the exterior does not resolve 
the problem of how the world appears to us.  If we take Heidegger‘s route we risk 
overlooking this problem, which Henry believes can be solved by examining how 
the subject manifests itself (self-constitution in Husserl‘s terms).  According to 
Henry this can be achieved through self-affection: the self-affection of an absolute 
subject.  This subject would be indifferent to such notions as ‗interior‘ or ‗exterior‘, 
since it is the absolute subject and manifests itself as such through affectivity: 
 
Affectivity reveals the absolute in its totality because it is 
nothing other than its perfect adherence to the self, nothing other 
than its coincidence with self, because it is the auto-affection of 
Being in the absolute unity of its radical immanence. In absolute 
unity of its radical immanence, Being affects itself and 
experiences itself in such a way that there is nothing in it which 
does not affect it and which is not experienced by it, no content 
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transcendent to the interior experience of self which constitutes 
this content. (Henry, 1973, p.858-9) 
 
Thus, through self-affection, the subject manifests itself as absolute, that is to say 
unified, non-ecstatic, with no ‗outside‘, no ‗world‘, no ‗interior‘ or ‗exterior‘.  The 
absolute subject is a ‗given phenomena‘ in Husserl‘s terms, that is to say, a 
phenomenon given to the self, it is given to ‗I‘ but it is ‗self-given‘: given to the self 
itself.   Unlike Husserl‘s account it is minus the need for intentionality to achieve 
this self-givenness.  The self itself is a phenomenon and it is given to itself.  The 
idea of the absolute subject may also side-step the problem of the paradox of 
subjectivity that we find in later work by Husserl.  Since the subject is absolute, 
beholden to no exterior, there is no Other to view the subject as an object, the 
paradox simply never arises. 
  
Heidegger posed a second objection based on the claim that, for Husserl, 
subjectivity is hypocheimenon, the ‗underlying ground‘ for the world and the other 
characteristics of the subject.  Henry agrees that Heidegger is right to raise this issue, 
but, as with the last objection concerning the lack of the exterior, he simply gives 
the wrong response.   The response from Heidegger‘s appears to be that we should 
jettison all philosophical concepts such as ‗ego‘, ‗person‘ or ‗subject‘ because 
invoking them often involves overlooking a philosophical presupposition upon 
which such concepts lie: thus the concept is not properly grounded.  Instead we 
should talk about Dasein, the ‗being-there‘, the being that we ourselves are, as such 
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it needs no grounds, no lengthy argument to justify its existence; it is in-the-world, 
as we are in-the-world, living our life. 
 
As outlined above, Henry argued that Dasein would be the wrong move as 
he himself favours an absolute subject, with affectivity as its essence. However, 
much as Henry wishes to endorse an absolutist conception of the subject, he can be 
viewed as in agreement with Heidegger‘s assertion that Husserl needed to be taken 
to task for his failure to give grounds for the subject: 
 
The ego cogito gets a priority in the problematic whose 
significance is not merely chronological; but the subordination 
of ontology to ego-ology, whether implicit or not, in modern 
philosophy is no more justified than the ancient primacy of 
theology.  Whether it be considered under the rubric of  ‗subject‘ 
or ‗spirit‘, ‗person‘ or ‗reason‘, the cogito, whilst undergoing 
these non-essential transformations, remains an existent which 
as such cannot be confused with a foundation of the ontological 
order.  Actually it is the significance of philosophy which has 
been lost it is the very possibility of bringing up the question of 
Being which is questioned. (Henry, 1973, p.21) 
 
As a philosopher who does prioritise a form of the cogito
13
over ontology, 
Heidegger‘s criticisms are supported by Henry, the ‗subject‘ and its priority is not 
justified.   However, it should be made clear that Heidegger does not condemn 
transcendental subjectivity in principle with this critique.  That is to say that 
                                                 
13
 Form because it morphs from ‗I think‘ to ‗I can‘ in different phases of Husserl‘s career.  
 
104 
 
Heidegger never explicitly rules out the notion of the transcendental, nor jettisons 
the notion of subjectivity completely, Heidegger merely argues against its priority.  
It is entirely possible that there is a place for some notion of subjectivity, albeit not 
in fundamental ontology. Heidegger is also against the phenomenological reduction.  
However, for Henry, Heidegger‘s Dasein is no suitable alternative for the failure of 
Husserlian subjectivity.  Heidegger himself falls foul of ontological monism by 
characterising Dasein as ecstatic, for in being ecstatic, Heidegger demands a ‗world‘ 
an ‗exterior‘, it posits being once again as a ‗there‘ to be grasped, which Henry 
would see both as limiting the notion of Being and, as an argument against Husserl, 
superfluous; one need not posit an exterior in order to point out the faults in 
Husserl‘s philosophy, for Henry the demand for a world is not his main, but rather 
the incompleted project of immanence, that the subject is not immanent enough.  I 
will give an outline of Heidegger‘s ‗existential analytic‘ before giving Henry‘s full 
critique which is, after all, borne of a critique of Heidegger. 
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Chapter Four: Heidegger’s Phenomenology of Existence 
 
Introductory Remarks 
 
In the previous three chapters I examined the notions of self, subject and world in 
the work of Descartes, Kant and Husserl.  I then went on to examine Heidegger‘s 
perspective on these thinkers; finally I offer my own critique of Heidegger‘s view.  
These thinkers are of particular interest to me because they are essentially 
Heidegger‘s ‗targets‘ in Being and Time.  For Heidegger his project is justified 
because in his view the philosophies of Descartes, Kant and Husserl are in some 
way or another incomplete or simply wrong.  With respect to the question of the 
subject, Heidegger rejected Descartes‘ notion of the subject as a fundamental 
ground: a substance with a set of characteristics.  He also rejected Kant‘s 
conception of the foundationalist subject: namely a single unified consciousness, 
itself a substance although we can know nothing of its characteristics.  With regard 
to Husserl, Heidegger wants to distance himself from Husserl‘s account of the 
intentional objects of thought.  In Husserl‘s view these intentional objects form part 
of the contents of consciousness of a transcendental subject.  Ultimately, Heidegger 
regards all three accounts (despite their individual complexities) as simply based on 
subjectivity: that is to say accounts of subjectivity and therefore explicitly or 
implicitly ego-based accounts.  As such, all should be dismissed as merely 
providing three different versions of Cartesianism. 
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In this chapter I will provide an overview of Heidegger‘s project in Being 
and Time.  In relation to the project of Being and Time I will raise some troubling 
questions concerning Heidegger‘s official refusal to engage with subjectivity. 
 
What is the Project of Being and Time? 
 
As strange a question as this might seem to some, it also very pertinent and 
difficult to answer.  Before it can be answered, it might be more useful to say when 
the project of Being and Time began.  Now, it is too simplistic to say that it began 
when Heidegger first put pen to paper with the intention of writing a book, a book 
that was to become Being and Time.  Rather the project of Being and Time began 
when Heidegger first came across the ideas that were going to influence that work.  
However, one has to be careful here too, for just as it would be too simplistic to say 
that the project began when he first put pen to paper, equally it would be too 
simplistic to say it began when he first studied philosophy.  This would be like 
saying that Beethoven‘s Ninth Symphony began when he first played the piano.  
Theodore Kisiel in his book The Genesis of Heidegger‟s Being and Time gives 1924 
as the date when Heidegger began Being and Time.  This date coincides with 
Heidegger‘s lecture to the Marburg Theological Society on ―The Concept of Time‖.  
This is certainly when the first piece of work covering most of the issues in Being 
and Time were presented.  However I would like to date the beginning of Being and 
Time as early as 1920 as this date coincides with his Lectures on The 
Phenomenology of Religious Life, when Heidegger first mentions Dasein in 
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conjunction with ‗Life‘.  It is in this work that he begins to set out what 
phenomenology means to him, through an application of phenomenology to the 
writings of St.Paul and Augustine.  The reason I want to give an earlier date for the 
project of Being and Time will become apparent when I discuss his notion of 
Dasein. However it is possible to elaborate here as it concerns part of the central 
point of my thesis.  Heidegger‘s main criticism of his philosophical predecessors is 
that their notions of subjectivity, selfhood and world do not accomplish the task for 
which they were introduced: they fail to answer the question of what it means to be 
human.  In other words, their notions of subjectivity, self and world are not ―fleshy‖ 
enough in the sense that they do not convey the impression that they describe a 
living human being, or in Heidegger‘s terms, they do not provide us with the 
fundamental ontology.  Heidegger wishes to provide an account that captures the 
human being but does not fall back into any of the problems previous accounts have 
encountered.  This account is not one that would be grounded on subjectivity but 
would be something more fundamental, closer to the essence of what it means to be 
human.  Given that this is the case it is difficult to understand why Heidegger 
expresses his notion of the human in terms of existence.  This seems rather dry and 
theoretical especially when, in his earlier work, such as The Phenomenology of 
Religious Life he used the term life to describe human beings, and this seems to 
better capture the primordial nature of the human being.   I will return to this issue. 
 
To return to the question, ‗What is the project of Being and Time?‘  In 
simple terms, the project of Being and Time aims to answer the question ‗What is 
Being?‘  However, Heidegger goes about this task in a different way from previous 
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philosophers who have asked this question.  He claims that since we (humans) are 
beings, we are the only species we know of that concerns itself with Being or 
existence.  We can ask, ‗What does it mean to be?‘ Therefore if we want to know 
the answer to the question ‗What is Being?‘ we must first understand the being who 
is asking the question, namely us or human beings.  To accomplish this task that 
Heidegger applies phenomenology, and in so doing, he radically alters the nature of 
phenomenology itself. 
 
The Question 
 
For manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean 
when you use the expression ―being.‖  We, however, who used 
to think we understood it, have now become perplexed. (BT: 1) 
 
Thus, with the above quote, begins Being and Time.  It is no accident that 
Heidegger opens by quoting the ‗Eleatic Stranger‘ from Plato‘s Sophist, for 
Heidegger‘s inquiry is almost the same as the Eleatic Stranger‘s.  He is asking 
‗What is the meaning of Being?‘  However, this is not the only reason that 
Heidegger has chosen to begin with that particular quote.  By quoting Plato, he 
locates his project historically within the Western tradition.  By citing Plato, 
Heidegger indicates that he sees this question as a dialogue with Plato, and not other 
Greek thinkers with whom Heidegger may have some sympathies, thinkers such as 
Heraclitis and Parmenides. According to Heidegger these thinkers worked before 
metaphysics was corrupted and the question of Being was lost, at least until 
Heidegger himself appeared. Finally, by citing Plato he avoids any explicit 
109 
 
comparison of his work to Husserl‘s phenomenology (and to any of his peers).  In 
Being and Time Heidegger is engaging critically with the Sophist, reworking the 
concepts of Being, Presence, not-being or Nothingness in the light of the idea of 
Phenomenology, but not any particular pre-existing phenomenology. Heidegger is, 
in the course of his inquiry, finding his own way to phenomenology.  
 
Why did Heidegger feel that Plato had not answered the question of Being? 
It is not that Heidegger finds the Eleatic Stranger‘s conclusion incorrect, that being 
is presence and the opposite of non-being, and rather it is that the wrong questions 
are being asked. This is what Heidegger means when he states, ‗This question has 
today been forgotten‘ (BT:21).  Heidegger felt that to simply claim that ‗Being is 
presence‘ is to provide an essentially empty answer.  He feels that the remark needs 
not just clarification but justification before it can be stated.  Heidegger is not 
simply asking ‗What is being?‘ he is asking ‗What makes being possible?‘  To 
answer that question, we have to ask not only what is the meaning or sense of being, 
but what are we enquiring about?  Therefore to even begin to answer the question 
‗What is the meaning of being?‘ we have to start by interrogating an entity which 
will, in Heidegger‘s language, reveal the meaning of being. 
 
Do we in our time have answer to the question of what we really 
mean by the word ‗being‘?  Not at all.  So it is fitting that we 
should raise anew the question of the meaning of Being.  But are 
we nowadays even perplexed at our inability to understand the 
expression ‗Being‘?  Not at all.  So first of all we must reawaken 
an understanding for the meaning of the question.  Our aim in 
the following treatise is to work out the question of the meaning 
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of Being and to do so concretely.  Our provisional aim is the 
Interpretation of time as the possible horizon for any 
understanding whatsoever of Being . (BT:19) 
 
Even Heidegger‘s opening paragraph gives the reader clues as both to the 
reformulation of the ‗forgotten question‘ and to how Heidegger views Being.  That 
we the inquirer or questioner ―...must reawaken an understanding of the meaning of 
the question and the question of the meaning of Being  and to do so concretely‖ (my 
italics) suggests that the question has to be reformulated or rewritten so that it can 
be answered.  Secondly, we are told by Heidegger that to begin to approach the 
question ‗What is the meaning of Being?‘ we must take time into account because 
the answer to the question may in some way involve time. 
 
Inquiry, as a kind of seeking, must be guided beforehand by 
what is sought.  So the meaning of Being must already be 
available in an understanding of Being.  Out of this 
understanding arise both the explicit question of the meaning of 
Being and the tendency that leads us towards its conception.  We 
do know what ‗Being‘ means.  But even if we ask, ‗What is 
Being?‘ we keep within an understanding of the ‗is‘, though we 
are unable to fix conceptually what the ‗is‘ signifies.  We do not 
even know the horizon in terms of which that meaning is to be 
grasped and fixed.  But this vague average understanding of 
Being is still a Fact. (BT:25) 
 
Even though we do not know what Being is, we understand that we, as the ones 
inquiring are asking a question, a question about the meaning of ‗Being‘.  And that 
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we can ask the question ‗What is Being‘ means that we have some understanding 
about Being, whether it simply means that we know what Being is not or simply the 
conclusion of  Plato‘s Sophist, which Heidegger would see as one of the ‗traditional 
theories‘. ―What we seek when we inquire into Being is not something unfamiliar, 
even if proximally, we cannot grasp it at all.‖ (BT:25). 
 
At this point Heidegger makes his radical revision to the question of the meaning of 
Being.  He concludes that ‗Being‘ or ―…that which determines entities as entities...‖ 
is not itself an entity.  We the inquirer cannot simply define ‗Being‘ or trace the 
origin of entities back until we discover their ‗Being‘.  Heidegger is careful not to 
say too much about Being at this stage.  This is because he believes that the failure 
of philosophers such as Aristotle, Descartes and Kant was to assume more about 
Being than their argument warranted.  Thus Descartes makes the mistake of stating 
that thinking is the proof of his existence, without knowing what it means to think 
or to exist.  He had overlooked the Being of thinking or the Being of existence and 
that is why, in Heidegger‘s view, his argument fails.  However, Heidegger needs to 
properly begin his investigation into Being, that is to say, without making the same 
kind of assumptions that Descartes did.  In order to introduce the subject without 
making any implicit or explicit assumptions about Being and without introducing 
concepts and terms not justified by his argument Heidegger uses what on previous 
occasions he has called ‗formal indication‘. 
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Formal Indication 
 
‗Formal Indication‘ (formale Anzeige) is a method that Heidegger uses to introduce 
terms and concepts necessary to his project, without permitting those concepts to 
fall prey to particular, though not all philosophical prejudices.  Concepts which 
have been ‗formally indicated‘ are almost without content.  Thus the term ‗am‘ 
‗formally indicates‘ ‗to exist‘ but it does not presuppose individual consciousness or 
the cogito.   This is the ‗negative‘ aspect of formal indication, that it has, in 
Heidegger words ‗a prohibiting character…‘ (PIA, p.105).  Formal indication 
embargoes discussions about the nature of a particular instance of a concept: what 
Heidegger called the ontic level.  In short, whilst one can discuss the concept of 
‗wine‘ discussing particular kinds of ‗wine‘ is prohibited. Talk about red wine, 
white wine, good wine or bad wine, is prohibited since they are not necessary to 
understand the concept of ‗wine‘.  A good or bad wine is still wine. ―Formal 
Indication prohibits any ontic discussion for as a long as we are doing 
phenomenological ontology.‖ (Overgaard, 2004, p.85).  It prevents the investigation 
into being switching from the ontological to the ontic level.  This aspect of the 
formal indication bears similarity to Husserl‘s epoché, in particular, ‗bracketing‘.  
Just as Husserl‘s epoché was designed to prevent any assumptions about an object, 
it is the prohibitive-deterring function of formal indication that prevents one from 
assuming that one‘s surroundings are ‗natural‘, ‗objects of nature‘ that ‗I‘ can touch 
and use.  
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However, concepts that give direction to the analysis must be chosen, so 
ultimately the concept will have some content.  The term Dasein implies existence, 
similarly the term World implies surroundings and this brings us to the ‗positive‘ 
aspect of Heidegger‘s Ansatzmethode (formal method).  These terms point to the 
‗how‘ of a thing, but not the ‗what‘.  Dasein implies existence - the ‗how‘ of Dasein, 
but not to ‗what‘ it is that makes this existence possible.  Formally indicated 
concepts, whilst prohibiting discussion at the ontic level, are intended to point the 
inquirer towards the ontological problematic of being.  
 
The Phenomenon: Appearance and Phenomenology  
 
In section seven of Being and Time, Heidegger defines what he means by 
the concepts of phenomenon, appearance and phenomenology in the project as a 
whole.  This is an important part of Being and Time, as it defines, to a great extent, 
how Heidegger will carry out his ‗existential analytic of Dasein‟.  Heidegger begins 
by defining the concept of ‗Phenomenon‘.  In short ‗phenomenon‘ means ―that 
which shows itself in itself ‖ (BT: 51), that which is manifest, available to Dasein. It 
is not an appearance ―…phenomena are never appearances…‖ and it is also not a 
semblance, a mere appearance of an appearance: 
 
We shall….distinguish ―phenomenon‖ from ―semblance‖, which 
is a privative modification of ―phenomenon‖ as thus defined. 
But what both these terms express has proximally nothing at all 
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to do with what is called appearance, or still yet a ‗mere 
appearance. (BT: 28) 
 
Heidegger also rejects the idea of the absolute or noumenon, he refers to this as the 
―non-manifest‖ (BT:51). When Heidegger refers to the ‗phenomena‘ of 
phenomenology what he means is the presently unthematised ‗forms of intution‘ 
that might be thematised and might be available to the agent.  Such phenomena 
usually remain unthematised and are always foundational to experience, but to the 
phenomenologist can be made explicit.  Or as Heidegger states they are: 
 
That which already shows itself in the appearance as prior to the 
‗phenomenon‘ as ordinarily understood and as accompanying it 
in every case, can, even though it shows itself unthematically, be 
brought thematically to show itself; and what shows itself in 
itself (the ‗forms of intuition‘) will be the phenomena of 
phenomenology.  (BT: 31)  
  
Having determined what the ‗phenomenon‘ is or what it means, Heidegger now 
begins to define phenomenology.  Heidegger begins by noting a similarity between 
the concept of ‗phenomenon‘ and the concept of ‗logos‘.  Logos, as Heidegger 
explains has been understood as ― ―reason‖, ―judgement‖, ―concept‖, ―definition‖ , 
―ground‖ or ―relationship‖. (BT: 32)  For Heidegger logos means ―…letting 
something be seen in its togetherness with something-letting it be seen as 
something.‖ (BT: 31). 
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For Heidegger, both the concept of ‗phenomenon‘ and the concept of logos 
have something to do with revealing or showing the presently unseen. However the 
‗something‘ made seen is not simply a brute fact which is made available by an 
‗objective viewer‘: the phenomenologist.  For something to be seen ―in its 
togetherness‖ the phenomenologist must ‗gather‘ that something together, she/he 
must interpret it to make it sensible.  This idea of showing or making something be 
shown is a clue to the concept of the phenomenology as Heidegger will use it.  He 
distinguishes between three different conceptions of description: the formal, the 
ordinary and the phenomenological. The formal conception outlines 
phenomenology‘s fundamental aim ―to let that which shows itself be seen from 
itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself‖ (BT: 34). This is 
Heidegger‘s way of restating the main aim of phenomenology, one that does not 
depart too far from Husserl‘s project to reveal phenomena as phenomena.  However 
this conception does do one thing, it defines phenomenology as descriptive, with the 
understanding that there is no such thing as mere description, interpretation is 
always involved, but with no theory about interpretation.  Phenomenology is 
certainly not about making deductions, nor is it about performing dialectics or 
arguments whether they are logical or transcendental: it is a description of 
phenomena.  
 
The ordinary conception of phenomenology is advanced to make the point 
that any object can become the proper of object of phenomenological study, and 
that the task of phenomenology is to make the essence of the object explicit. (BT: 
35) 
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We now arrive at the phenomenological conception of phenomenology, 
where Heidegger aims to do two things; firstly, to answer the question ‗What does 
phenomenology ‗let us see?‘ What counts as a phenomenon of phenomenology?  
Secondly to answer the question ‗How does the phenomenon show itself?‘  
phenomenology allows that which is implicit or unnoticed to show itself. But it does 
not and cannot make the unnoticeable be seen.  Phenomenology can reveal ‗the 
world‘ for what it is, but it cannot reveal God or the absolute, or anything that 
would fall under the category of Kant‘s thing-in-itself.  Things such as these are 
simply unnoticeable: they cannot be shown.  In this sense a good analogy for 
phenomenology is that of turning on the light in a darkened room.  Imagine walking 
down a corridor, you know well, but it is night time and the lights are off, you know 
more or less where the wall is, where the door is and how far you are from them.  
However, they remain hidden, unnoticeable until you turn on the light, after that 
you can see all that was shrouded in darkness before.  For Heidegger, 
phenomenology is essentially that light, it reveals what was hitherto not obvious but 
was already there for all to see.  
 
Heidegger thinks that this interpretative method is well suited to 
investigating the meaning of Being.  As with the corridor we have some idea, a pre-
ontological understanding of Being. For Heidegger, phenomenology is the only way 
of doing ontology (BT: 35) because it will reveal Being by bringing it out of the 
darkness and into the light. 
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How does the phenomenon show itself for Heidegger?  The answer to this 
has already been given: it is through interpretation that the phenomenon shows itself.  
However a short contrast with Husserl may illuminate matters further.  Husserl 
argued that phenomenology should only study that which it can make ―fully 
evident‖, absolutely free from philosophical prejudices.  Heidegger essentially 
reverses Husserl‘s position.  A phenomenon can never be fully evident, although it 
can be made explicit, but explicitness is not the same as fully evident, because it is 
made explicit through interpretation.  Interpretation is necessary, along with some 
prejudgements or prejudices about what the phenomenon might be without which 
we could not make the phenomenon explicit. We can only answer the question 
‗What is Being?‘ because we have a vague understanding of it.  We are now in a 
position to arrive at a Heidegger‘s definition of phenomenology.  He states ―Our 
investigation itself will show that the meaning of phenomenological description lies 
in interpretation.‖ (BT: 37). 
 
Heidegger’s Phenomenology: Dasein and the Project of Being and Time 
 
I have now given an initial outline of Heidegger‘s question and I have 
briefly outlined his phenomenological method.  We are now able to look more 
deeply into Heidegger‘s project in Being and Time.  In particular we can look more 
closely at why Heidegger believes that the main ontological question ‗What is 
Being?‘ can be answered only through phenomenology.  Secondly we can look 
more closely at how Heidegger thinks phenomenology can achieve this end. 
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Heidegger believes that ―Only as phenomenology, is ontology possible.‖ 
(BT: 35).  ‗Ontology‘ should be understood as the question ―What is Being?‘ 
because only phenomenology is concerned with revealing the Being of entities.  
When used in a mundane sense this means to discover the essence of an entity.  
Thus a computer keyboard is a ‗thing to be typed on‘, that is the ‗Being‘ of the 
computer keyboard.  However, because it is concerned with the being of entities, 
indeed with the whole science and nature of Being only phenomenology can answer 
the question ‗What is the meaning of Being in general?‘.  It aims to answer the 
question what is Being, understood not just as the Being of a particular object or 
entity but also understood as what is Being itself?  Being in general would be ‗that 
which determines entities as entities...‘ how we as persons come to see something as 
an entity at all.  ‗Being in general‘ should not be understood as the Supreme Being, 
as a collection or an aggregate of all the ‗beings.‘  Rather an understanding of 
‗Being in general‘ allows us to think of a Supreme Being or a particular group of 
beings; for example, as we do with Biological categories such as genus and species. 
This is because the inquiry into ‗Being in general,‘ which is necessarily a 
phenomenological investigation, is ontologically prior to investigations in Theology, 
Biology, Physics, Mathematics and other Natural Sciences. They apply an 
understanding of Being to a particular subject matter, but phenomenology is 
attempting to clarify the meaning of the very term ‗Being‘ that they utilise.  They 
deal with the Being of particular phenomena, but: 
 
…phenomenology is the science of the Being of entities-
ontology.  In explaining the tasks of ontology we found it is 
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necessary that there should be a fundamental ontology taking as 
its theme that entity which is ontologically-ontically distinctive, 
Dasein, in order to confront the cardinal problem-the question of 
the meaning of Being in general (BT: 37).  
 
With this statement, Heidegger shares his view on the why only phenomenology can 
resolve the question ‗What is Being?‘  It is because phenomenology is the ―science 
of the Being of entities.‖  And no other science has ‗Being in general‘ as its object 
of study.  He has also begun to introduce the how, through a phenomenology of 
Dasein.  I have already mentioned Dasein in this thesis and at that point I left it 
unexplained and untranslated, except to say that it ―implies existence‖.  In German 
Dasein means precisely that - existence.  Heidegger has chosen the term quite 
deliberately for in a sense it is a quite common place and non-technical word.  
Immanuel Kant uses it in the Prologemena.  For Heidegger however it takes on a 
whole new meaning.  Since it does refer to ‗existence‘ it is his way of making a start 
on the question of Being.  And because it refers to existence it is, as he puts it 
―ontologically-ontically distinctive‖.  What he means is that existence has a relation 
to Being (ontologically) and entities (ontically).  Because of this Dasein ―has 
ontologically priority over every other entity‖ (BT: 37-8). The phenomenology of 
Dasein will also be hermeneutic in the sense that the phenomenology of Dasein will 
be concerned with revealing the structure of Dasein: in revealing the structure of 
Dasein it will also reveal the conditions for any future ontological investigations. 
(BT: 37).  Thus Heidegger shows than an investigation of Dasein or an ‗existential 
analytic of existence‘ will be necessary a step on the way to arriving at an answer to 
the question ‗What is Being in general?‘ 
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Dasein Reborn 
 
We are ourselves the entities to be analyzed. The Being of any 
such entity is in each case mine.  These entities, in their Being, 
comport themselves toward their Being.  As entities with such 
Being, they are delivered over to their own Being.  Being is that 
which is an issue for every such entity (BT: 42). 
 
Heidegger has made four ontological claims about Dasein: 
A) Dasein‟s being is in each case mine. 
B) Dasein comports itself towards its being. 
C) Dasein is delivered over to Being. 
D) Being is an issue for Dasein. 
 
I will now try to unpack these claims.  Claim (a) ―Dasein‟s being is in each case 
mine.‖ It may seem as though this is Heidegger‘s way of saying that Dasein is a 
person or human being yet Heidegger does not use these terms.  He avoids using 
them because whilst he would not deny that Dasein is ―us‖ if pushed, he would 
want to avoid using terms such as ‗person‘, or ‗human being‘ because these are 
ontic categories whereas at this point his concern is an ontological one. He also 
avoids identifying Dasein with ‗subject‘, ‗subjectivity‘ or ‗self-consciousness‘.  He 
wishes to avoid these terms because they are associated with Cartesian and Kantian 
ontologies.  In Heidegger‘s opinion these approaches failed to capture what is 
fundamental to our being.  He believes that there is something deeper and more 
fundamental about us than merely being a kind of thing (ontically) who reflects, 
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sees an object or conceives an experience as ‗mine.‘ There is something more 
fundamental than the ideas that Western metaphysics has hitherto arrived at.  If this 
is so, then how is ‗I‘ am Dasein or Dasein is mine to be understood?   
 
It may help if we look at what Heidegger says about Dasein and mineness or 
Jemeinigkeit a little later in Being and Time ―…Dasein has in each case mineness 
[Jemeinigkeit], one must always use the personal pronoun when addressing it:  ‗I 
am‘, ‗you are‘‖ (BT: 42). 
 
Dasein is something ‗one‘ can call ‗mine‘ and it is in virtue of this 
‗mineness‘ that a human being is Dasein.  The question we now need to ask is what 
does Heidegger mean by Jemeinigkeit?  The term can be confused as many have 
used ‗mineness‘ for entirely different reasons. For example in the following 
statement by Descartes ‗I am also taught by  nature that various other bodies exist in 
the vicinity of my body, and that some of these are to be sought out and others 
avoided‘ (CSM II, p159 my italics). 
 
Now Heidegger is not invoking mineness in the same way that Descartes 
does.  For Descartes existence or Dasein is mine in the same way that my copy of 
Being and Time or my body is mine and this appears to imply a subject/object 
relation.  ‗I‘, the subject, Michael has a copy of Being and Time, which is the object. 
Heidegger is making the claim that Dasein is mine and that I am Dasein, but there 
is a notion of mineness that is an alternative to the external relation of ownership 
invoked by Descartes.  An understanding of (b) should clear up these matters.  
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When Heidegger states that ‗Dasein comports itself towards its being.‘ he is, 
as William Blattner as argued, stating one of the basic claims of the existentialists 
about the nature of the self and existence: that the essence of the self is to exist.  
Kierkegaard is the first one to offer a variation of this position.  
 
A human being is spirit.  But what is the spirit?  Spirit is the self.  
But what is the self?  The self is a relation that relates itself to 
itself or is the relation‘s relating itself to itself in the relation; the 
self is not the relation but it is the relation‘s relating itself to 
itself. (Kierkegaard, 1989, p.43). 
 
Kierkegaard‘s language may be difficult to access and the passage is written using 
Hegelian language – a system which Kierkegaard and Heidegger are both 
attempting to overcome or avoid.  Heidegger of course never uses the term ‗relates 
itself‘.  However it should be noted that the German for ‗comports itself‘ is ‗verhalt 
sich‘.  According William Blattner this translates more easily as ‗relates itself‘.  As 
a result when Heidegger states ‗Dasein comports itself towards its being‘ he could 
be said to mean ‗Dasein relates itself towards its being.‘  For our purposes here 
‗relation‘ must be understood in a particular way and to understand this we turn 
back to Kierkegaard.  What is important to Heidegger is the idea that Dasein is the 
―relation‘s relating itself to itself‖.  For Heidegger, the traditional way of 
understanding the term ‗relation‘ is to have entity A and a relational element that 
connects entity A to entity B.  It cannot be said that instead of having a relational 
element, Heidegger makes Dasein the relation to ‗I‘, it is rather that Dasein is 
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designated as the ‗relation‘s relating‘.  Dasein is an active entity, it is to be 
understood as operating adverbially, therefore it is the act of relating to ‗I‘, the 
relation‘s relating. 
 
Heidegger advances such an understanding of ‗relation‘ as being in some 
way more illuminating than the Kantian ‗mine‘ or ‗I-think‘.  Dasein, whilst it ‗is 
mine‘, it not should be thought of as something which ‗I‘ have, it is not ‗mineness‘ 
experienced within the subject/object dualistic way of thinking.  It is not that ‗I‘ a 
separate, and self-contained entity experience an object as being mine.  There is 
something about Dasein and its way of relating to the world which is simply more 
fundamental than this.  Dasein is mine, and Dasein and its Being should be 
understood as an activity not just as a static thing it is a process: Dasein has being to 
―be‖ which is mine.  The following statement suggests that Heidegger is using the 
term Dasein in this way; 
 
 The ―essence‖ of this entity lies in its to be [Zu-sein].  Its what-
being (essentia) must, so far as we can speak of it at all, be 
conceived in terms of its being (existential)…The essence of 
Dasein lies in its existence (BT: 42) 
 
This statement ends by pointing out that the essence of Dasein is to exist, and 
existence has something to do with being or rather to do with Dasein‟s ‗ to be [Zu-
sein]‘.  One should notice use of the term Zu-sein and not Sein; this is because 
Heidegger is intentionally employing the adverbial sense of being – ‗to be‘.  In view 
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of this it is perhaps the line ―The essence of Dasein lies in its existence‖ could be 
better understood as ―The essence of Dasein lies in its ability to be‖. 
 
I will outline the last two ontological claims Heidegger made about Dasein.  
Firstly I will deal with (d) ‗Being is an issue for Dasein‘.  As a Dasein, my being is 
an issue or is of interest to me.  This focus of interest or concern would apply to all 
other Dasein‟s.  Heidegger believes us to be ontologically unique, in the sense that 
we only have concerns, worries and hopes about our own ‗being‘.  To use a 
Heideggerian term, the significance of which I will explain later, we ‗care‘ about 
our ‗being,‘ we ‗care‘ about what we are going to be, or what we could potentially 
be.  We care about whether we are going to be a parent, and about whether we will 
be a good parent or a bad parent.  We care about whether we will behave as good 
sons or daughters and we care about whether we will become Doctors of 
Philosophy.  Heidegger believes that we are the only beings who care about our 
being in this way.  Other creatures do not care whether they become good parents, 
or at least show very little of evidence of such care.  (It is also curious, although a 
parenthetical point that even the word ‗being‘ cannot be attached to non-human 
species, one rarely talks about ‗penguin-being‘ or ‗rabbit-being‘) Heidegger notes 
that ―To entities such as these [non-human animals], their Being is ‗a matter of a 
indifference‘; or more precisely, they ‗are‘ such that their Being be neither a matter 
of indifference to them, nor the opposite.‖ (BT: 42 altered). 
 
In his view the issue of ‗care‘ cannot arise because for non-human animals 
their being is simply not there for them as a possible concern. 
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Finally we turn to claim (c) ‗Dasein is delivered over to Being.‘  It was this 
phrase that inspired Sartre to exclaim ‗Man is condemned to be free.‘  Whilst in 
later work Heidegger would criticise Sartre‘s way of expressing this point, it is quite 
useful for the purposes of exegesis and interpretation.  In saying that we are 
condemned to be free Sartre was saying here that we have no choice but to choose 
our way of being.  One must choose to be something or someone, and Dasein must 
choose.  Because it is ‗delivered over to Being‘, Dasein is potentiality, therefore it 
must choose.  For example, it is faced with choices such as whether am I to be 
married or not, do I want to become a parent or not, do I want to become a student 
or not and so on.  Because Dasein is potentiality, it cannot abdicate responsibility 
for choosing, even saying ‗I refuse to make anything of my life‘ is itself a choice.  
Heidegger states all this rather cryptically: 
 
And because Dasein is in each case essentially its own 
possibility, it can, in its very Being, ‗choose‘ itself and win itself; 
it can also lose itself and never win itself; or only ‗seem‘ to do 
so.  But only in so far as it is essentially something which can be 
authentic-that is, something of its own-can it have lost itself and 
yet won itself.  As modes of Being, authenticity and 
inauthenticity (these expressions have been chosen 
terminologically in a strict sense) are both grounded in the fact 
that Dasein whatsoever is characterized by mineness. (BT: 42-3). 
 
Heidegger‘s initial claims about Dasein can be summed up as follows.  Dasein is 
the only entity for which Being is an issue, it is concerned with its own being, its 
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own possibilities, and it cannot choose to ‗be‘ otherwise because it is delivered over 
to being.  Dasein is not a subject in the Cartesian or Kantian sense as Heidegger 
reads them. I have suggested that we interpret the claim that Dasein is ‗in each case 
mine‘ differently from the substantive idea of an experience being mine: for 
instance myself being aware of myself typing on a keyboard.  Heidegger tries to 
elucidate this when he introduces the term disclosedness.  When I wonder whether I 
am a good person or a bad person, I am asking the question ‗Who am I?‘ and this is 
a question about my own existence or Dasein.  When asking such questions Dasein 
is disclosed to me, it is revealed to me as something that ‗I am‘.  It is because of 
Dasein‟s disclosedness that Heidegger says Dasein comports itself towards being.  
Coming to some sort of sense of being, is a practical action, therefore a term like 
comportment is perhaps better suited than ‗related‘, although ‗related‘ may better 
capture its existential characteristics for purposes of exegesis  
 
Heidegger conceived the terms relation and mineness in a primordial sense 
with his notion of Dasein.  He believed that he had begun to present a picture of our 
being that was not reliant on notions of subject and subjectivity or on the Kantian 
idea of experience as something that is there for me.   Dasein aimed at something 
more fundamental.  However, I wish to suggest that Heidegger‘s use of ‗mineness‘ 
is not free of the Kantian inheritance that he was trying to escape since it has to 
allow the possibility of the first-personal.  My contention is that with his account of 
Anxiety and conscience Heidegger opens the possibility of reinterpreting his 
account of ‗mineness‘ in very much the same vein as the Kantian way of thinking, 
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with its notions such of subjectivity and self-consciousness.  Before I can elaborate 
on this argument, we must look at Heidegger‘s conception of the World. 
 
Being-in-the-World 
 
Having formally indicated Dasein as that which refers to existence and 
having begun his phenomenology of Dasein, Heidegger indicates that whatever 
Dasein is, it is a being-in-the-world: 
 
Dasein is an entity which, in its very Being, comports itself 
understandingly towards that Being.  In saying this, we are 
calling attention to the formal concept of existence.  Dasein 
exists. Furthermore, Dasein is an entity which in each case I 
myself am.  Mineness belongs to any existent Dasein, and it 
belongs to it as the condition which makes authenticity and 
inauthenticity possible.  In each case Dasein exists in one or the 
other of these two modes, or else it is modally undifferentiated.  
But these are both ways in which Dasein‘s Being takes on a 
definite character, and they must be seen and understood a 
priori as grounded upon that state of Being which we have 
―Being-in-the-world ‖.  An interpretation of this constitutive 
state is needed if we are to set up the analytic of Dasein 
correctly.  (BT: 53) 
 
The extent to which Dasein is defined as a ‗Being-in-the-world‘ has in part been 
indicated by the discussion in the last section.  However, it is also worth noting that 
the word ‗Dasein‘ means literally ‗there-being‘ where the ‗there‘ should be taken 
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spatially, temporally and existentially.  We are as Dasein a being-in-the-world. 
Being-in-the-world should be taken as Dasein‟s ‗basic constitution‘ in that 
everything that Dasein is, could and could not be, and does take place within the 
framework of being-in-the-world.  Because it is ―Being-in-the-world‖ Dasein‟s 
relationship to the world is more fundamental than the relationship of a subject to an 
object. Dasein as Being-in-the-world is immersed in and familiar with the world, 
rather than the world being an object for an independently constituted subject.  
Dasein is constituted by its world, and the world, as we shall see, is constituted as 
being a world for Dasein. Heidegger indicates this through an etymological analysis 
of the phrase ‗I am‘: 
 
The expression ―bin‖ [―am‖] is connected with ―bei‖ [―at the 
home of,‖ or ―on the person of‖], and so ―ich bin‖ [―I am‖] 
means in turn ―I reside‖ or ―dwell amidst‖ the world, as that 
which is familiar to me in such and such a way.  Being, as the 
infinitive of ―ich bin‖ (that is to say, when it is understood as an 
existentiale), signifies ―to reside amidst….to be familiar with…. 
(BT: 54) 
 
What Heidegger is saying here, and what he goes on to show phenomenologically is 
that as Dasein, we live and act in the world, it is where we work and rest.  For 
example, at the moment I am in my flat in Hull, typing on my computer in a corner 
of my living room.  This is not what Heidegger means by familiarity with the world 
or “Being-in” because what I have just described is purely physical description, a 
phenomenon that Heidegger calls ―Being-alongside‖.   This has nothing to do with 
Dasein as he makes clear in the following statement ―There is no such thing as the 
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‗side-by-side-ness‘ of an entity called Dasein with another entity called 
‗world‘. ‖(BT: 55) 
 
 Heidegger is not denying physicality; for Heidegger, the world is of 
course, a world of chairs next to tables, upon which might sit computers, perhaps all 
to be found in a living room. But this does not capture what Heidegger means by 
familiarity with the world, what he means is for the world to be ‗encounterable‘, to 
be mine, or there for me.  Thus in my living room I find myself in room of 
computers, television and chairs all which are familiar to me because I can use them.  
The computer is mine in that I can type on it and the chair is mine in that I can sit 
on it.  It should be emphasised that this sense of ‗mineness‘ is not a legal claim of 
ownership, it is rather that the object is there for me.  In another environment 
objects are ‗encounterable‘ by me, even though I do not own them.  And this is 
what Heidegger means by familiarity with the world or ‗Being-amidst‘ which is a 
translation of sein-bei or Being-in, and since they are ‗encounterable‘ they are 
related to Dasein.  This is, as Heidegger calls it, a ‗unitary phenomenon‘, not 
something that should really be divided into ‗Being-in‘ and ‗world‘, since this goes 
against the idea of ‗Being-in-the-world‘, of our life being in the midst of the world 
and its surroundings.  But for the purposes of exegesis, Heidegger does separate this 
phenomenon into three parts:  ‗Being-in‘, which I have begun to describe above, 
‗Wordhood‘ or ‗in-the-world-ness‘ and finally the answer to the question who are 
we referring to when we refer to Dasein.   
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Worldhood 
 
Heidegger begins his analysis of the world first by putting forward four 
definitions of the world.  He rejects the first two because they seem too similar to 
Platonic and Cartesian conceptions of the world, they are: 
 
1. ―World‖ is used as an ontical concept, and signifies the 
totality of those entities that are present-at-hand within the world. 
2.  ―World‖ functions as an ontological term, and signifies the 
Being of those entities we have just mentioned.  And indeed 
‗world‘ can become a term for any realm which encompasses a 
multiplicity of entities; for instance when one talks of the ‗world‘ 
of a mathematician, ‗world‘ signifies the realm of possible 
objects of mathematics. (BT: 64-65). 
 
Definition one, seems to refer to a Cartesian picture of world, the term ‗present-at-
hand‘ (a term Heidegger elaborates on later) refers to objects existing in the world, 
and conceived of as res extensa.  This is the conception of the world adopted by 
science.  Definition two could apply to both Plato and Descartes.  Heidegger was 
not precise and the conceptions he rejects may have been characterised so as to 
cover many other conceptions of the world. It would be wrong to presume that one 
definition is meant to fit one particular thinker, more a way of thinking about the 
world.  It just so happens that Plato and Descartes advance similar conceptions in 
their corpus. 
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Having rejected two conceptions of the world Heidegger settles on a 
conception of the world that consists of entities one can encounter within the world, 
they are public and are a world where Dasein can be.  This is the world qua 
environment, and Heidegger‘s full description is given below: 
 
3. ―World‖ can be understood in another ontical sense-not, 
however, as those entities which Dasein essentially is not and 
which can be encountered within-the-world, but rather as the 
‗wherein‘, a factical Dasein as such can said to ―live‖. ―World‖ 
has here a pre-ontological existential signification.  Here there 
are different possibilities: ―world‖ may stand for the ‗public‘ 
we-world, or one‘s own closest (domestic) environment (BT: 
64-65). 
 
By examining the Being of entities in the world qua environment Heidegger hopes 
to arrive at an existential conception of the world, which is the conception he 
ultimately wishes to endorse.  To do this he needs to find the Being, the nature as it 
were of entities, Other Dasein‘s and the Being of Dasein itself. Heidegger believes 
that when this is done he will arrive at the fourth conception of the world: the 
existential conception.  This conception would be the a priori nature of the third 
concept or worldhood revealed by the third conception of the world.   In short, it 
would be the essence of the world. 
 
…Finally, ―world‖ designates the ontologico-existential concept 
of worldhood.  Worldhood  itself may have as its modes 
whatever structural wholes any special ‗worlds‘ may have at the 
time; but embraces in itself the a priori  character of worldhood 
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in general.  We shall reserve the expression ―world‖ for our third 
signification. (BT: 64-65) 
 
The world qua environment consists of three essential components: Dasein 
as Existenz, entities which have the Being Zuhandenheit or ‗ready-to-hand‘ and 
entities which have the Being Vorhandenheit or present-to-hand.  I will now outline 
the categories of Zuhandenheit and Vorhandenheit.  One thing must be made clear, 
the entities are not a thing in themselves, it is being ready or present that makes 
them ready or present entities. 
 
All objects exist in a network of relation and never in isolation.  The 
keyboard exists ‗in-order-to‘ type, the printer ‗in-order-to‘ to print, the paper in-
order-to be printed on.  Every object refers to something else: 
 
The hammering does not simply have the knowledge about the 
hammer‘s character as equipment, but it has appropriated this 
equipment in a way that could not possibly be more 
suitable ...the more we seize hold of it and use it the more 
primordial does our relationship to it become, and the more 
unwieldy is it encountered as that which it is - as equipment.  
The hammering itself uncovers the specific ‗manipulability‘ of 
the hammer.  The kind of Being which equipment possesses- in 
which it manifests itself in its own right  - we call readiness-to-
hand.  (BT: 69) 
 
This is how Heidegger introduces the category of Zuhandenheit or ready-to-hand.  
According to Heidegger objects in the world that we can use, are encountered by us 
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as ready-to-hand. Such an object as Heidegger‘s own example of the hammer is 
ready-to-hand or usable because it exists in a particular network of relations 
between other objects and their function as was described above.  The hammer 
exists as a hammer in relation to nails, wood, et cetera.  The hammer in isolation 
would be meaningless for it would not have ―equipmental totality‖ a place which 
gives the hammer a function and meaning.  Thus the hammer is available for us to 
use, it exists for us as something ‗in-order-to-hit-nails‘.  We do not need not to think 
or form intentions as to how to use it, its purpose and our knowledge as to what to 
do with it is already there, by being part of the ready-to-hand and part of the 
equipmental totality. 
 
The concept of Vorhandenheit or the present-at-hand is a little more difficult 
to explain.  This is because Heidegger does not give it the same amount of attention 
as he does to Zuhandenheit.  The present-at-hand being of entities is revealed when 
we view objects merely as there, but un-usuable.  There is no one passage that 
defines the present-at-hand, but Heidegger does make many remarks, for example: 
 
When an assignment has been disturbed  - when something is 
unusable for some purpose - then the assignment becomes 
explicit...When an assignment to some particular‘ towards-this‘ 
has been circumspectively aroused, we catch sight of the 
‗towards-this‘ itself, and along with  everything connected with 
the work - the whole ‗workshop‘ - as that wherein concern 
always dwells.  The context of the equipment is lit up, not as 
something never seen before, but as a totality constantly sighted 
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beforehand in circumspection.  With this totality, however, the 
world announces itself. (BT: 74-75) 
  
The environment, that is to say, objects within the world are disclosed to Dasein as 
ready or present, objects that can be used for some task or objects that are merely 
there, or perhaps, objects we cannot engage with because we are unable.  A 
consequence of Heidegger‘s account of the interdependency of Dasein and World, 
is a change in the meaning and function of intentionality. Whereas for Husserl 
intentionality was attributed to consciousness, signalling the content of our 
conscious states, for Heidegger intentionality is more fundamental than 
consciousness. It captures the constitutive feature of Dasein as the ‗towards-which‘:  
 
Because the usual separation between a subject with its 
immanent sphere and an object with its transcendent sphere- 
because, in general, the distinction between an inner and outer-is 
constructive and continually gives occasion for future 
constructions, we shall in future no longer speak of a subject, of 
a subjective sphere, but shall understand the being to whom 
intentional comportments belong as Dasein, and indeed in such a 
way that it is precisely with the aid of intentional comportment, 
properly understood, that we attempt to characterise suitably the 
being of Dasein  (BP, p.64).  
 
Thus Heidegger shifts away from the transcendental ego as the ‗seat of 
intentionality‘ moving it to Dasein.  Dasein, when the world is disclosed as ready, 
does not need to be conscious of the object, in the sense of deliberating in order to 
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use it, the object, such as a computer keyboard, discloses itself ‗for typing‘ and 
Dasein ‗comports‘ itself ‗towards‘ the object in the appropriate manner. 
 
It should be made clear that neither in the above quotation from The Basic 
Problems of Phenomenology, nor in Being and Time does Heidegger deny that there 
may be occasions when the subject/object model of the relationship between 
existent and world does capture an aspect of our phenomenology.  Indeed, 
presumably during times of complete breakdown, that is how we view an object.  
Heidegger‘s point is that just that the subject/object model is not fundamental.  It is 
not constitutive of the being of Dasein or of the World. 
 
Affectivity 
 
Heidegger‘s concept of Befindlichkeit is very difficult to translate let alone 
elucidate.  Macquarrie and Robinson translate it as state-of-mind, which suggests a 
mental state, and this is misleading.  It is an attempt to capture the German ‗Wie 
befinden Sie sich?‘ which can be roughly translated as ‗How do you find yourself?‘ 
meaning ‗How are you?‘  An equivalent expression is difficult to find in British 
culture. ‗Fit like?‘ that is found in the Doric dialect, spoken in some parts of the 
North East of Scotland and literally meaning ‗What like?‘, is close.14  Another 
example also found in Scotland would be ‗How‘s your self?‘ both are a general 
inquiry to health and wealth, but most importantly they explain Befindlichkeit, 
emotional well being. Others translate Befindlichkeit as ‗disposition‘ or 
                                                 
14
 Thanks to the McPhersons of Huntly for this example. 
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disposedness, but this suggests behaviourism, that one is ‗disposed to feel sad‘, 
which would also fail to capture Befindlichkeit. No word really does the trick so 
throughout this section I will use ‗affectedness‘ or simply Befindlichkeit.  
‗Affectedness‘ or Befindlichkeit is essentially Dasein‘s sensitivity or ‗attunement‘ 
to a given situation that is expressed through mood (Stimmung): ―What we indicate 
ontologically by the term affectedness is ontically the most familiar and every day 
sort of thing; our Stimmung, our being-attuned‖ (BT: 134).15 
 
There can be some conceptual confusion with Heidegger‘s account of 
Befindlichkeit beyond mere translation of the word; this occurs with his idea of 
Stimmung.  This word Stimmung translated from the German is ‗mood‘.  However, 
not all the ‗moods‘ he analyses are conventionally considered moods.  Fear, for 
example is certainly an emotion, not a mood such as ‗sadness‘.  It appears that 
Stimmung must be doing more work than it would be in common language.   It can 
refer to a certain world-view such a ‗the climate of fear‘, or to a particular culture 
‗the post 9-11 World‘, or to a spirit of the times such as ‗uneasy‘.  It can also apply 
to the mood of a particular situation, for example ‗the tense atmosphere‘, and of 
course, the mood of a particular person when faced with that situation.   All of the 
above examples fall under the concept of Stimmung. They each describe a different 
sort of ‗mattering‘, a salience that is always already there, the ontologico-existential 
condition of Dasein. 
                                                 
15
 I should make clear that for the purposes of explaining Befindlichkeit alone I will refer to Dreyfus‘ 
translation of Sein und Zeit, which translates Befindlichkeit as affectedness.  The page number of 
Dreyfus (1991) is given followed by the ‗Heidegger number‘. Disposedeness is also a translation of 
Befindlichkeit as given in  Being in the World A Commentary on Heidegger‟s Being and Time, 
Division I. MIT Press.  
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Moods have four main characteristics.  Firstly they are public, available to 
all. Secondly, they reveal Dasein‘s throwness.  Thirdly, Moods provide the 
conditions for disclosedness: the necessary condition for the world ‗showing up‘ for 
Dasein at all.  The fourth characteristic, which Heidegger says little about, is 
Affectedness; this is also the basis of intentionality.  I shall now attempt to explain 
these characteristics. 
 
Heidegger is very keen to avoid the shadow of Cartesianism in his account 
of Affectedness, as it would seem to lend itself so easily to such a reading. So in the 
first instance he rejects conceptions of affect where they are private and discovered 
via conscious reflection:    
 
But affectedness is very remote from anything like coming 
across a psychical condition by the kind of apprehending which 
first turns round and then back.  Indeed it is so far from this only 
because the ―there‖ has already been disclosed in affectedness 
can immanent reflection come across ―experiences‖ at all. (BT: 
136) 
 
Moods are public.  By making moods public Heidegger is accomplishing two tasks.  
He is avoiding Cartesianism and giving expression to an everyday expression of 
moods. He notes ―Publicness, as the kind of being which belongs to the one, not 
only has in general its own way of having a mood, but needs moods and ―makes‖ 
them for itself.‖ (BT: 138). 
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The Public or ‗the One‘ is Dasein.  Dasein defines itself in terms of the 
public world, a public world that Heidegger calls Das Man.  This can translate as 
‗The Anyone‘, ‗the They‘ or, the ‘The One‘ as I will translate it following Dreyfus.  
The One is an impersonal community not a community made up of particular 
Dasein‘s but a mass, faceless herd. However as the public world, all our ideas, 
beliefs and social practices have their origin and are given legitimacy by ‗The One‘. 
We see the effect of ‗The One‘ everywhere, for example when someone does 
something rude such as interrupting someone who is speaking or when someone 
commits an act of violence, it is understood if not voiced ‗that one does not do 
those sort of things.‘  Thus ‗The One‘ is the source of all Dasein‘s possible being.  
Whatever one might become, whatever values one espouses, these ideas are 
possible only because they are to be found in ‗The One‘.  Taylor Carman calls it 
‗the anonymous social normativity‘ (Carman, 1994, p221), because it judges what 
ideas, beliefs and social practices are acceptable and which are to be rejected.  Of 
course there is no one particular ‗judge‘ because of ‗The One‘ being an impersonal 
community.   Heidegger believes that for the most part we do not have our ‗own‘ 
self distinct from others, a self that only ‗I am,‘ as what ‗I‘ do, in virtue of Dasein‟s 
publicness has already been decided by what ‗Others‘ are doing. Therefore what 
gives moods their foundation is ‗The One‘ or the public.  If moods were not public, 
no individual Dasein could have them.  ‗The dominance of the public way in which 
things are interpreted have already been decisive even for the possibilities of having 
a mood - that is for the basic way in which Dasein lets the world ―matter‖ to it‘ (BT: 
169-170). 
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Everybody has moods and everyone is at some point in a mood, and yet 
philosophy has seldom looked at Mood, with a few notable exceptions: Descartes 
Passions of the Soul and Scheler‘s The Nature of Sympathy16 to name two.  Hubert 
Dreyfus offers the possibility that it may be the very commonality of mood that has 
prevented it from being subjected to philosophical treatment.  It can be said that 
Mood also ―…contradicts the traditional assumption that one can always know 
something best by gaining a reflective and detached clarity about it.‖(Dreyfus, 1991, 
p.173).  Heidegger writes ―Ontologically mood is a primordial kind of being for 
Dasein in which Dasein is disclosed to itself prior to all cognition and volition, and 
beyond the range of disclosure.‖ (BT: 136). 
 
We can never fully know or control our moods, they are ultimately beyond 
‗the realm of knowledge‘ or disclosure and not under the control of one‘s will. 
Since Dasein is always affected by some mood or another, it is always surrounded 
by a world that ‗matters‘ to it, a world of salience, from which, ordinarily, there is 
no escape.  Dasein is ‗already‘ in a world of salience reveal by mood that is its 
throwness: 
 
This characteristic of Dasein‘s being-this ―that it is‖- is veiled in 
its ―whence‖ and ―whither‖, yet disclosed in itself all the more 
unveiledly; we call it the ―throwness‖ of this entity into its 
―there‖…The expression ―throwness‖ is meant to suggest the 
facicity its being delivered over.  The ―that it is and has to be‖ 
                                                 
16
 Scheler, M. trans Heath, P. The Nature of Sympathy. Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
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which is disclosed in Dasein‘s affectedness. (Dreyfus, 1991, 
p.173-4: BT:135) 
 
Not only does mood reveal the world as ‗mattering‘ to Dasein, it also provides the 
conditions for the specific situations that affect us and it influences how we may 
react to them.  In a sense it both limits and opens possibilities for Dasein.  If I am 
afraid, that may prevent me from acting because I am paralysed with fear, but it 
might also spur me to act.  Or as Heidegger states ―The ―bare mood‖ discloses the 
―there‖ more primordially, but correspondingly it closes it off more stubbornly than 
any not perceiving.‖(Dreyfus, 1991, p.174: BT:136). 
 
Moods do not just disclose, or indeed, close the world off to us rather they disclose 
Dasein itself, in its throwness as being ‗in a mood: 
 
A being of the character of Dasein is its ―there‖ in such a way 
that, whether explicitly or not, it finds itself in its throwness.  In 
affectedness Dasein is always brought before itself, and has 
always found itself, not in the sense of coming itself by 
perceiving itself, but in the sense of finding itself in the mood 
that it has. (BT: 135) 
 
Dasein ‗finds itself‘ in a mood, not by introspection, but by discovering that the 
world appears in a certain way.  This experience is not unusual, one can, in a 
particular situation find a mood ‗creeping up on one‘ such as sadness at funeral, or 
happiness at unexpected good news.  It is not that the person introspects and 
perceives ‗sadness‘, rather they just find things in the world sad. 
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It is worth emphasising that as the conditions of Originary Intentionality, by 
making some things ‗show up‘ as mattering and others not, moods ―provide the 
background‖ (Dreyfus, 1991, p: 174) for intentionality.  For example, I may not fix 
the washing machine, because at the time it needed fixing I was receiving good 
news about my brother passing his exams.   Compared to this the washing machine 
ceased to ‗matter‘ in that way, so it did not take on the shape of ‗something to be 
fixed‘.  As Heidegger points out ―Mood has already disclosed, in every case, being-
in-the-world as a whole and makes it possible first of all to direct oneself towards 
something.‖ (BT: 135) Heidegger goes on to show how affectedness may ‗provide 
the background‘ for particular intentional directedness towards specific entities.  It 
does this by contrasting the ‗affect‘ of fear with Anxiety.  
 
Anxiety  
 
Heidegger begins his discussion of Anxiety with a discussion of fear which 
he sees as ontologically less important; however he wishes to differentiate it from 
fear, so it is with fear that we begin this discussion.  According to Heidegger, when 
we are afraid we have the feeling of fear, that is to say the sense itself, an object or 
situation of which are afraid, and/or an object we are afraid of.  When a gun is 
pointed at me it is something I am afraid of, losing a limb or my life is what I am 
afraid of, I am ‗in fear of my life‘, and then there is the actual sensation of fear.  
Dreyfus points out that ―Primarily and usually, Dasein is in terms of what it 
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concerned with.  When this is endangered, being-amidst is threatened.‖ (Dreyfus, 
1991, p.176: BT180-81). 
 
Fear has an object, the thing of which we are afraid, therefore the 
phenomenon of fear opens the possibility of new courses of action for the ‗towards-
which‘.  However, for Heidegger Anxiety is not like that.  Whilst one can be 
anxious about something, this is not Anxiety for Heidegger.  He uses the term 
Anxiety in a very specific way because for him Anxiety is objectless, that is to say 
that it does not have a specific object, for example the failure to finish a piece of 
work on time.  The only example from everyday life would be a panic attack or 
nervous breakdown in which Anxiety grips one to such an extent that one is simply 
incapable of action. 
 
Even though Heidegger‘s exposition of fear is brief, he does go on to show 
how Anxiety is markedly different from fear.  Anxiety is a ―privileged way in 
which Dasein is disclosed‖ (BT: 185).  The aim of this brief account of fear was to 
help us see why Anxiety is a ‗privileged way‘.  And why is this account needed at 
all?  Heidegger needs to show how Dasein can be disclosed to itself, how all the 
different modes of being must be found in Dasein‘s mode of being. Without that 
Dasein would seem to play no part in fundamental ontology, or at least it is difficult 
to make the case that it has a role to play in that project thus the project itself risks 
falling apart. 
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If the existential analytic of Dasein is to retain clarity in 
principle as to its function in fundamental ontology, then in 
order to master its provisional task of exhibiting Dasein‘s being, 
it must seek for one of the most far reaching and most 
primordial possibilities of disclosure-one that lies in Dasein 
itself . (BT: 80-81)  
 
Now whatever allows Dasein‟s self-disclosure, it cannot be found in every day 
experiences for these rely on particular and possibly private experiences, therefore 
they are not adequate to the task for whilst I may have this experience another may 
not.  Instead Heidegger chooses Anxiety for this task.  There is logic behind this, 
just as the breakdown of equipment reveals the ready-to-hand so Dasein is ‗broken 
down‘ by Anxiety: 
 
Anxiety individualizes Dasein and thus discloses it as ―solus 
ipse.‖ But this existential ―solipsism‖ is so far from the 
displacement of putting an isolated subject-thing into the 
innocuous emptiness of a world of a worldless occurring, that in 
an extreme sense what it does is precisely to bring Dasein face 
to face with its world as world, and thus bring it face to face 
with itself as being-in-the-world. (Dreyfus, 1991, p.176: BT188) 
 
However, during an experience of Anxiety, the public world is without significance 
for Dasein.  Dasein relates to it as an unready object, only worse for ―anxiety is 
total is disturbance‖ (Dreyfus, 1991, p.177).  Instead of ―revealing some part of 
the…world from the inside ... the whole world is revealed ―as if from the outside‖ 
(Dreyfus, 1991, p.177).  But unlike simple unreadiness ‗the world‘ is still ‗there‘ is 
just appears unusable. Anxiety has disengaged Dasein.  The world collapses away 
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from Dasein, not as an ―unstructured mass‖, to use Dreyfus‘ term, which the 
inauthentic Dasein can see, but not use. And in Anxiety ―Dasein‘s ... not-being-at-
home breaks through‖ (Dreyfus, 1991, p.179)  Unable to engage in the world 
Dasein is ―unsettled‖ or ―not-being-at-home‖ (BT: 188).  Everything is there and 
nothing is usable.  However as disconcerting as the experience is, it reveals 
Dasein‟s essential structure to itself, it is (usually) thrown temporalised existence, 
directed through intentionality made possible through affectivity, and it is just not 
that now.  Unsettled, cast out from the world, it is now aware of the ready and the 
present, of worldiness, and of the mood it now lacks to enable directedness, 
‗nothing matters‘.  
 
With Anxiety, Dasein is individualised in the sense that it is singled out 
alone, hence the reference to solus ipse, it is now apart from all other particular 
Dasein‘s, and comes ‗face to face with itself as being-in-the-world‘.  Through 
Anxiety Dasein is now distinct and separate from other Daseins, it has been 
individualised.  However, whilst a particular Dasein has be located and separated 
from the ‗The One‘, the general herd, Anxiety can be expressed in the third-
personal, it has however ‗set the stage‘ and made possible the first-personal.  This 
possibility is to be found with the call of conscience. 
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Conscience 
 
Dasein has been individualised by Anxiety, although this does not mean that 
it has now become a subject, in the Cartesian or Kantian sense of that notion, with a 
singular, particular, ‗I‘ and a singular consciousness, an ‗I that I am‘.  However, 
Anxiety has individualised and particularised Dasein, that is to say separated it 
from other Dasein‘s.  However Heidegger still couches the language of Dasein in 
the third-personal.  He now wishes to characterise being-a-self, as opposed to a one-
self, being a particular Self without falling into the ‗Cartesian/Kantian trap‘ of using 
the first-personal.  Heidegger intends to achieve this through investigating the 
phenomenon of conscience (Gewissen). 
 
The ‗call of conscience‘ is one way in which Dasein self-discloses and 
makes disclosure to the world, but it must be a particular type of disclosure.  It must 
not show Dasein to be merely dependent on the public world, on the ‗they-self‘.  
This condition means that the call of conscience cannot be a set of moral or social 
principles, ready packaged for Dasein to lead its ‗authentic‘ life.  Instead, ‗the call‘ 
must place Dasein beyond this, beyond simply acting out any moral principle that 
may usually apply in a given situation.  In this sense, what the voice of conscience 
does not say is just as important as what does say to Dasein.  Heidegger says: 
 
The call asserts nothing, gives no information about world-
events, has nothing to tell.  Least of all does it try to set going a 
‗soliloquy‘ in the Self to which it has appealed. ‗Nothing‘ gets 
the called to [zu-gerufen] this Self, but it has been summoned 
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[aufgerufen] to itself-that is, to its ownmost potentiality-for-
Being…Conscience discourses solely and constantly in the 
mode of keeping silent.‖ (BT: 274) 
 
In understanding what Heidegger means by the ‗call‘ and the ‗voice‘ of conscience 
we must recall that throughout Being and Time Heidegger has been emphasising 
Dasein‘s disclosedness, that it discloses itself and the world to itself.  Therefore it 
should not come as a surprise, that Dasein is to be both the ‗caller‘ and the ‗called‘.   
In Heidegger‘s call of conscience, what is being talked about?  In other words, to 
whom is the appeal made?   
 
Manifestly Dasein itself.  The answer is as incontestable as it is 
indefinite. If the call has so vague a target, then it must at most 
remain an occasion for Dasein to pay attention to itself.  But it is 
essential to Dasein that along with the disclosedness of its world 
it has been disclosed to itself, so that it always understands 
itself…And to what is one called when one is thus appealed to? 
To one‘s own Self  (BT: 272-3). 
 
Thus, Dasein calls and answers, but one must clear about what Heidegger means by 
that.  The call is made to ―the they-self in its Self‖ to the One to isolate the Self as a 
potential singular self, a singular Dasein, to choose to accept its possibilities as a 
singular self, different from the ‗One‘ or the public.  Heidegger states ―…such an 
appeal…summons the Self to its potentiality-for-Being-its-Self, and thus calls 
Dasein forth to its possibilities.‖ (BT: 274). 
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Thus, Dasein is both the ‗caller‘ and the ‗called‘ of conscience, in its own 
attempt to bring itself forth to its own Being.  And yet it should be made clear, 
Dasein cannot be aware that it is the origin of its conscience.  The ‗call‘ seems to 
Dasein to be non-specific in origin.  Indeed whilst the caller is Dasein, it seems to 
Dasein that the ‗call‘ came from ‗beyond‘ it. 
 
Indeed the call is precisely something that we ourselves have 
neither planned nor prepared for nor voluntarily performed, nor 
have we ever done so. ‗It‘ calls, against our expectations, and 
even against our will.  On the other hand, the call undoubtedly 
does not come from someone else who is with me in the world.  
The call comes from me and yet from beyond me. (BT: 274) 
 
Care as the Being of Dasein 
 
Heidegger, having outlined Dasein‘s various ways of being is now able to 
give an answer, albeit incomplete, to his question ‗What is the meaning of Being?‘.  
His answer in short is Care (Sorge): 
   
Dasein exists as a being for which, in its being, that being is an 
issue.  Essentially ahead of itself, it has projected itself upon its 
ability to be before going on to any mere consideration of itself.  
In its projection it reveals itself as something which has been 
thrown.  It has been thrownly abandoned to the ―world‖ and falls 
into it concernfully.  As care - that is, an existing in the unity of 
the projection which has been fallingly thrown - this entity has 
been disclosed as a ―there‖. (BT: 406) 
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However, Heidegger‘s use of the term ‗Care‘ should not be taken to mean 
something such as ‗I am a careful person, because I work hard‘ or ‗I am worried 
about my thesis.‘ It is not referring to the concern of one particular agent for 
him/herself.  It should be primarily understood ontologically not ontically as ―the 
being for whom being is an issue‖ in that Dasein ‗cares‘ about itself, its projects, its 
surrounding world and others: 
  
[Care] is to be taken as an ontological structural concept.  It has 
nothing to do with ―tribulation,‖ ―melancholy,‖ or even the 
―cares of life,‖ though ontically one can come across these in 
every Dasein.  These-like their opposites ―gaiety‖ and ―freedom 
from care‖- are ontically possible only because Dasein, when 
understood ontologically, is care. (BT: 57) 
 
Since the Being of Dasein is Care, Care is like the world, ―always already there‖, it 
is constitutive of Dasein.  One cannot ‗opt out‘ of Care, for care is not only 
constitutive of Dasein, but is involved in all of Dasein‘s activities, in fact it makes 
them possible: 
 
Care, a primordial structural totality lies ―before‖ [―vor‖] every 
factical ―attitude‖ and ―situation‖ of Dasein, and it does so 
existentially a priori; this means that it always lies in them.  So 
the phenomenon by no means expresses a priority of the 
―practical‖ attitude over the theoretical.  When we ascertain 
something present-at-hand by merely beholding it, this activity 
has the character of care just as much as does a ―political action‖ 
or taking a rest or enjoying oneself.  ―Theory‖ and ―practice‖ are 
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possibilities of a being for an entity whose being must be 
defined as a ―care‖. (BT: 193) 
 
Now, since the analysis of Dasein was ultimately going to be ontic, the ontic or 
particular modes of ‗care‘ are included but are derived from the care qua 
ontological: 
 
Because being-in-the-world is essentially care (Sorge), being-
amidst the available could then be taken in our previous analyses 
as concern (Besorgen) and being with the Dasein-with of others 
as we encounter it within-the-world could be taken as solicitude 
(Fursorge). (BT: 193) 
 
To conclude this part, it is important to make clear that Care as the Being of Dasein, 
is an ‗incomplete‘ answer because the issue of temporality was never fully 
articulated and resolved by Heidegger aside from his claim that temporality should 
be understood ―as the Ontological Meaning of Care.‖ (BT: 323).  Exactly how this 
was to be understood is more difficult to say since Heidegger never finished 
Division II.   What can be gleaned is that Heidegger is pointing towards the idea of 
Dasein as ecstatic: 
 
The being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-being-already-in-(the 
world) as being-amidst (entities encountered within-the-world).  
This being fills the signification of the term ―care,‖ which is 
used in a purely ontologico-existential manner (BT: 192). 
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Dasein, is always amidst, always ‗out there‘, ecstatic.  It is always ahead of itself, it 
looks towards the future therefore it has a horizontal temporal structure.  Thus 
temporality is what gives care its ―ontological meaning‖. Thus it is because the 
Being of Dasein is care that individual Dasein‘s can perform actions such as writing 
theses, negotiating the world and being with others, indeed living a life.   
 
I have given an exegesis of Heidegger‘s ideas in Being and Time.  I will now 
evaluate and critique his project in the light of his criticisms of his predecessors and 
my own concern with subjectivity.  
 
Conscience and First-Person Awareness in Being and Time 
 
Using Heidegger‘s account of conscience, I wish to argue that he may have 
committed himself to giving an account of first-personal self-awareness or self-
consciousness.  It should be understood that Heidegger never denies the first-
personal, but he is cautious how the first-personal is to framed and understood.  
Certainly Heidegger never meant Dasein to be understood as in the Kantian sense 
of an autonomous thinker.  The existential analytic of Dasein whilst it concerns 
particular human beings – ‗me‘ and ‗you‘ is framed in third personal language, in 
order to give an general account, one that can apply to all human beings.  However, 
the language Heidegger must use to give his account of conscience lends itself to 
first-personal description.  The call of conscience is made to ‗one‘s own Self‘ and 
as Dasein is both caller of and ‗responder‘ to conscience seems to suggest first-
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personal description.  Heidegger would remind us that ultimately the call comes 
from ‗beyond me‘ from the general Dasein, the one-self and is answered by ‗I‘ the 
particular self.  However, ―the call comes from that entity which in each case I 
myself am‖ (BT: 278).  It is difficult to interpret this as anything but first-personal 
self-awareness.  It seems that with conscience Dasein is further individualised as 
personal self, a self, suffering breakdown after Anxiety and singled out by 
conscience as subject: an ‗I that I am‘.  This is suggested by his discussion of 
conscience and being-Guilty.  After all, it was ‗I myself‘ that watched ‗House M.D‘ 
instead of doing my thesis it was no other person, it is I alone who must answer for 
my laziness.  It is difficult to interpret this in any way other than the first-personal.   
 
However, one might still ask, what is the nature of this first-personal self-
awareness that has been located?  It is certainly not the one-self, the general ‗I‘ and 
neither is it the singular self, rather it is as Crowell puts it, ―a hidden condition of 
both‖ (Crowell, 2001, p.444), that first-personal self-awareness is a necessary 
condition for both.  Again Heidegger himself suggests this (however inadvertently).  
Crowell states: 
 
The uncanny ‗nothing at all‘ revealed in breakdown and voiced 
as conscience is Dasein‘s ‗basic kind of being in the world, even 
though in the everyday way it has been covered up‘ (BT: 
322/277).  Thus even the call ‗to the Self in the one-self does not 
force it inwards upon itself, so that it can close itself from the 
―exterior world‖‘ (BT: 318/273), this is not because subjectivity 
is somehow ‗part‘ of that world or totality of significance.  
Rather it is because this image of subjectivity – an ‗interior‘ 
space of representations cut off from the external world – is not 
subjective enough. (Crowell, 2001, p.444) 
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If the uncanny is Dasein‘s ‗basic state‘ and is fully shown to Dasein as conscience 
then some sort of first-personal awareness must be a condition of the Dasein, since 
(as Crowell and I contend) conscience can only be understood in first-personal 
terms.  However it is not that ‗Heidegger‘s subject‘ is merely general Dasein 
‗retreating‘ into itself, as Dasein being interdependent with the world, is always part 
of the world would not be subjective enough. Rather it is something even more 
subjective something so subjective that is manifests itself even before Dasein is in-
the-world.  It must be part of Dasein‘s initial ‗make-up‘, its constitution.  I will now 
go on to examine how this different notion of the subjective changes the whole 
meaning of Heidegger‘s phenomenology in Being and Time.  In particular, I believe 
that a different understanding of disclosure and self-disclosure, forces Heidegger‘s 
position closer to Kant‘s transcendental unity of apperception than Heidegger 
would be comfortable with.  In order to show that Heidegger‘s position is not as far 
away from Kant as Heidegger would like to think, we must return to Jemeinigkeit.  
The salient point here is that with the idea of mineness, Dasein, is characterised as 
follows: its ‗existence‟ is something that ‗I‘ can call mine. That ‗Dasein is mine‘ 
might seem innocuous.  Heidegger does not use and in fact opposes terms such as 
self-consciousness, awareness or self-awareness and instead favours disclosedness.  
As explained earlier in this chapter, disclosedness is Dasein‟s familiarity with world, 
familiarity is a priori – hence the world is always already there for Dasein.  
Admittedly in one sense Heidegger does differ from Kant.  For Heidegger, there is 
no ‗manifold‘ to synthesise; Dasein can approach the world since it is already 
interdependent with it, objects are familiar, such as typing on this keyboard, 
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because Dasein as Being-in-the-world is linked with the world a priori.   Thus ‗I‘ 
am familiar with both Dasein and world.  
 
However, although he has moved away from one aspect of Kantian language, 
Heidegger has moved closer to another.  If it is possible to claim that Dasein and 
the world are available to me or ‗are mine‘ because of some prior unity, for example 
of Dasein‘s Being-in-world, then this bears some similarity to the following 
statement: 
 
It must be possible for the ‗I think‘ to accompany all my 
representations; for otherwise something would be represented 
in me which could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to 
saying that the representation would be impossible, or at least, 
nothing to me. (B131-2) 
 
It is not obvious why Heidegger‘s disclosedness might bear similarity to Kant‘s 
transcendental unity of apperception.  I will now explain how this seemingly bizarre 
comparison can be made.
17
  Since Dasein is disclosed as Being-in-the-world a 
priori and as ‗mine‘, Øverenget points out that ―It appears to itself, but not as an 
object, and not independently of the appearance the world.  Thus it is not its own 
object but is nevertheless aware of itself, i.e., of its very essence.‖ (Øverenget, 1998, 
p.164). 
 
                                                 
17
 Much of this argument comes from Einar Øverenget ‘s Seeing the Self: Heidegger on Subjectivity 
(1998) Kluwer Academic Publishers 
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Recall that ―The essence of Dasein lies in its existence‖, an existence which 
is to be ‗addressed‘ as ‗mine‘ and understood in the first person – ‗I am‘.  Whether 
it is called disclosedness, awareness or relatedness, Dasein must have the possibility 
of relating to its own essence and on the basis of this, and only on this basis are 
reflections such as ‗I did this‘ possible.  If it could not do this it would not be 
Dasein.  And since Dasein is Being-in-the-world, Dasein‘s essence is a relatedness 
to the world.  This would be a non-positional relatedness, Dasein as is related to 
itself as itself, not as an object. 
 
It is Øverenget‘s contention and mine that Heidegger is embracing a notion 
of self-consciousness very similar to Kant here.  If Dasein must possibly be related 
or directed towards itself non-positionally, and on the basis of this relatedness, 
reflection is possible, Dasein as the ‗towards-which‘ is primarily directed not 
towards an object, or the world as sociality, but itself, this kind of directedness 
would be neither practical nor theoretical intentionality, rather it is a transcendental 
condition of Dasein as Being-in-the-world.  In other words a condition of Dasein‘s 
being ‗in-the-world‘ is that it must be directed towards itself as an ‗I am myself‘, in 
the first person.  If it did not have this intimate relationship with itself as part of its 
constitution as Being-in-the-world, it could not have the relationship that it enjoys 
with the world and with others, and ultimately with itself as a worldly creature.  The 
one-self and the self after conscience would not be possible without it. Since this 
condition is necessary for Dasein to ‗be‘ at all, Dasein is a subject since it is 
founded on the first-person directedness towards itself.  It is also a Kantian-
flavoured subject since it is Dasein‟s directedness towards itself it could be 
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construed as a kind of self-consciousness.  In this sense one could make the same 
criticism of Heidegger that he makes of Kant when he characterises Kant as using 
the ‗I think‘ to form  ―…the ultimate ground of our relation to entities, a relation 
Kant still conceives in terms of mental representation.‖ (Carman, 2003, p.303). 
 
The ‗I-think‘ establishes the subject for Kant, and Heidegger needs to make 
exactly the manoeuvre with Dasein, namely that a first-personal disclosedness or 
awareness acts as grounds for Dasein as subject.  And, like Kant‘s ‗I think‘ since 
Dasein is related to itself, as it is for Kant, a form of self-consciousness. 
 
A Need for an Account of Self-consciousness    
 
In Being and Time Heidegger wishes to characterise the ‗I‘ of the ‗I am‘ as 
impersonal, understood in the third-person, it is Dasein as Being-in-the-world 
which is understood as mine, it is Being and not the Ego, not the Self that is ‗mine‘. 
In itself, this move is not problematic.  However, I wish to suggest that it becomes 
problematic when we try to reconcile the task of Division I of Being and Time with 
Division II.  In Division I Heidegger is giving an account of the one-self: a general, 
impersonal Dasein.  However, in Division II he wishes to show how Dasein can 
understand itself, not just as part of ‗The One‘, but as a Self, its own Self.  
Authenticity and care can be understood impersonally: that Dasein cares for itself 
not myself and that it becomes its ‗ownmost self‘ can all be described in the third-
person.  However, the process by which Dasein arrives at the care-structure and 
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becomes a resolute authentic Dasein: as in the phenomena of Anxiety and 
conscience cannot be couched in purely third-personal terms, but rather must be 
described in first-personal language, the language of self-awareness.  This language 
opens the possibility of understanding terms such as self-disclosure and self-
understanding ontically: as pertaining to a particular subject, thus putting concepts 
such as subjectivity and self-consciousness back in play.  This may force one to 
read Heidegger‘s account as quasi-Kantian.  
 
In the next chapters I will attempt to articulate a phenomenology of self-
experience taking into account the possibility of a Kantian reading of Heidegger.  
To do this I will use the resources of Zen Buddhism, German Idealism, and French 
Phenomenology. 
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Chapter Five: From Freiburg to Kyoto:  Heidegger’s 
Encounter with Buddhism 
 
Introductory Remarks 
 
In this chapter I will be comparing Heidegger‘s view of selfhood with a 
view given by a Japanese school of philosophy called The Kyoto School, so named 
because many of its leading exponents taught at Kyoto University.  It is worth 
noting that a discussion of Heidegger and the Kyoto School is not a juxtaposition of 
ideas but rather it provides an interesting exercise in comparative philosophy since 
Heidegger himself was personally acquainted with many of its members.
18
  They 
included in particular, Nishitani Keiji, Miki Kiyoshi, Kuki Shuzo and its current 
leading exponent Ueda Shizuteru.  It is believed that Kuki, the author of Iki no 
kozo
19
 is the very real template for one of the participants in Heidegger‘s ‗Dialogue 
on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer‟20 and he is certainly mentioned in 
the dialogue.  Heidegger‘s teaching and interaction with his Japanese students is 
well documented in a number of sources, and a good overview is to be found in the 
article by Yuasa in Graham Parkes‘ Heidgger and Asian Thought21 (87/92) and 
Reinhard May‘s Heidegger‟s Hidden Sources: : East-Asian Influences On His Work 
                                                 
18
 For a history of  The Kyoto School  separate from and in relation to Heidegger see David Williams‘ 
2004 book Defending Japan Pacific War: The Kyoto School philosophers and Post-White Power 
published by Routledge Curzon. 
19
 Kuki‘s  most famous work ‗Iki no kozo‟ translated can be found in Hiroshi Nara‘s 2004 work The 
Structure of Detachment: The Aesthetic Vision of Kuki Shuzo published by University of Hawai‗i 
Press 
20
 To be found in Heidegger‘s On the Way to Language (1959/71) trans Hertz, P,D. & Stambaugh, J. 
New York: Harper and Row. 
21
  G.Parkes (1987/92) Heidegger and Asian Thought.Montilal Banarsidass Publishers Private 
Limited. Delhi. 
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(1996)
22
.  We know that Miki
23
 was instructed by one Kita Reikichi to offer 
Heidegger a post at Tokyo, at a new Research Centre, an offer that was turned down 
by Heidegger.
24
  It may be difficult to imagine how Being and Time would have 
turned out if Heidegger had written it spatially and existentially closer to the Zen 
gardens of Kyoto instead of the Black Forest of Germany, but this is something I 
will not try to imagine here
25
.  The ideas of The Kyoto School especially those of 
Nishitani and Ueda pose some difficult questions to Heidegger especially with 
regard to his ideas on Nihilism, the self and Nothingness, yet I believe we can 
hazard a guess at how Heidegger may respond.  I will begin by examining what can, 
with quite some justification be called the key idea of The Kyoto School, that of 
‗pure experience‘; this was first expounded by The Kyoto School‘s founder, 
Nishida Kitarô in his maiden work Zen no Kenkyu (1911) translated as Inquiry into 
the Good (1990): 
 
To experience means to know facts just as they are, to know in 
accordance with facts by completely relinquishing one‘s own 
fabrications.  What we usually refer to as experience is 
adulterated with some sort of thought, so by pure I am referring 
to the state of experience just as it is without the least addition of 
deliberative discrimination. The moment of seeing a colour or 
                                                 
22
 May, R. (1996) trans Parkes, G. Heidegger's Hidden Sources: East-Asian Influences On His Work. 
Routledge Press 
23
 It is often the form to put ‗family name‘ of  Japanese thinkers first, hence Miki Kiyoshi 
24
 For evidence of this offer being made by Miki see Yusa, M. ‗Philosophy and Inflation. Miki 
Kiyoshi in Weimar Germany, 1922- 1924‘. Monumenta Nipponica Vol. 53, No. 1. (Spring, 1998), 
pp. 45-71. Sophia University. 
 
25
 An interesting although parenthetical point is that the phrase ‗Being-in-the-world‘ can be found in 
Okakura Kakuzo‘s ―The Book of Tea‖ published in 1906.  Okakura writes ―Chinese historians have 
always spoken of Taoism as the ―art of being in the world,‖ for  it deals with the present—ourselves‖ 
(Okakura, 1906/2007, p20).  Okakura spent much of his time with the young Kuki Shuzo and was 
most likely his biological father.  Kuki certainly read this book. 
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hearing a sound, for example, is prior not only to the thought 
that the colour or sound is an activity or an external object or 
that one is sensing it, but also to the judgment of what the colour 
or sound might be.  In this regard, pure experience is identical 
with direct experience.  When one directly experiences one‘s 
own state of consciousness, there is not yet a subject or object, 
and knowing and its object are completely unified.  This is the 
most refined type of experience (Nishida, 1911/1990, p. 3-4). 
 
Nishida is advancing two theses here.  The first concerns the nature of reality; the 
reality referred to here is essentially one or absolute, a reality that does not 
originally admit of any divisions or conceptualisations into subject and object.   
This in itself is not new, many philosophers have claimed that reality is a unity, and 
we as subjects‘ conceptualise, divide and separate the reality in order to make sense 
of it.  Where Nishida differs from nearly all of Western Philosophy is with the claim 
that reality is originally experienced as unity, an absolute unity between knower and 
known, in which there is no distinction between subject and object, hence pure 
experience.  Yet, as we shall see, there is a self that is experiencing this reality. 
 
 The second component articulated by Nishida, as implicit in the idea of pure 
awareness, is his notion of self-awareness, or to use the roman form of Japanese 
jikaku.  This is a difficult term to translate. It similar to the French ‗conscience a 
soi‘, meaning self-consciousness, although it must be understood that Nishida in no 
way treats the self as an object, in fact, it is this move, that Nishida views as a very 
Western way of thinking about self-awareness, one he is trying to avoid.  In order to 
avoid the ‗Western conception of self-consciousness‘ Nishida and the Kyoto School 
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tend to avoid the term when talking about pure experience and the absolute, 
although there are exceptions.  As Miki explains the notion of self-awareness is 
favoured and self-consciousness avoided ―…because the latter is fraught with many 
epistemological problems, while at the same time retaining its essential meaning of 
―self knowing its self.‖ ‖ (Nagatomo, 1995, p.29). 
 
It may help if we return to the Japanese and examine the meaning of the 
term. Mayuko Uehara states: 
 
The term jikaku is made up of two Chinese characters: ji, which 
means ―self,‖and kaku, which means ―awake.‖ The meaning of 
the term itself incorporates the significance of the word jiko, 
which, together with jikaku, plays a major role in Nishida‘s 
writings. Jiko is generally taken to be the equivalent of the 
French soi or moi, but these latter belong fundamentally to a 
system of personal pronouns whereas jiko belongs to a different 
grammatical system of terms designating the person. (Uehara, 
2006, p.55) 
 
Jikaku, then, is a composite of ‗self‘ and ‗awakening‘, where self or ji should not be 
taken to mean ‗person.‘ for this would involve committing to an ontology that 
Nishida has yet to develop.  Rather the self, whilst it refers to the selfhood that we 
human beings have, should be understood more simply as ‗that which experiences‘.  
Kaku meaning ‗awake‘ indicates that self-awareness for Nishida is closer to a 
notion of auto-affectivity of the self or what Jim Heisig calls ―an auto-awareness of 
the self‖ (Heisig, 2001, p.50) in that experience constitutes or awakens the self as a 
self. 
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One has to be careful of how ‗thick‘ a notion of self-awareness or self-
awakening one can get from this one passage in Inquiry into the Good.  Whilst 
Nishida certainly mentions jikaku in this book, he does not elaborate a great deal 
until his book Intuition and Reflection in Self-Consciousness (1917).  However 
there is much in his maiden work and the term can be found in his earlier notes and 
lectures: 
The term jikaku appeared long before Intuition and Reflection in 
Jikaku (1917), in fact even before the book that launched his 
philosophical career in 1911, A Study of the Good. I would point 
in particular to the use of the term in two texts written between 
1904 and 1906, ―A Lecture on Psychology‖ and ―A Proposal for 
an Ethics.‖  Nishida took the psychology of Wilhelm Wundt 
(1832–1920) as his guide in composing his ―Lecture,‖ but even 
so, we can see hints of his original philosophical position there 
in germ. A short section of the ―Lecture,‖ intended as an outline 
of Western psychology, is set aside for the concept of jikaku. 
(Uehara, 2006, p.57) 
 
Nishida challenges Western Philosophy with his ideas of pure experience 
and self-awakening, including the phenomenology of Heidegger.  For Nishida, with 
his idea of self-awakening there is something more fundamental than our 
relationship to the world as a subject to an object as it occurs in Philosophy from 
Descartes to Kant.   It is also more fundamental than our primary way of existence 
as Being-in-the-world (as it was for Heidegger and the Husserl of Ideas II onwards).  
For Nishida, Being conscious-of, or the ‗towards-which‘ i.e. intentionality, is not 
the most fundamental way of experiencing the world. Pure experience undercuts 
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such a notion by presenting a world of experience, given to the self, but prior to the 
appearance of subjectivity and objectivity and, crucially for Heidegger, prior to the 
experience of the world, as world.  A similar idea can be found in Lacan‘s notion of 
the Real, a ‗pure‘ experience of the world prior to the world being divided into 
subject and object, but unlike Nishida, since this is a stage in developmental process, 
once passed it cannot be reported on.  For Nishida not only can pure experience be 
reported on, albeit not necessarily exhaustively, 
26
 being the ‗most refined type of 
experience‘ it is not a stage on the way to subjectivity.  Rather subjectivity is what 
one must overcome to achieve pure experience.  It would also be a mistake to view 
pure experience as a non-positional awareness of the world in the same sense that 
Sartre intends those terms. Whilst pure experience is ‗before‘ reflection, it is 
perhaps misleading to call it pre-reflective as the ‗pre‘ suggests that reflection is an 
inevitable step to forming some kind of subjectivity.  This is not the case for 
Nishida.  Pure experience is instead a mode of experience we all should seek, for 
only then do we know the world for what it truly is, in the work of Nishitani, this is 
absolute nothingness.  I will outline this further below.  
 
Nishida‘s notions of pure experience and self-awakening form the basis of 
Kyoto School thinking. Much of the work done by its ‗members‘ re-interprets these 
notions, in the same way that much Continental Philosophy started out as treatises 
on either Husserl or Heidegger.  Before moving on to examine other Kyoto school 
thinkers it is important to compare Heidegger‘s work with Nishida himself. 
                                                 
26
 Nishida being influenced by Zen Buddhism is ultimately describing a spiritual experience with pure 
experience and as such some aspects may be too personal to describe in words. 
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Nishida Kitarô  and Martin Heidegger: ‘Nothing’ Between Them?’ 
 
 In many ways Nishida and Heidegger were similar people. Both men were 
born as the turn of century approached (although Nishida was 19 years Heidegger 
senior) they both lived as mature philosophers in times of great strife in their 
respective countries.  Nishida was born in a time when the restored Emperor Meiji 
had begun to rule after the fall of the Tokugawa shogunate in 1868.  After this there 
was a period of relative quietude until December 1931 and the infamous 
‗Manchuria Incident‘.  This was followed by the war in the Pacific, and ended of 
course with Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  Heidegger lived through the First World War, 
the Depression in Germany, and the rise of National Socialism in which Heidegger 
himself to some degree played a part.  Added to this, he witnessed the near 
destruction of the Nazi regime in Germany during the Second World War.  As 
philosophers within their own countries even their respective status is similar.  Both 
men were seen as philosophers par excellence, and both dealt with the issue of 
‗Being‘ and ‗Nothingness‘.  Whilst Nishida was not a phenomenologist or an 
existentialist both were attempting to ‗renew‘ philosophy.     
 
However, on the issue of ‗Being‘ and ‗Nothingness‘, they are very different 
philosophers and as Nishida points out this may be one of the defining differences 
between East and West: 
 
What, then, were the differences in the forms of culture of East 
and West as seen from a metaphysical perspective?  I think we 
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can distinguish the West to have considered being as the ground 
of reality, the East to have taken non-being or nothingness as its 
ground. (Nishida in Dilworth et al, 1998, p. 21) 
 
At first glance, this statement may seem unkind to Heidegger. Remember that 
Dasein is grounded in groundlessness, in the Abgrund and that this could be 
interpreted as another way of saying that it is grounded in the Das Nichts, the 
Nothing. Moreover Heidegger agreed with Hegel in What is Metaphysics? that 
‗Being and Nothingness amount to the same thing‘. Also Nishida seems to have 
ignored ―…the traditions of ―the East‖ that are not guided by the thought of the 
Nothing, and to overlook the deep similarities he often finds with the thought of 
nothingness in the ―the West‖ ‖ (Maraldo, 2003, p.32). 
 
However, we must remember that by Nothingness, Nishida means absolute 
nothingness and by absolute he means ultimately Buddha.  Not only does Heidegger 
not admit of the absolute he certainly wants the deity or theology to have nothing to 
do with philosophy, except for his famous call that ―Only a God can save us now.‖ 
(Wolin, 1993, p.113).  In saying this Heidegger is stating a need for the divine, but 
not a Christian God and it is unclear that Heidegger‘s ‗God‘ would have anything to 
do with philosophy. 
 
Heidegger has his reasons for his reaction against a role for God or the 
absolute in metaphysics and these are most clearly explained in his 1957 lecture 
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‗The Onto-theo-logical Constitution of Metaphysics‘. 27  In this lecture he is asking 
the question ‗How does the deity enter philosophy?‘ thus making philosophy and in 
particular metaphysics onto-theological in nature.  If we can understand the way in 
which metaphysics came to talk about God, we can go some way in preventing such 
discourse with the result that metaphysics would be a more open-ended discussion.  
His reason for wanting to remove reference to God from metaphysics was not rabid 
atheism, indeed Heidegger was a believer, but rather that in his view the inclusion 
of God would limit metaphysics as a field of philosophical inquiry.  Heidegger 
makes a three-stage argument for this.  Firstly he reminds us that metaphysics is 
concerned with Being and beings and their grounds ―…all metaphysics is a bottom, 
and from the ground up.  What grounds, what gives account of the ground, what is 
called to account by the ground, and finally what calls the ground to account.‖ 
(Heidegger in Caputo, 2002, p.69).  His second move is to argue, as he had in Being 
and Time, that ontology is an attempt to find an answer the question ‗What is 
Being?‘ and to show how Being can act as a ground for beings.  He notes 
―Ontology, however, and theology are ―Logies‖ inasmuch as they provide the 
ground of beings as such and account for them within the whole.  They account for 
Being as the ground of beings.‖ (Heidegger in Caputo, 2002, p.69). 
 
We now approach the problem that God or the deity poses for Heidegger‘s 
conception of metaphysics.  In the history of Western Metaphysics God has always 
had the status of Causa Sui.  It or the Godhead is its own cause.  If God is its own 
                                                 
27
 Given on February 24
th
 1957 in Todtnauberg to be exact.  See Heidegger, M.  trans Stambaugh, J. 
(1969/2002). Identity and Difference.University of Chicago press. p21 
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cause, then it is the only candidate for Being, for an entity that could act as the 
ground for all beings.  Metaphysics is therefore onto-theological: 
 
Being as the ground, is thought out fully only when the ground 
is represented as the first ground…The original matter of 
thinking presents itself as the first cause, the causa prima that 
corresponds to the reason-giving path back to the ultima ratio, 
the final accounting. The Being of beings is represented 
fundamentally, in the sense of the ground as causa sui. This is 
the metaphysical concept of God. (Heidegger in Caputo, 2002, p. 
69) 
 
With the inclusion of God the question of what acts as the ground of beings as 
whole, has been answered, before metaphysics has begun, the answer will always 
be God: God must be the Being of all beings.  And the idea of being whose nature is 
casua sui feeds into modernity with the idea of the subject, with ‗I think‘ being its 
own grounds for its existence, it exists in and of itself, dependent on no other Being 
for its self-actualisation. We, as ‗Metaphysicians‘ should give up the idea of giving 
an account of God, or indeed what God is not, we should abandon such ‗talk‘ of 
God within metaphysics: 
 
The ground itself needs to be properly accounted for by that for 
which it accounts, that is, by the causation through the 
supremely original matter - and that is the cause as casua sui.  
This is the right name for the god of philosophy. Man can 
neither pray nor sacrifice to this god.  Before the causa sui, man 
can neither fall to his knees in awe nor can he play music and 
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dance before this god…The god-less thinking which must 
abandon the god of philosophy, god as casua sui, is thus perhaps 
closer to the divine God.  Here this means only:  god-less 
thinking is more open to Him than the onto-theolo-logic would 
like to admit. (Heidegger in Caputo, 2002, p.74-75) 
 
The idea of God qua casua sui would prevent the activity of giving grounds, and 
stop ontology ‗in its tracks‘ by taking the place of the Being of beings.  The idea of 
a God, some notion of God not as casua sui and not within metaphysics, is 
something to which Heidegger is not opposed.  In Heidegger‘s essay on Nietzsche 
‗The Word of Nietzsche: God is Dead‘ 28 , Heidegger remarks that Nietzsche‘s 
madman, who seeks God in The Gay Science is certainly seeking God despite the 
nihilism that surrounds him.  He simply awaits God‘s answer.  In short, Heidegger 
will accept some notion of God but not accept that it has a role to play in 
metaphysics.  
 
Could Heidegger accept Nishida‘s idea of the Deity, qua the absolute 
nothingness?  Heidegger had dismissed the idea of Buddhism as a replacement for 
God, in his interview in Der Spiegel, (given in 1966 on the understanding that it 
would be published after his death, which was in 1976).  He stated: 
 
It is my conviction that a reversal can be prepared only in the 
same place in the world in which the modern technical work 
originated, and that it cannot happen because of any takeover by 
                                                 
28
 In Heidegger, M. trans Lovitt, W. The Question Concerning Technology and other Essays. New 
York: Harper & Row.  pp.53-112 
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Zen Buddhism or any other Eastern experiences of the world 
(Wolin, 1993, p.113).  
 
Only A God can save us now, for it is God we have lost and Technology has taken 
its place as the creator of all things.  Heidegger believes that we cannot simply 
replace this with another kind of religious figure such as the Buddha.  However, it 
is curious that according to Reinhard May, Heidegger could be seen with German 
translations of Daoist and Zen texts. Whatever the truth of the matter, it would 
appear that Heidegger would not be receptive to intervention from a Zen influenced 
philosopher such as Nishida Kitarô.   
 
Nishida’s Intervention 
 
In his article ‗Rethinking God: Heidegger in the Light of Absolute Nothing, 
Nishida in the Shadow of Onto-theology‘ 29 John C. Maraldo points out that in  ―the 
traditional Buddhism that inspired Nishida, there was no speaking of a God as 
ground, or God as word from elsewhere; nothing was said of God at all.‖ (Maraldo, 
= 2003, p.35). 
 
There is little mention of God in Buddhism; Maraldo explains that 
Christianity and Western Philosophy, possibly coupled with his interest in Fichte 
and Hegel, convinced Nishida that one had to explain or account for God.  However, 
                                                 
29
 For this article see pp31-49 in Jeffrey Bleoechl‘s (1993) Religious Experience and the end of Metaphysics. 
Indiana University Press 
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as Maraldo points out it also convinced Nishida that ―…there is no getting around 
the notion of God if one is to think philosophically.  Here he seems to comply with 
Heidegger‘s conviction about the destiny of philosophy as metaphysics.‖ (Maraldo, 
2003, p 35).   
 
However, the fusion of Western Metaphysics and Christianity with Zen 
Buddhism creates theory, the foundation of which has been explained with his 
notions of pure experience and jikaku.  This introduces a notion of God as ―largely 
unaffected by onto-theological destiny.‖ (Maraldo, 2003, p 35).  The use of God in 
a ‗Buddhist sense‘ does necessarily use notions such as casua sui or highest being.  
Nishida believed that his notion of ―God‖ is still an underlying subject, just as 
Heidegger diagnosed the Western conception of God, but it is not a substance, nor 
should it be understood through the concepts of identity and difference.  Rather it is 
understood as absolute nothingness.  
 
Nishida‘s notion of the ground is radically different from Heidegger‘s.  It is 
not about giving reasons or accounting for Being, the foundation upon which all 
rests.  Rather the understanding of ground is reversed, it is the place where all is 
found, and that place is ultimately the Nothing or the emptiness – sunyata to use the 
Buddhist term.  Now one might argue that Heidegger uses a similar notion with the 
‗groundless ground‘, it has Nothingness as its ground, literally Nothing.  But this is 
to miss the point of sunyata, it is not Nothing qua ground as grounding, that creates 
or accounts for particular beings, rather it is ‗placemaking‘ to use John Maraldo‘s 
term.  It is a way of thinking about Nothingness in the sense of finding it a place, a 
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place where all are.  In this way Buddhist thought is similar to the Ancient Greek 
thought of Heraclitis, All is One, and that One ‗is‘ Nothingness.  The One does not 
ground rather it is the Many, the place of all things. 
 
Secondly, the character of absolute nothingness must be made clear.  God 
qua absolute nothingness is not an absolute that stands in opposition to the relative.  
This would simply make absolute nothingness a ―relative absolute‖, with the notion 
of the absolute and relative opposing each other.  But how is it possible to get away 
from such a logic, the logic of either/or.  Nishida‘s suggested solution is to through 
the logic of ―self-negation‖.  Again this is an idea that comes from Buddhist texts, 
in particular the Diamond Sutra with the quote ‗Buddha is not the Buddha and 
therefore is the Buddha‘.  As this statement may seem non-sensical it might be 
illustrated by an example.  If one were to ask ‗What is fire?‘ we could respond ‗Fire 
burns‘ and that fire burns is something fire does it is burn-ing, that is the essence of 
its Being, and yet fire cannot burn itself.  Therefore Fire only is, only has Being by 
negating its own nature, its own self, therefore one could argue that ‗fire is fire and 
at the same time not fire‘.  It is possible to think of fire as existing and as not 
existing, as Being and Nothing at the same time, something that is expressed in 
Japanese through the phrase soku.   Soku should as Maraldo points out be 
understood not merely as ―‗co-independence‘, ‗relativity of opposites or a 
‗transformation of one thing into its opposite‘ ‖.  Soku should be understood as ‗the 
co-habitation of space‘ (Maraldo, 2003, p. 40).  It is difficult to explain soku 
without using metaphors but when it is combined with a negative (hi) it allows that 
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an entity could be and not be at the same time, for example ‗fire is fire and therefore 
not fire‘ or ‗fire soku-hi fire‘. 
 
To return to absolute nothingness aimed with this idea, the absolute is not 
opposed to the relative because of the following logic.  The absolute is absolute 
only by having Nothing opposing or standing relative to it.  To maintain this, the 
absolute must become nothing itself.  It must negate its own being to ‗be‘ absolute 
nothingness.  Or in the words of the example given above the absolute is not the 
absolute therefore is absolute.  The Absolute has ―being‖ by being absolute 
nothingness, it for this reason that Nishida calls absolute nothingness ‗an absolutely 
self-contradictory self-identity‘.  
 
It is therefore clear that this notion of absolute nothingness is distinct from 
the concepts of both ‗the nothing‘ and ‗God‘ as they appear in Heidegger‘s work. 
Consequently the accompanying notions of pure experience and self awareness are 
also distinct from any notions Heidegger employs.  I will discuss in a later section 
whether such concepts enable us to offer illuminating alternatives to Heidegger‘s 
concepts of ‗Being‘ and ‗World‘. But first I will trace the development of these 
concepts as they appear in other writers of the Kyoto school. 
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Nishitani Keiji (1900-90) 
 
Nishitani Keiji was born on 27
th
 February 1900 in Ishikawa Prefecture, just 
like Nishida
30
. He read philosophy under Nishida at Kyoto, writing a thesis on 
Schelling.  He became an adjunct Professor of Philosophy at Otani University in 
Kyoto in 1928, a position he held until 1935.  Philosophy alone never satisfied 
Nishitani and in 1936 he began to practice Zen Buddhism in Kamakura. In 1937, he 
received a scholarship from the Ministry of Education to study under Henri Bergson. 
Bergson‘s age meant that Nishitani had to go to Freiburg, where he also met and 
studied for two years under one Martin Heidegger. Heidegger‘s thinking was to 
have a great influence on Nishitani‘s. They later came to share the same 
philosophical interest – nihilism.  He studied Nietzsche with Heidegger and 
Nishitani himself delivered a talk on Nietzsche and Eckhart.  His first major work 
The Philosophy of Elemental Subjectivity was published in 1940.  In December 
1946, Nishitani was forced to take a leave of absence for having supported the 
wartime government – another feature of his biography that, along with nihilism he 
shares with Heidegger.  His book Religion and Nothingness was published in 1956. 
He retired from academic life in 1963 and died in 1990. 
 
Nishitani‘s engagement with Heidegger takes up much of his career.  In this 
chapter I will focus on three stages.  Firstly, his early work, The Self-Overcoming of 
Nihilism (1941/90) where Nishitani is giving a survey of Nihilism that includes 
Heidegger.  Secondly, Religion and Nothingness (1956/83) where Nishitani is 
                                                 
30 Curiously Nishida, Nishitani & Tosaka of the Kyoto School were all were born or spent their childhoods in 
Ishikawa,leading to a joke that the Prefecture ‗breeds philosophers‘. 
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laying out his own ideas and these ideas have consequences for Heidegger‘s 
philosophy.  Finally there is On Buddhism (2006) which are lectures on Buddhist 
thought, given in 70‘s, where Nishitani also seems to be addressing directly 
Heidegger‘s notion of Conscience, Nothingness and Self. 
 
Nishitani: Nihilism and the Self 
 
In his work The Self-Overcoming of Nihilism, Nishitani offers a survey and 
analysis of Nihilism in Western Philosophy from Hegel to Nietzsche, looking at 
Russian Existentialism, Heidegger and finally Sartre.  He makes it clear that 
nihilism is primarily an existential problem concerning the concept of selfhood: our 
‗own‘ selves: 
 
[N]ihilism is a problem that transcends time and space and is 
rooted in the essence of human beings, an existential problem in 
which the being of the self is revealed to the self itself as 
something groundless…The phenomenon of nihilism shows that 
our historical life has lost its ground as objective spirit, that the 
value system which supports this life has broken down, and that 
the entirety of social and historical life has loosened itself from 
its foundations.  Nihilism is a sign of the collapse of the social 
order externally and of spiritual decay internally-as such 
signifies a time of great upheaval.  Viewed in this way, one 
might say that it is a general phenomenon that occurs from time 
to time in the course of history.  The mood of post-war Japan 
would be one such instance. (Nishitani, 1990, p. 3) 
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Just as Heidegger encountered the problem of nihilism after Germany‘s defeat 
during the First World War, similarly Nishitani encounters it in Japan after the 
Second World War.  Both Heidegger and Nishitani saw nihilism as an existential 
problem and as such, it is not a problem that can be remedied by a social policy 
since it affects our own selves, what it is to be, to exist.  Of course, it is not just 
something that the Japanese faced after the War, Nishitani refers to the Kamkura 
period (and does often throughout his works) when paradoxically a rise in Buddhist 
belief was accompanied by a belief that Buddhist law or dharma would ultimately 
degenerate and finally end.  This was called mappo thinking and it is similar to the 
Christian idea of the ‗End of Days‘: the idea that slowly, belief would disintegrate. 
  
...[N]ihilism is disclosed as a universal phenomenon, appearing, 
for example, at the end of the ancient period or the medieval 
period in the West, and in Japan  in the mappo thinking of the 
Kamakura period. (Nishitani, 1990, p.4)  
 
Like Heidegger before him Nishitani has defined the problem of nihilism as an 
existential and historical problem about the self.  Unlike Heidegger, or least to a far 
greater degree, Nishitani also views the problem of the self as a spiritual one, 
informed by his Buddhist upbringing.  When talking about Nietzsche Nishitani 
remarks: 
 
The body in Nietzsche is the kind of self that is conceived from 
the side of an ultimate self-awakening beyond self-
consciousness, or what I previously referred to as ―Existence.‖  
The affirmation is on the same level as that of a religious 
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believer who can affirm a God beyond death. (Nishitani, 1990, 
p.97) 
 
Following Nishida, Nishitani distinguishes between the self that is involved in the 
mundane world, the self that is conscious and self qua self-awakening. Nishitani 
outlines his own ideas on the self in later works such as Religion and Nothingness 
and lectures such as On Buddhism.  I will now go on to outline these ideas and 
compare them to Heidegger‘s ideas on the self in Being and Time.  
 
Religion and Nothingness 
 
In Religion and Nothingness, Nishitani is developing the line of thought begun in 
The Self-Overcoming of Nihilism, that nihilism is an existential problem concerning 
the self.  In what way is this case for Nishitani?  We concern ourselves with the 
irrelevant things or necessary worldly tasks that divert our attention away from the 
threat of nihilism.  However, because we have consciousness and self-
consciousness we can reflect on our ‗lot in life‘ and in so doing we ―…discover the 
threat of nihility underlying all existence.‖ (Stambaugh, 1999, p.101).  This may 
seem similar to Heidegger‘s idea of the authentic resolute self, realising the 
meaninglessness of existence.  But Nishitani goes further than Heidegger.  He 
wishes to overcome consciousness and self-consciousness, to decentre or make 
inapplicable to any conceptualisation of ‗man‘ but unlike Heidegger Nishitani‘s aim 
is to do this by becoming nihility itself: 
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Consciousness is the field of relationships between those entities 
characterized as self and things.  That is, it is the field of beings 
at which the nihility that lies beneath the ground of being 
remains covered over.  At this level, even the self in its very 
subjectivity is only represented self-consciousness as self.  It is 
put through a kind of objectivization so as to be grasped as being. 
Only when the self breaks through the field of consciousness, 
the field of beings, and stands on the grounds of nihility is it able 
to achieve a subjectivity that can no way be objectivised. 
(Nishitani, 1956/83, p.16  my underscore) 
 
The first part of the above quotation, the underscored part is Heidegger‘s diagnosis 
of philosophy.  If we understand the self and others, including things as beings, then 
all we can do is represent them as beings, and such a representing will distort how 
the entities really appear.  Heidegger goes on to investigate the question of Being.  
Nishitani on the other hand investigates nihility itself.  For Nishitani, investigating 
the question of Being will only reveal more distortions and representations because 
Heidegger‘s inquiry is an inquiry into Being grounded on presence.  Like others that 
were to follow him, for example Derrida, Nishitani wonders what has happened to 
absence.  For Nishitani, if we are to achieve a satisfactory notion of subjectivity we 
must overcome nihility. 
 
Nishtani believes that Heidegger‘s notion of ‗Nothingness‘ has the 
characteristic of being a thing, and therefore it is not ‗Nothingness proper‘.  
Nishitani feels that accounts of the self carried out by Nietzsche and Heidegger 
leave us facing the problem of nihility, that nothing matters to us. The task remains, 
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to subject nihilism itself to such an interrogation.  Here Nishitani offers us a 
different account of ‗Nothingness‘.  It is not like Heidegger‘s ‗Nothingness‘ 
encountered through an experience of Anxiety. Such a ‗Nothingness‘ is not really 
Nothingness at all, because it is grounded in nihilism through Anxiety.  It is what 
Nishitani Keiji calls ‗relative nothingness‘ or ‗relative emptiness‘ it is relative to 
nihilism that is itself grounded in Anxiety.  As Nishitani states in Religion and 
Nothingness: 
 
[N]ihility is still being viewed here from the basis of self-
existence as the groundlessness (Grundlosigkeit) of existence 
lying outside of existence.  This means that lying outside the 
―existence‖ of the self, and therefore also as something more 
than that ―existence,‖ or distinct from it.  We find this, for 
example, even in Heidegger‘s talk of self-existence as ―held 
suspended in nothingness,‖ despite the fundamental difference 
of his standpoint from other brands of contemporary 
existentialism or nihilism.  The very fact that he speaks of the 
―abyss‖ or nihility already tells us as much.  In Heidegger‘s case 
traces of the representation of nothingness as some ―thing‖ that 
is nothingness still remain. (Nishitani, 1956/83, p.96) 
 
Nothingness grounded in nihilism is not ‗nothingness‘ at all. Nothingness for 
Nishitani must be just that, grounded in absolutely nothing, not even a ‗groundless 
ground‘, ground, even a groundless one is still a foundation.  Like Nishida, 
Nishitani espouses absolute nothingness or emptiness coined from the Buddhist 
term sunyata: 
…sunyata represents the endpoint of an orientation to negation.  
It can be termed absolute negativity, in as much as it is a 
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standpoint that has negated and thereby transcended nihility, 
which was itself the transcendence-through negation of all being.  
It can also be termed an absolute transcendence of being, as it 
absolutely denies and distances itself from any standpoint 
shackled in any way whatsoever to being.  In this sense, 
emptiness can well be described as ―outside‖ of and ―absolutely 
other‖ than the standpoint shackled to being, provided we avoid 
the misconception that emptiness is some ―thing‖ distinct from 
being and subsisting ―outside‖ of it. (Nishitani, 1956/83, p.97) 
 
absolute nothingness or Emptiness does not go through a stage of nihility to reveal 
nothingness, absolute nothingness is just that, it cannot be reached by some 
intermediary stage or it would not absolute nothingness, but relative nothingness. 
 
Nihility has a particular meaning here it is the: 
 
…nullification of self by the nullification of the ground it has to 
stand on.  It is not that the self is annihilated out of existence, 
but that all certitude is completely absorbed in doubt, and that 
this doubt becomes more real than the self or the world it 
belongs to.  It is a Great Doubt. (Heisig, 2001, p.220) 
 
Unlike Descartes, we should not look upon this Great Doubt as a method more as a 
way of being.  Nishitani tells us it is not a ‗state of consciousness‘ but rather doubt 
‗presents itself as a reality‘ and ‗in its presence the self becomes Doubt itself‘. I 
become the doubt, and then there comes third and final stage.  This stage may never 
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come to some, but may to others.  Nihility is itself nullified, but as James Heisig 
reminds us - not annihilated: 
 
…but transcended through its negation-in the awareness that the 
world of being rests on the nihility of the self and all things is 
only a relative manifestation of nothingness as it is encountered 
in reality.  Beneath that world, all around, there is an 
encompassing absolute nothingness that is reality.  Nihility is 
emptied out, as it were, into an absolute emptiness, or what 
Buddhism calls sunyata. (Heisig, 2001, p.220-1) 
 
Thus for Nishitani, absolute emptiness/nothingness or sunyata is simply different in 
character to Heidegger‘s Nothingness in Being and Time.  Firstly, it is not revealed 
in the same way or for the same reasons; sunyata is not something we experience as 
a result of Anxiety, but rather it is a process of alleviating Anxiety or Doubt.  It is 
not negativity as it is for Heidegger it is a relief to ‗find‘ sunyata, because it does 
not bring Anxiety with it as one is staring into the abyss.  Sunyata is transcendent.  
Because the experience is spiritual, it is not there for me in the same way as one 
might experience the abyss, or as Nishitani puts it ―It is not something ―out there‖ in 
front of us‖ (Nishitani, 1983, p 97)  I am simply aware of sunyata and sunyata 
whilst transcendent, is ―co-present‖ with being and ―structurally inseparable‖ from 
it.  In short, for Nishitani, Being and Nothingness are the same. 
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The Later Nishitani on Heidegger 
 
I will now go on to outline Nishitani‘s later views on conscience, which 
were partly a critique of Heidegger‘s notion of conscience in Being and Time. 
Unlike Heidegger, Nishitani believes that conscience is a phenomenon reliant on 
self-awareness and self-consciousness such that if a human being did not have self-
consciousness or self-awareness it could not hear the ‗call of conscience‘.  For 
Nishitani ‗the call of conscience‘ can only be ‗heard‘ if there is a community and 
this is also true for Heidegger.  But unlike Heidegger, Nishitani has a much ‗thicker‘ 
notion of community in mind, not an impersonal ‗One‘, but a community where 
every self is interconnected to every other human being. 
 
Nishitani on Conscience 
 
In his work On Buddhism (2006)
31
, Nishitani discusses the idea of 
conscience and its role as a Buddhists Ethics for modernity.  His account is 
Heideggerian to an extent, in that he emphasises that conscience is a relation to 
oneself (or indeed the one-self), the self that I am.  Secondly it is a relation to other 
things and thirdly to other people, again as an egoless ‗I‘ both in the metaphysical 
and in the social sense - ‗I‘ am not more important than another.  The relation with 
others and other things is less emphasised in Heidegger, although it is there to some 
extent.  However it is the fourth characteristic that represents a complete departure, 
                                                 
31
 Nishitani,K. (2006) On Buddhism. SUNY Press. compiled from a series of lectures he gave in the 
70‘s 
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at least from the Heidegger of Being and Time: Conscience opens up a field where 
the absolute, that is God or Buddha can be received.  It is the absolute in which 
conscience itself is grounded, in absolute nothingness or emptiness. 
 
Like Heidegger, Nishitani provides an etymological analysis of the word 
‗conscience‘, with interesting results, for conscience or ryoshin in the romaji means 
‗good mind‘ and as such is related to the concept of consciousness.  For Nishitani 
then, conscience requires some kind of self-awareness.  Of course self-awareness is 
a notion that Heidegger has no time for, but I want to suggest it is one that he needs. 
 
Conscience and Self-Consciousness 
 
I will deal with Nishitani‘s second characteristic of conscience first: his 
claim that conscience is a relation to things and people.  Whilst not explicitly stated 
by Heidegger I believe this to be unproblematic.  We say ‗He is a conscientious 
student‘, or feel that our conscience ‗pricks us‘, or that a particular action was done 
‗in all good conscience‘; these are statements about particular persons.  A person 
might feel bad because they have not done enough work or not feel they have 
helped a friend to the best of their abilities, and this is a matter for their conscience.   
However, the first characteristic – the relationship with oneself – is more 
problematic. Whilst Heidegger sees the ‗call‘ of conscience as answered by the 
‗caller‘, arguably he does not elaborate sufficiently on how the relationship between 
called and caller - that is Dasein as ourselves – is to be understood in both cases.  Is 
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conscience one‘s ‗inner voice‘, or ‗Kantian duty‘, and if it is neither of these, how is 
conscience to be understood in Heidegger?  Or rather, how are we to understand 
that caller/called relationship?  Nishitani offers some elaboration on Heidegger‘s 
account: 
 
―Con‖ indicates a gathering of all things together, and the 
original meaning of ―science‖ is ―knowledge.‖  ―Con‖ has to do 
with that which is all-inclusive, which consists not so much in 
all things collected one by one as in the whole that is given birth 
when these things are brought together.  Thus, the ―con‖ gives 
expression to the whole as such.  It is because of the fact that all 
things are united at their basis and thus constitute the whole that 
the collecting of them one by one is rendered possible. 
(Nishitani, 2006, p.137) 
 
Nishitani reminds is that the English word ‗con‘ used to mean ‗with‘, so the prefix 
‗con‘ necessarily refers to the idea of the whole, of two or more entities being 
brought together, ‗being-with‘ in Heideggerian terms.  We are related through 
conscience to other people and things, ourselves and the absolute.  How we are 
related to these entities, is where the ‗science‘ part of ‗conscience‘ comes into play.  
Nishitani has already reminded us that ‗science‘ originally meant ‗knowledge‘, 
although we should not understand ‗science‘ here in a ‗scientific‘ manner, to do 
with ‗the sciences‘, it merely refers to one‘s ability to know and to knowledge itself: 
 
As I mentioned, ―science‖ is concerned with ―knowledge‖ and 
the means ―to know‖.  At the background of knowledge thus 
established lies the fact that the self knows itself when it returns 
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to itself.  When it is said that we feel relieved, and settle down to 
ourselves, this means we have returned to ourselves.  And this 
involves within itself a kind of self-knowledge through which 
the self knows what it is really like.  This self-knowledge exists 
at the very bottom of every individual.  Such knowledge 
involves self-consciousness within itself.  In this case, reference 
is made to self-consciousness.  The word ―conscious‖ is related 
to ―conscience,‖ and includes, after all an implication of 
knowing (Nishitani, 2006, p.137-8). 
 
Nishitani views conscience as necessarily a relation of knowledge with and of 
oneself and others and as such it is not enough to simply consider the call and the 
called as being oneself, as Heidegger does.  It is not enough for the call to come to 
me and alert me to the possibility of realising my guilt.  A person becomes aware of 
their guilt by viewing what they have done against the reactions other people, and 
whilst Heidegger does have a notion of a community, it is not one made up of many 
singular selves, rather it is mass.  Nishitani believes, in a similar logic to Sartre that 
guilt can only be recognised by seeing oneself through the eyes of an actual or 
possible singular other, and to do that we require self-consciousness the ability to 
reflect on ourselves. 
 
What, then is self-consciousness for Nishitani?  ―It is not what could be 
called a ‗Cartesian‘ model of self-consciousness where we contemplate our selves, 
or strongly adheres to his or her self-consciousness.‖ (Nishitani, 2006, p.138).  
Knowledge of oneself - that is self-consciousness, is cultivated through a public 
activity through which we are related both to the act and to others.  A painter may 
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paint a picture, whether it is a landscape or portrait, and through the act of painting 
comes to know him/herself better, as a painter.  But what the painter has created is 
also public; it can be viewed by others and becomes identified with him/her.  Hence 
we speak of ‗Picasso‘s Guernica‟ or ‗Bacon‘s Screaming Popes‘ the painter is in 
the art, and is not just the producer of it.   
 
Nishitani is proposing an account of self-consciousness that is not self-
centred or egoistic, as it always points to an other as a necessary feature if one is 
achieve this self-knowledge.  But this other is not separate nor separable from the 
self that cultivates self-knowledge, there is not a self/other distinction, rather self 
and other are mutually dependent and inseparable, what the Japanese called 
jitafuni.
32
 
 
Self-Consciousness to Self-Awareness 
 
However, for Nishitani, the notion of self-consciousness outlined above is 
not quite sufficient to secure selfhood.  Despite its emphasis on publicness and 
activity Nishitani feels that there is still a danger of it leading to a concept of self 
understood egoistically, the self as simply ‗that which I am‘: 
 
[self-awareness] is concerned with problem of how the self truly 
comes to know itself.  By contrast, since everyone in ordinary 
self-consciousness becomes conscious of his or her own self, the 
                                                 
32
 If Nishitani‘s account of self-consciousness seems to use Heideggerian model to demonstrate his 
point (Nishtanti‘s own example was actually that of a carpenter not a painter, it is because he studied 
with Heidegger in Germany between 1937-9.  
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question of how the self comes to know itself does not really 
arise here.  In the worst case, a strongly egoistic tendency 
surfaces.  Therefore, the standpoint of self-consciousness is 
rather a standpoint in which the self is captured for itself.  And 
concerning this, I have the impression that here the self confines 
itself within a narrow prison.  But this is not a basic feature of 
the existence of the self. (Nishitani. 2006, p.139-40) 
 
One could, like the painter, immerse oneself an activity so that one becomes aware 
of one‘s ‗painterhood‘, that one is a painter and can be identified as a painter is 
through showing one‘s work.  However, none of this tells us how the question of 
the self arises in the first place, not ‗how do I become a self‘ but how does selfhood 
come to be at all.  For Nishitanti, the question of how I or we become a self or how 
we come to possess an ego must be answered non-egoistically.  Put more simply, 
what is the basis of the self, how does one achieve selfhood as an individual or how 
does one become an individual? 
 
The idea of self-awareness partly refers back to the Kyoto schools ‗founder‘ 
Nishida Kitarô with his notion of Pure Experience; Nishida first expounds this in 
his maiden work Inquiry into the Good, outlined earlier in this chapter. But to 
reiterate, once we understand jikaku as self-awakening, as self-constitution we can 
see what the painter might not achieve from what Nishitani calls ‗the standpoint of 
self-consciousness‘.  The painter, whilst they might realise they are a painter, would 
not realise how being a painter became possible for them at all.  How did they come 
to see themselves as painters who produced ‗their art‘? This is what they learn from 
the ‗standpoint of self-awareness‘, how selfhood was possible at all, but this 
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selfhood is not qua painter.  Hence for Nishitani one‘s existence as a self is 
established at the same time as self-knowledge (Nishitani, 2006, p.146).  The self‘s 
existence and knowledge must be constituted in such a way that  ―…once the self 
truly comes to know itself, it is not because it becomes conscious of itself 
ambiguously,  but rather that it becomes awakened to its real features, saying, ―This 
is ‗I‘‖ (Nishitani, 2006, p.146 my italics). 
 
For Nishitani, if one were merely conscious of oneself, it would be a second 
rate kind of knowledge, possibly treating the self as an object, which raises the 
concerns outlined above.  Also ―there is no difference between being and 
knowledge.‖ (Nishitani, 2006, p.145) for Nishitani since ‗self-awakening‘ would be 
impossible if they separated, one might have to rely on the standpoint of 
consciousness.  However, it is not only concerns regarding selfhood that Nishitani 
has in mind with the idea of self-awareness, but also concerns regarding conscience.  
Conscience as self-knowledge, requires one to ‗know thyself‘, for the self to be 
related to itself.  If the self were separated from knowledge, one would have to rely 
on the standpoint of self-consciousness, look for some ‗objective facts‘ on which to 
base our knowledge.  We determine through an act of conscious reasoning that ‗ ‗I‘ 
am a human being‘.  Through using ‗objective facts‘, through objectifying, we re-
introduce the subject/object dichotomy that the standpoint of self-awareness was to 
help us avoid, we fall back on egocentric knowledge (Nishitani, 2006, p.147).  Once 
introduced, the subject/object dichotomy allows us to reason, to use an example 
from history of which Nishitani was a part ‗I am Japanese, they are not, therefore I 
oppose them‘. 
187 
 
 
Nishitani on Heidegger and Conscience 
 
One can use Nishitani to draw out a challenge to Heidegger.  Recall that to 
hear the call of conscience, Dasein must first be ‗individualised‘ by Anxiety.  Why, 
Nishitani might challenge, in order for conscience to be an issue for us, must it first 
be individualised?  For Nishitani, this claim for individualisation would seem to 
move towards an egoistic account of subjectivity, with its emphasis on being.  It is 
the individual Dasein and not Dasein in general that hears the voice of conscience 
and whilst that individualised Dasein could be a person, a society or whole planet, it 
nonetheless invites an I/Other dichotomy.  It makes thoughts like ‗I am a solider, 
they are the enemy‘ possible, and despite its benevolent intention ‗I must help them 
for they are in danger‘, it invites a dualism between self and other.  Secondly, why 
is Dasein individualised, made almost solitary at the very time when it ought to 
remember its nature as Being-with or jitafuni, that it is connected to all people and 
all things, and not just a solitary individual facing the abyss and their own 
conscience?  Conscience is rarely solitary, we feel we have done wrong to someone, 
or had wrong done to us, by its very nature conscience involves at least two. 
 
Nishitani‘s account of conscience shows up deficiencies in Heidegger‘s 
account since it lacks not only a sense of positive connectedness to others, for 
example that ‗I‘ am part of ‗whole,‘ but it is also disassociated from those Others 
and from itself qua self.  It is not connected to others until it is made ‗resolute‘.  
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This resoluteness can only be achieved through self-consciousness; this is 
something that Heidegger wishes to avoid.  Resoluteness or self-knowledge is 
simply not something one can come to completely alone, it is can only be achieved 
by a person endowed with self-consciousness, it must be done amongst singular not 
general others whom we are intimately connected to and Being-with simply does 
not offer such interconnectedness. 
 
Heidegger’s Response to the Kyoto School 
 
It is difficult to imagine Heidegger‘s response to Nishida and Nishitani, 
whether he actually would feel the need to disagree with them or whether he would 
accept what they say.  The Der Speigel article with its anti-Eastern stance seems to 
suggest that Heidegger would resist Nishida and Nishitani, even if he accepted 
some of their premises and arguments.  However in What is Metaphysics? 
Heidegger states ―Pure Being and Pure Nothing are therefore the same This 
proposition of Hegel‘s (Science of Logic, vol I, Werke III, 74) is correct.‖ 
(BW,p.108). 
 
This seems promising, for in this statement Heidegger is agreeing with the 
essence of the idea behind all Kyoto School thinking, that Being and Nothingness 
are the same, that one implies the other.  However, Heidegger quickly follows this 
statement with: 
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Being and nothing do belong together, not because both – from 
the point of view of the Hegelian concept of thought – agree in 
their determinateness and immediacy, but rather because Being 
itself is essentially finite and reveals itself only in the 
transcendence of Dasein which is held out into the nothing.  
(BW, p.108) 
 
Heidegger views Nothing as that which ―…is manifest in the ground of Dasein…‖ 
(BW, p.108).  Dasein is Being-in-the-world whose essence is Nothingness revealed 
through Anxiety.  This is very different from the idea of Nothingness or indeed 
Being put forward by Nishida and Nishitani which is anything but worldly.  For 
Heidegger, Being-in-the-world or Worldhood, is Dasein‘s fundamental state, and it 
is through investigating this worldly entity that the truth about Being will be 
revealed to us.  However for Nishida and Nishitani Being-in-the-World is where the 
investigation begins not ends.  For Kyoto School thinkers the truth about Being, 
Nothingness and the Self will be revealed once we have overcome the world. 
 
This is the fundamental difference between Heidegger and the Kyoto School, 
and the difference is essentially one of the phenomenological beginnings of the 
investigation.  For Heidegger it starts with the Dasein as Being-in-the-world and 
analyses Dasein‘s lived experiences of Being-in-the-world.  Such an analysis would 
reveal the Being or essence of the world and of Dasein subsequently this would lead 
us to the meaning of Being itself. 
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However, for Nishida and Nishitani, the investigation begins with world but 
this is in order to overcome it, to arrive at pure experience.  It is with pure 
experience that the meaning of Being, Nothingness and our self is revealed.  It is 
not that our ‗worldly‘ self is of no consequence, after all, a Buddhist has to eat, 
sleep and work, it is simply that, contra Heidegger these worldly activities 
ultimately will not reveal the fundamental truth about ourselves, the fundamental 
ontology as Heidegger would phrase it.  
 
Heidegger’s and The Kyoto School’s ‘Self’   
 
The Kyoto School offers an interesting and useful corrective to Heidegger‘s 
existential phenomenology.  Firstly, with the notion of pure experience it offers an 
idea of a relation to the world that does not rely on the concept of intentionality or 
the idea of the ‗towards-which‘.  It is rather that the world of pure experience is the 
ground or conditions for intentionality since it is a world prior to conceptualisation 
before ‗the world‘ is divided into objects and subjects; yet there is still some kind 
phenomenal experience, experienced by a singular self.  Heidegger whilst he does 
refer at times to the ‗primordial‘ simply would not admit such a description of the 
self in his phenomenology.  It allows us to talk about highly subjective experiences 
something Heidegger seems unwilling to do. 
 
Secondly, Nishida and Nishitani show Heidegger‘s preoccupation with 
Being, or presence to have negatively influenced his view of Nothingness.  Both 
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Heidegger and the Kyoto School are concerned about the problem of nihility, but 
for Heidegger, at least in Being and Time, it seems to be a obstacle to be overcome 
in the experience nothingness: an experience that reveals the self to the world in a 
moment of Angst.  However, for Nishitani, any inquiry into Being will be blighted 
by the fact that the problem of nihility had not been dealt with properly.  This 
failure to do so affects Heidegger‘s account of nothingness and conscience.  In 
Nishitani‘s opinion Heidegger views nothingness as an encounter with a thing, as if 
nothingness were an abyss that was ‗out there‘ ready to swallow Being up in the 
experience of Anxiety.  If Heidegger had viewed nothingness not as something 
experienced by Dasein through Anxiety, but as something that transcended anxiety 
and nihility then he would have a more coherent picture of Nothingness.  
Nothingness stands alongside Being, and it is still an experience that is available for 
the individual self, just not one that is revealed though Anxiety.  The opening of the 
self to conscience would not then begin with terror but would be welcomed.  It 
would be ‗welcomed‘ because Nothingness is not experienced in isolation from 
Being, it is experienced in the presence of others.  They may not be experiencing 
with you but it is an experience within a community of other beings.  Heidegger‘s 
account isolates Dasein.  In Nishitani‘s view this leads to a highly mistaken picture 
of conscience because for Nishitani one can only recognise one‘s guilt through 
particular others, through their actual or imagined responses. And an account of 
conscience, one that recognises that as ‗conscientious‘ beings, and as such 
conscious of others, aware of our self as connected to others, is required for an 
adequate concept of self-consciousness. 
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Conclusion 
 
Whilst giving a very radically different account of selfhood, admittedly one 
that requires an acceptance of a religious ontology, the idea of pure experience and 
self-awakening advanced by the Kyoto School thinkers presents a challenge to 
Heidegger‘s idea that Dasein as Being-in-the-world is fundamental.  In the next 
chapter I will attempt to elaborate on this challenge by incorporating these ideas 
into a phenomenology of self-experience.  
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Chapter Six: Towards a Phenomenology of Self-Experience 
 
Introductory Remarks 
 
In the sixth and final chapter of my thesis, I shall attempt to conclude the 
critique of Heidegger developed in the fourth and fifth chapters and I will offer a 
tentative alternative critique. In chapter five, I used Japanese philosophy of the 
Kyoto School to argue that Dasein as being-in-the-world is not the fundamental 
experience of the world, that there is a condition of existence more fundamental 
than this and that is pure experience.  Dasein, because of its worldliness, does not 
capture the subjective character of existence and could never do so, as Dasein only 
appears with the world: the world of things.  The idea of a more fundamental 
experience, something prior to intentionality itself, something that would capture 
the subjective character of existence is not a possibility for Heidegger, except as the 
indescribable primordial.  Through Zen influenced philosophy, Nishida and 
Nishitani allow one to conceive of experience, as immediate experience of a ‗non-
object.‘ The Japanese novelist Yukio Mishima puts this so well when he states, ―If 
only one can direct the eye of self-awareness so intently towards the interior and the 
self that self-awareness forgets the outer forms of existence, then one can ‗exist‘ as 
the ‗I‘ in Amiel‘s Diary.‖ (Mishima in Lingis, 1994, p.78). 
 
In this chapter, I will put the lessons of the Kyoto School to use in an 
attempt to describe self-experience, with its subjective character, that which is 
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‗forgotten‘ by Dasein.  I will be using the ideas of pure experience and jikaku in 
order to develop a phenomenology of self-experience.  Nishida and Nishitani are 
not phenomenologists in the ‗German‘ or ‗French‘ sense of the term.  However I 
wish to explore the idea of a phenomenology that includes the idea of pure 
experience, as I believe only this idea, or something similar can capture the 
subjective character of experience.  I will also be using the ideas of two 
phenomenological thinkers, Emmanuel Levinas and Michel Henry, and the ideas of 
the Kyoto School thinkers in order to develop the beginnings of a phenomenology 
of self-experience.   In this chapter I will give an exegesis of each phenomenology 
and I will then apply these ideas to my own critique. 
  
Three Phenomenologies 
 
As briefly stated above, a phenomenology of self-experience is needed to 
anchor notions such as self-consciousness, self-awareness, and conscience because 
these are certain kinds of self-experience which are so personal, so subjective, that 
neither ego-based subjectivity nor Dasein is capable of capturing them.  Such a 
phenomenology aims to capture a more fundamental experience, one that could not 
be said to have been experienced by ‗I‘ qua Ego, but which certainly involves ‗me‘.   
Such a phenomenology would not deny the existence of the world, but, in a move 
similar to Husserl, the question of the world (though not the world itself), what it is 
and how I relate to it, must itself be suspended.  To aid the development of such a 
phenomenology I will start by looking at the work of Emmaunel Levinas and 
195 
 
Michel Henry. The third phenomenology will be my own.  I have chosen the work 
of Levinas and Henry because both place great emphasis on ipseity and affectivity in 
their phenomenological accounts and they also pay attention to the notion of ‗life‘.  
These ideas will play an important role in the third phenomenology.  I shall begin 
by looking at the work of Levinas. 
 
Levinas: Ipseity, Wakefulness & Affectivity 
 
Emmaunel Levinas (1906-1995) was born in Lithuania and studied 
phenomenology with Husserl and Heidegger.  He is largely responsible for bringing 
phenomenology to France with his work, The Theory of Intuition in Husserl‟s 
phenomenology.  This work offered a whole new way of reading the 
phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger.   I will be looking at his work on the 
nature of first-personal experience or ipseity.  For Levinas, Ipseity has two essential 
characteristics, wakefulness and affectivity, and these give rise (one could say ‗birth‘) 
to a third: „life‟.  I shall discuss wakefulness first. 
 
Ipseity as Wakefulness 
 
In an article discussing Husserl‘s phenomenology called ‗From 
Consciousness to Wakefulness‘ (1974), Levinas states the following: 
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The apodicticity of the Cogito-Sum rests on the infinity of the 
―iteration‖.  The apodictically indubitable comes from no new 
trait of evidence that would ensure it a better openness upon 
being or a better approach.  It is due only to the deepening 
evidence, to a change of level, where, from the evidence that 
illuminates it, the subject awakens as if from a ―dogmatic 
slumber.‖  In the ―living presence of the Ego to itself,‖ does not 
the adjective ―living‖ designate that wakefulness that is possible 
only as an incessant awakening? (Levinas, 1998, p.159-160) 
 
Whilst discussing Husserl‘s Cartesian Meditations, Levinas has introduced a notion 
not dissimilar from Nishitani‘s ‗Great Doubt‘.  Husserl is endorsing an ego based 
subject, but both are in different ways a radicalisation of the cogito sum.  Such a 
radicalisation appears here with the idea that the ‗apodicticity of the Cogito-Sum 
rests on the infinity of the ―iteration‖ ‘  In other words, if a living human being is to 
be constituted, the cogito sum must be perpetually recited and each recitation 
constitutes or ‗awakens‘ the subject again and anew.  Levinas goes on to argue that 
this notion of wakefulness also indicates a notion of ‗life‘ in Husserlian 
Phenomenology, a notion of ‗life‘ as subjectivity which would be understood in 
phenomenological terms  through the concept of experience or Erlebnis,  and not 
through the idea of intentionality, or the ecstasis of being-in-the-world, nor as self-
consciousness.  Rather, wakefulness presents ‗life‘ as a ‗living presence‘ to the self, 
a presence which awakens or constitutes the living self as a transcendent in 
immanence:  
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Does not the adjective ―living‖ express the apodicticity of the 
subjective, which is not only a degree of certainty but the ‗Life‘ 
mode - the liveliness of ‗Life‘?  Does not the adjective reveal the 
importance, from the beginning of the Husserlian discourse, of 
the word ―Erlebnis,‖ which designates the subjectivity of the 
subjective?  The lived, and ‗Life‘, would thus be described by  
the ecstasis of intentionality, not by the outside-oneself of being 
in the world, nor even as…in the passive synthesis of time, into 
a ―presence to self‖, a perfect knowledge of self-consciousness, 
a perfect immanence.  Presence to self, as a living presence to 
self in its very innocence, casts its center of gravity outside: 
always presence of the self to self awakens from its identity as a 
state and presents itself to an ego, that is ―transcendent in 
immanence‖. (Levinas, 1998, p.160) 
 
Whilst I would want to reject the suggestion that living presence has nothing to do 
with self-consciousness, I do embrace Levinas‘ ideas of wakefulness inasmuch as it 
similar to the Japanese notion of jikaku.  Just as for Nishida, the self is constituted 
by ‗self-awakening‘ a primordial experience of the world, the self for Levinas is 
originally and continuously (re)constituted as a self, as ‗I am,‘ the repetition of the 
cogito sum.  I will now outline the second characteristic of ipseity for Levinas, 
affectivity. 
 
Affectivity in Totality and Infinity: Enjoyment 
 
 Emmanuel Levinas appears to see ipseity as grounded in affectivity, it is 
affectivity understood as pleasure or ‗enjoyment‘. In Totality and Infinity: An Essay 
198 
 
on Exteriority (1961/69) the account of ipseity given by Levinas seems to be a 
philosophical doppelganger to Henry, even the title of the section where he writes 
about ipseity is similar ―Affectivity as the Ipseity of the I‖ 33 .  In this account 
Levinas sees affectivity qua enjoyment as being the essence of the I, and affectivity 
immanent to the I, although it gestures towards an ultimately unknowable and 
transcendent exterior. Levinas characterises the essence of affectivity as 
‗enjoyment‘.  Enjoyment is how the self relates to itself, not through representing 
enjoyment to the self or through ‗reason‘ as found in a Kantian account, nor through 
intentionality per se. It is more fundamental than just a pre-reflective awareness of 
oneself, negotiating the world.  Indeed at one point Levinas calls enjoyment a 
―…withdrawal into oneself.‖ (Levinas, 1961/69, p.118).  Because it is characterised 
by enjoyment and not by practical or pure reason, or even intentionality, the I is 
beyond being, it is simply enjoyment:  Or as Levinas states: 
 
Enjoyment is a withdrawal into oneself, an involution.  What is 
termed an affective state does not have the dull monotony of a 
state, but is a vibrant exaltation in which draws the self.  For the 
I is not the support of enjoyment.  The ―intentional‖ structure is 
here wholly different…To be I is to exist in such a way as to 
already be beyond being, in happiness. For the I to be means 
neither to oppose nor to represent something to itself, nor to use 
something, nor to aspire to something, but to enjoy something. 
(Levinas, 1961/69, p.118 & 120)  
 
                                                 
33
 For a parallel account in Henry‘s work see ‗The Fundamental Ontological Interpretation of the Original 
Essence of Revelation as Affectivity: Affectivity and Ipseity‘ Section IV pp457-467 in  Henry, M. (1973) trans 
Etzkorn, G The Essence of Manifestation. Nijhoff. 
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Enjoyment is the essence of the self but not because it is something we do in an 
instrumental sense, such as we ‗enjoy work‘; neither is it a ‗state of being‘.  In fact 
it constitutes the ‗I‘ as beyond being, for enjoyment has nothing to do with being.  
Enjoyment is the essence of the ‗I‘ where enjoyment and therefore the ‗I‘ exists for 
itself, for its own enjoyment, although as always with Levinas, the I faces the (im) 
possibility of an encounter with the transcendent Other. 
 
Whilst Levinas says much about ipseity in Totality and Infinity, some 
themes, namely those concerning the passivity of experience and radical alterity are 
perhaps best brought out in a later piece of work, Useless Suffering.   Arguably 
passivity is the key theme in the account given by Levinas.    Despite its passivity, 
or rather because of it, suffering is not reducible to an object‘s presence-at-hand.  
Nor is pain or suffering a thing upon which we can act, there is nothing one can do 
with pain.  Pain can merely be experienced and endured through consciousness.  
Thus pain is not ―the performance of an act of consciousness‖ but rather ―…in its 
adversity, a submission; even a submission to submitting, since the ‗content‘ of 
which the aching consciousness is conscious is precisely the very adversity of 
suffering, its hurt.‖ (Levinas in Bernasconi & Wood, 1988, p.157). 
 
All we can do is feel it.  The problem with pain is that because of what pain 
is - hurt, it cannot be an object of knowledge, and therefore useful; one can be pre-
reflectively conscious of it, one can be aware of the hurt, but one certainly cannot, 
to use Kantian language, as Levinas does, synthesise it into knowledge.  One cannot 
allow pain into one‘s conceptual apparatus because the very nature of the sensation 
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- the painfulness of pain- makes such an act impossible. Pain is not an act of 
consciousness because as suffering it makes conscious acts impossible.   
 
The sufferer is passive, and yet this passivity Levinas passionately impresses 
on us, is not because suffering has struck ―…a blow against freedom‖. (Levinas in 
Bernasconi & Wood, 1988, p.157).  Rather suffering is an:  
 
...evil which renders the humanity of the suffering person, 
overwhelms his humanity otherwise than non-freedom 
overwhelms it: violently and cruelly, more irremissibly than the 
negation which dominates or paralyzes the act in non-freedom. 
(Levinas in Bernasconi & Wood, 1988, p.157)  
 
All of which sounds very depressing.  However there is some optimism in Levinas‘ 
ideas.  Suffering, despite its violence to one‘s consciousness, brings a possibility of 
salvation of a sort. As noted by Paul Gilbert and Kathleen Lennon, what pain 
locates is:
34
  
 
…an experience of something other, of alterity, but also what he 
takes to be our basic relation to things, jouissannce - enjoyment.  
It is here that he departs most fundamentally from Heidegger. 
(Gilbert & Lennon, 2005, p.40) 
 
The issue of enjoyment is one I shall address later.  I now wish to look at Levinas‘ 
insistence on exteriority, his insistence that suffering opens up the possibility of 
                                                 
34
  Gilbert, P. & Lennon, K. (2005)The World, the Flesh and the Subject:  Continental Themes in the 
Philosophy of Mind and Body. University of Edinburgh Press. 
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something Other, something beyond ‗I‘: an Other that may provide relief.  Also, one 
must recall that for Levinas suffering itself is never fully graspable by 
consciousness, it is ―unassumable‖.  Certainly it is experienced by me, but it is not 
quite graspable by me: 
 
 Is not the evil of suffering - extreme passivity, impotence, 
abandonment and solitude - also the unassumable and thus the 
possibility of a half opening, and more precisely, the possibility 
that wherever a moan, a cry, a groan, or a sigh happen there is 
an original call for the aid, for curative help from the other 
whose alterity, whose exteriority promises salvation? (Levinas 
in Bernasconi & Wood, 1988,  p.158) 
 
Thus, for Levinas suffering is a passive, self-experience which gestures towards an 
exterior, an exterior which promises salvation – an end to pain and the promise of 
possible pleasure.  Whilst the suffering may also manifest itself physically, it is the 
interior that concerns them, the ‗mental‘ torment.   
 
 What interests me about Levinas‘ account of affectivity, as the essence of 
ipseity, is that ipseity‘s essence is shown to be a phenomenal experience, but also an 
originary experience in the sense that it constitutes the self as a self.  In this way his 
account is similar to that of the Kyoto School with their idea of self-awakening.  
 
 I shall go on to demonstrate that a similar account can be found in the work 
of Michel Henry.  In order to understand Henry, it is worth outlining the kind of 
account he is trying to oppose, and for this I turn to Sartre.  I do so because Sartre‘s 
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philosophy shows in a sharper and clearer manner the aspect of Heidegger‘s 
phenomenology that Henry rejects: the facticity/transcendence dualism.   
 
Sartre and Pure self-presence 
 
Of course, Sartre is opposed to the idea that self-awareness is some kind of 
pure presence.  Rather he defends the view that: 
 
…self-awareness and self-transcendence are interdependent.  In 
his view, subjectivity is characterized by a pre-reflective self-
awareness of not being the object, of which it at the same time is 
intentionally conscious. (Zahavi in Gron, Damgaard & 
Overgaard, 2007, p.134) 
 
In Being and Nothingness Sartre begins by arguing that the very notion of presence 
involves some kind of division, and this is no less true of self-presence, where there 
is a division within the subject itself: 
 
Concretely, each for-itself is a lack of a certain coincidence with 
itself.  This means that it is haunted by the presence of that with 
which it should coincide in order to be itself.  But as the 
coincidence in Self is always coincidence with Self the being 
which the For-itself lacks, the being which would make the For-
itself a Self by assimilation with it-this being is still the For-
itself…What must be noted here is that the For-itself is 
separated from the Presence-to-itself by Nothing and in another 
sense by the totality of the existent in the world, inasmuch as the 
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For-itself, lacking or possible, is For-itself as a presence to a 
certain state of the world. (Sartre, 1943/2003, p.125-126) 
 
What Sartre is saying here, is that human subjectivity is not a whole, present to 
itself, and can never be so. For Sartre our notion of human subjectivity is 
constituted by a division between what we are, our facticity on the one hand and on 
the other hand, our transcendence, our possibilities or what we can become.  As 
human subjects we will always lack the latter (until we die) since there will always 
be more possibilities; hence, for Sartre the human subject can never achieve self-
presence.  
 
For Henry, the separation within this duality between 
facticity/transcendence is pernicious.  He will not accept a bifurcated subject 
because for him the subject must be absolute.   However, for Sartre the human 
subject is self-aware because of its facticity, but this self-awareness cannot be 
viewed in terms of self-identity, because to be self-aware is an attempt at 
transcendence towards future possibilities, through intentionality.  Hence there is 
always a division between self-awareness and self-identity, a ‗fissure‘ within 
consciousness. 
 
Henry, Pure Immanence & Ipseity 
 
Henry accepts no fissure, fracture, separation, division or self-alienation 
within the subject.  Nothing but absolute subjectivity where the self completely 
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coincides with itself will do.  Henry‘s motivation behind such a radical conception 
of the subject is, of course, to combat ontological monism, the idea that the 
‗phenomenon‘ of phenomenology, in order to ‗show itself‘ must be an object, 
exterior, ecstatic, in anyway worldly.  This insistence on the ontological priority of 
the world has left self-consciousness or self-awareness to be achieved through 
reflection, introspection, or at best pre-reflective experience.  But all involve some 
kind of separation within the subject, which Henry wishes to avoid.  For Henry ―the 
self-manifestation of the subject is an immediate, non-objectifying and passive 
occurrence and is best described as a self-affection.‖ (Zahavi in Gron, Damgaard & 
Overgaard, 2007, p.137). 
 
Absolute subjectivity is immanent to itself, and (with some similarity to 
Levinas) the essence of its ipseity is affectivity. Whereas Levinas, in Totality and 
Infinity, bases his ipseity on enjoyment, and makes references to suffering in 
‗Useless Suffering‘, Henry grounds the essence of ipseity in affectivity, and in 
Suffering.  Henry begins to describe his account in The Essence of Manifestation 
(1973): 
 
Affectivity reveals the absolute in its totality because it is 
nothing other than its perfect adherence to the self, nothing other 
than its coincidence with self, because it is the auto-affection of 
Being in the absolute unity of its radical immanence. In absolute 
unity of its radical immanence, Being affects itself and 
experiences itself in such a way that there is nothing in it which 
does not affect it and which is no experienced by it, no content 
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transcendent to the interior experience of self which constitutes 
this content (Henry, 1973, p.858-9) 
 
For Henry, the absolute subject which appears through self-affection is not worldly, 
it is as stated above, immanent to itself, it affects itself, experiences itself as itself 
without interference from ‗outside‘.  Therefore it is not experiencing sensations or 
affections, in the sense of feeling ‗the smoothness of paper‘, for that would be to 
bring in the world and succumb to ontological monism.  It is experiencing itself as 
itself, and this experience is entirely interior.  It is through this that the subject 
appears. 
 
However, despite this very ‗unworldly‘ subject, Henry does have more to 
say about it, despite its interiority, the ipseity of the absolute subject is to be 
understood in suffering.  For Henry suffering is passively experienced by the self 
and as such admits of no Other no divide.  When one suffers, whilst there may be an 
external cause or reason for the suffering, one‘s experience is ‗ourselves‘ alone, it is 
experienced by ‗me‘ and no other.  Nor is it initially subject to reflection.  One does 
not have chance to contemplate suffering, one merely receives it.  Hence affectivity 
understood as suffering is called by Henry ―original ontological passivity‖: 
 
[T]his is what the passivity of suffering means, this is what 
happens in it; the effectiveness of Being given.  In it, in its 
original passivity with regard to the self, feeling takes 
possession of its content, experiences it, experiences itself, 
enjoys the self and in this enjoyment of the self, as constitutive 
as such of its Being, arrives at this Being and places itself in it in 
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effectiveness. In the helplessness of suffering the power of 
feeling is born. (Henry, 1973, p.475) 
 
The experience of suffering, giving rise to the ‗power of feeling,‘ does not give the 
subject access to the world, rather it gives subjectivity its essence, affectivity: 
 
―The subjectivity constitutive of Being and identical to it is the 
Being-with-self, the arrival in the self of Being such as it occurs 
in the original passivity of suffering.  The essence of subjectivity 
is affectivity.‖ (Henry, 1973, p.476) 
 
The understanding of ipseity as affectivity qua suffering in turn leads Henry to the 
conclusion that: ―Every ‗Life‘ is essentially affective, affectivity is the essence of 
‗Life‘.‖ (Henry, 1973, p.477).  Thus the Phenomenology of ‗Life‘ is born, or rather 
self-affected.  One can see some similarities here to Nishida‘s concept of ‗pure 
experience‘ in as much as, whilst Henry does admit a subject/object split, where 
Nishida does not, this is an experience of self prior to any intrusion by the world.   
 
Henry has a very specific notion of ‗Life‘35.  Firstly, ‗Life‘ is absolute and 
transcendental; when Henry speaks of ‗life‘, he is not referring to individual persons 
or empirical egos, and in this way he parts company with Heidegger and part of 
Husserl.  Also ‗Life‘ has nothing to do with Being, ‗life‘ is ―not‖.  Or as he states in 
I am the Truth: Toward a Philosophy of Christianity (2003): 
 
                                                 
35
 Henry has a very specific notion of ‗Life‘.  ‗Life‘ – when capitalised refers to Transcendental Life, 
to the Absolute, ‗life‘ refers to the everyday material life.  Therefore when discussing Henry ‗Life‘ is 
often capitalised. 
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What we must steadfastly rule out of the analysis of ‗Life‘-at 
least if we want to grasp ‗Life‘ as coming forth in itself, and 
moreover, to understand the manner in which it does so-is the 
concept of being.  As we have already observed we are not using 
the verb ―to be‖ on the subject of ‗Life‘- say, for example, ‗Life‘ 
is,‖ and then taking this fallacious proposition as a piece of 
evidence, even though we are speaking of ‗Life‘ in human 
language, which is that of the world- which is precisely that of 
Being.   ‗Life‘ ―is‖ not.  Rather, it occurs, and does not cease 
occurring. (Henry, 2003, p.55) 
 
Henry’s Phenomenology of ‘Life’ 
 
It is because Henry‘s phenomenology of ‗Life‘ so insists on avoiding talk 
about the world or exterior that I believe it is able to locate the element of 
subjectivity lacking in  Heidegger:  a very fundamental relation to myself, one that 
is not accounted for by mineness, since mineness is to be grasped by Being, which 
for Heidegger is worldly. As I argued in Chapter Four, Heidegger, has no adequate 
concept of self-experience that can account for the self-experience of a particular 
human being, as opposed to human beings in general.  Whilst such experiences are, 
of course, had by particular human beings ‗in-the-world‘, in a very real sense the 
experience itself is not worldly, in that it is not an experience the person is having 
of themselves in-the-world, or in virtue of their being-in-the-world.  Self-experience 
is a very special kind of experience because it is radically subjective, it is an 
experience of one‘s ‗inner‘ and not of the world.  Henry‘s radical immanence of the 
experience of self allows for an account which gives expression to those kinds of 
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experiences which are deeply subjective and personal. The experience of my self 
related to my self should be understood as self-consciousness.  However, I would 
admit that because of the nature of his account, Henry gives the reader very little 
idea what it would be like to experience such subjectivity.  Of course it is ultimately 
impossible to give a full picture since Henry‘s account of the subject takes place 
prior to its being-in-the-world.  However we can see how it could be helpful in 
understanding self-experiences such as pain and pleasure.  Since it is ‗me‘ that is 
experiencing the pain, pain is self-experience par excellence.  In pain we are not 
experiencing an outside force or another person, but our own self.  As such pain 
may be considered to be auto-affective, it constitutes subjectivity through self-
affection.  It is as an experience of self where the self is completely unified and the 
pain is immanent to it. 
 
Levinas & Henry: A Summary 
 
It would easy to present Levinas and Henry each as the other‘s Jungian 
shadow.  Henry believes in absolute subjectivity, whereas Levinas advocates an 
excess just beyond the subject‘s grasp.  For Levinas‘ phenomenology is essentially 
a phenomenology of the 'Other' whilst Henry‘s phenomenology is that of a radically 
immanent self, the self that is ‗me‘.  However, despite these radical divergences 
both place great emphasis on affectivity as the essence of the ‗I‘, both emphasise 
the passivity of experience and they each have a place for self-affection. 
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The Third Phenomenology: A Heideggerian Preface 
 
― ‗Life‘ is not an existential structure of Dasein.  Yet Dasein dies‖.  (Krell, 
1992, p.34).  So states David Farrell Krell in his book Daimon Life: Heidegger and 
Life-Philosophy.  Krell points to a strange anomaly in Heidegger‘s work in that he 
considers himself justified in talking about death or Dasein dying, and yet he wants 
to avoid talk of ‗Life‘.  This is at best an odd asymmetry, or does it perhaps reveal 
that the foundations of Heidegger‘s phenomenology are not as strong as they seem?  
At one level it seems that Heidegger wants to avoid, and indeed criticise advocates 
of Lebensphilosophie, or Life-Philosophy, such as Bergson, Scheler and Jaspers.  
This is certainly indicated by his review of Jaspers‘ Psychology of Worldviews 
published in 1920, where Heidegger states: 
 
It is in this muddled fashion that problems in contemporary 
philosophy are predominately centred on life as the ―primordial 
phenomenon‖ in one of two ways.  Either life is approached as a 
fundamental reality, and all phenomena are seen to lead back to 
it, so that everything and anything is understood as an 
objectification and manifestation ―of life‖, or life is seen as the 
formation of culture, and this formation is thought to be carried 
out with reference to normative principles and values. (S, 2002b, 
p.81) 
 
Life as a ‗fundamental reality‘ is of course the kind of ‗Life‘ that Nishida and the 
Kyoto School would espouse and Heidegger firmly rejects here.   It seems that here 
Heidegger has rejected the concept of ‗Life‘ and Life-philosophy, and yet 
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references are made to it throughout his work.  For example in an earlier lecture, 
The Phenomenology of Religious Life from a section subtitled ‗Molestia [Trouble] – 
the Facticity of Life: 
 
1.  The ―the more life lives‖ means: the more fully the directions 
of experience of facticity are enacted.  In the first instance, this 
does not so much concern the fullness of what is experienced, 
but the directions of experience as such–the surrounding-wordly 
[sic], communal-worldly, and self-worldly directions-; the more 
these as such are full (that is, the more they surrender to 
themselves their complex of enactment, or the complex of 
enactment proper to their facticity), the more the full sense is 
explained historically factically, [This means:] The more the 
curare engages itself in every direction and pulls alongside itself 
the others according to their sense of experience in the 
respective engagement…2. The ‗more Life comes to itself‟ is the 
second determination and indicates that the being of Life 
somehow consists in the fact that it is had: the more Life 
experiences that it is itself, its being, that is at stake in its full 
self-enactment. (The categorical sense-structure of this being is 
the problem for which the executed interpretation should 
provide a certain cultural-historical, phenomenal situation. 
Regarding the concept of life, cf the critique of Jaspers in the 
lecture ―Phenomenology of Intuition and of Expression‖). (PRL, 
p.181) 
 
In this lecture, given as early as 1920, Heidegger is beginning to develop a concept 
of world and of existence, not dissimilar to the one he would give in Being and 
Time, although the notion of Dasein has yet to appear fully and be properly 
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developed.  Here it is ―factical Life‖ that experiences the world both as a 
phenomenological and as an historical situation.    
 
In his later lectures Heidegger is talking about ‗life‘ as a notion with 
phenomenological relevance, in connection with Being and Dasein, as well as 
‗World‘ and ‗Care‘.  Dasein is discussed but it takes on a role of lesser importance.  
In a course entitled Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Invitation to 
Phenomenological Research, Heidegger, in Part III, Chapter One states that 
― ‗[L]ife,‘ and the verb, ―to live‖ i.e., in the circuit of the indicated expressive 
directions, a peculiar sense now resounds: life = existence, ―being‖ in and through 
‗Life‘.‖ (PIA, p.64).  ‗Life‘ is discussed here, in some detail, in connection with the 
concept of World and Caring, in way unnerving similar to the way that he would 
discuss Dasein Being and Time, ‗Life‘ = existence whereas the author of Being and 
Time would claim that Dasein = existence. 
 
It seems that the Early Heidegger did consider ‗life‘ as a term with 
phenomenological significance and then he abandoned it, leaving little clue as to 
why.  Heidegger always did show some disagreement with certain ways of 
philosophising about ‗life‘ in a phenomenological sense, such as ways indebted to 
Henri Bergson, where ‗life‘ is seen as a ‗stream‘ or as an ‗infinite process‘. 
According to Heidegger: 
  
…attempts to understand life is forced to turn the surge and flux 
of the aforementioned process into a static concept and thereby 
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destroy the essence of life, i.e., the restlessness and movement 
(again something understood more as an occurrence than as a 
direction to something) that characterize Life‘s actualizations of 
its ownmost qualities. (S, 2002b, p.84) 
 
Is it that Heidegger just truly disagreed with Scheler and the modern day followers 
of Lebensphilosophie, on the basis that ‗life‘ was used to encompass all, and as such 
it had been used to explain all things as he stated in his Psychology of Worldviews 
review?  Or, given that Dasein is meant to refer to human existence, and to 
ourselves and we are human, living beings, could this be the reason be that Dasein 
might be dependent on the concept of ‗life‘ for its own legitimacy?  Maybe if a 
discussion were begun, Heidegger‘s fundamental ontology would ‗descend‘ into 
what he regarded as a ‗muddled‘ Lebensphilosophie. Heidegger‘s complete remarks 
on ‗life‘ in section forty- nine and fifty of Being and Time are curious36: 
 
In the order which any possible comprehension must follow, 
biology as a ‗science of life‘ is founded upon the ontology of 
Dasein, even if not entirely.  Life, in its own right, is a kind of 
Being; essentially it is accessible only in Dasein.  The ontology 
of life is accomplished by way of a privative Interpretation; it 
determines what must be the case if there can be anything like 
mere-aliveness [Nur-noch-leben].  Life is not a mere Being 
present-at-hand, nor is it Dasein.  In turn, Dasein is never to be 
defined ontologically by regarding it as life (in an ontologically 
indefinite manner) plus something. (BT: 49-50) 
 
                                                 
36
 It is also worth noting that in Being and Time Heidegger makes references to ‗‗Life‘‘ in at least 20 sections.  
They are Section 10,12, 35-38,40-43,47-49, 68, 78-81. 
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This passage raises far more questions than it answers.  Firstly, ‗Life‘ is accorded 
the status of Being, yet one only accessible to Dasein, and it appears that ‗‗Life‘‘ is 
a necessary conceptual tool that enables us to speak of ‗mere-aliveness‘.  Yet ‗‗Life‘‘ 
is not just present-at-handness; the concept ‗‗Life‘‘ is obviously doing some 
philosophical work, but what?  It cannot be the condition of Dasein, if it were 
Dasein would not be fundamental, and yet it certainly relates to Dasein.   I shall aim 
to resolve some of these questions through giving a phenomenology, whilst not true 
to the letter of Heidegger‘s wishes, is certainly not meant to be against Heidegger. 
 
The Phenomenology of Self-Experience: Introduction 
 
Before proceeding to give my own phenomenological description of self-
experience I feel it is necessary to put aside a few misconceptions about ‗self-
experience‘ and to indicate what I take the term ‗self-experience‘ to mean.  In 
giving a phenomenology of self-Experience, I am not attempting to give just an 
account of how ‗the self‘ experiences an entity as an object, including itself, but 
neither am I denying that such experiences are self-experience.  In fact the 
phenomenology will begin with a critique of Heidegger‘s In-Der-Welt-Sein.  I wish 
to give an account of self-experience, similar to the one given by Henry, where the 
self coincides or relates to itself in an immediate way, and I also want to point out 
that Heidegger misses out or obscures this type of account with his emphasis on 
Being-in-the-world.  In so doing I am not suggesting that this type of self-
experience is a ‗philosophically superior‘ form of self-experience.  The reason for 
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this attempt at neutrality is that I do believe that the ‗present to itself‘ conception of 
Self-Experience is one we need to articulate in order to challenge Heidegger, and 
for this reason I place great emphasis on Henry‘s notion of Life.  However I also 
believe that Henry‘s own ideas of Self-Experience are suspect, because of his lack 
of a world.  To construct a more satisfactory phenomenology, one that can take 
account of Self-experience as a phenomenon concerned with the Self and as a 
phenomena concerned with the self and world, requires a kind of fusion of Henry‘s 
Metaphysics and the ‗Eastern Logic‘ of the Kyoto School.  In fact it should be 
emphasized that the structure of this phenomenology, owes a great deal to the 
Kyoto School.  It should not be understood as a deduction or a reduction, but rather 
as dialectic.  That is to say, it is not that we begin with an account of the world, 
move on to account of ipseity qua self present to itself, and then move back to the 
world, at which point we arrive at ‗the truth of self-experience.‘  It is rather that 
there are three clearly discernable ‗stages‘.  They are: 
 
(1)  The self understood as ecstastic, Living-from-the-world. 
(2)  The self as present to itself. 
(3)  The self returned to the world as ecstatic. 
(4)  If one can say anything about self-experience it is that it is a way of 
engaging, or a place from which we can understand a certain phenomena, 
for example ourselves.  
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The Phenomenon of the Phenomenology of Self-Experience 
 
Phenomenology is the study of phenomena.  Whilst individuals studying 
phenomenology may argue whether ‗study‘ should mean science, this is the 
generally accepted definition of phenomenology.  From Heidegger onwards, 
‗phenomena‘ or ‗phenomenon‘ has meant ‗that which shows itself‘ or that which 
reveals itself to us.  In Heidegger‘s time, perhaps paying due attention to 
philosophy‘s Kantian inheritance, phenomena would be things we could experience, 
they would appear to us.  And it was presumed by some that to be experienced was 
to appear in the realm of sensibility, in much the same way as this piece of paper 
appears to us as humans.  Of course ‗Being‘ would not appear as something ‗out 
there‘ but it would for Heidegger be disclosed, made available.  However, Henry 
has pointed out that in this commonly held view of phenomenon there was a 
dangerous assumption, the assumption of ontological monism, that phenomena will 
necessarily be something exterior, ‗out there‘ or worldly.  The idea that phenomena 
can be subjective or interior has simply been ignored. 
 
In September 1997 at Villanova, there was a debate on ‗The Gift‘ between 
Jacques Derrida and J-L Marion.  Most of details of what they were debating are not 
necessary
37
 for my purposes, but one at one point, one of the debaters brought up 
Husserl‘s famous ‗first principle‘.  
                                                 
37
 Derrida argued that the ‗pure gift‘ could not be described, because being ‗pure‘ any description 
would involve destroying the gift‘s purity by placing it within the exchange economy.  There is no 
possibility of thinking about the ‗pure gift‘ and remaining phenomenological, since the very idea of 
the ‗pure gift‘ is something of which we cannot conceive.  To treat it phenomenologically would be 
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…that whatever presents itself in “intuition” in primordial form 
(as it were in its bodily reality), is simply to be accepted as it 
gives itself out to be, though only within the limits in which its 
then presents itself.  (Ideas I, p.92) 
 
Husserl is saying that what presents itself to intuition, to consciousness, must be 
accepted as it is.  But one could not do this with the ‗pure gift‘ because one would 
need to add qualities in order for one to make sense of it within an economy of 
exchange.  Marion responded by arguing that as long as description is possible, we 
remain in the field of phenomenology.  Derrida argued that such a description 
would only make sense against a theological background and would be untrue to the 
spirit of phenomenology.   
 
Whatever the truth of this matter is, Henry and the Derrida/Marion debate 
raised a larger question regarding our understanding of the concept of ‗experience‘.  
Why must we understand ‗experience‘ in the Kantian sense, as that which must be 
‗given in intuition‘ and why must  the phrase ‗given in intuition‘ be taken to mean 
available to one‘s consciousness, so that it can be recalled, thought about? Why can 
phenomena not be just ‗pure givenness,‘ in the sense that it is something given but 
not to consciousness as in the Kantian picture?  It is experienced but not in the 
sense that we could describe it.  Rather, if an experience is pure givenness then it is 
given to one‘s self and thus it has the possibility of being sensed, but it is not given 
                                                                                                                                        
to violate Husserl‘s famous ‗principle of principles‘, the bedrock of phenomenology. For this debate 
see Caputo, J.D & Scanlon M.J. (1999) God, the Gift and Postmodernism. Indiana University Press. 
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through the senses, it does not come from the world.  Phenomena may be given as 
constitutive component of the self or simply as the self itself. This is the lesson of 
ontological monism, that some phenomena will be so subjective or interior, 
immanent to the self and therefore not experienced in the same way as ‗worldly‘ 
phenomena, but we may still investigate these via phenomenology.  Such 
phenomena, with its radical subjectivism, would be necessary to accommodate self-
experience in a way Heidegger‘s Dasein simply cannot capture.  Henry believes 
that only some notion of Life will do the job of capturing such a notion of self-
experience.  His conception of life is intended to offer an account of self-experience 
that is more immediate, existentially closer to our own selves, than Heidegger‘s 
Dasein.  On this point, I agree with Henry.  However, unlike Henry I believe that 
such phenomena can also be revealed through our everyday activities through our 
‗worldly experiences‘.  Therefore, unlike Henry, this phenomenology will begin 
with a description of Being-in-the-world. 
 
From Being-in-the-world to Living-from-the-world 
 
As human beings, as a human subject, one lives in a world of people and 
things. As ecstatic beings in the world, we encounter objects which are ready-to-
hand and usable or present-at-hand and unusable. To this extent I take Heidegger‘s 
notion of Dasein as Being-in-the-world, as described in his ‗Worldhood of the 
world‘ section of Being and Time as my starting point.  I will not describe it in 
detail here as it has already been described in Chapter four, but is worth stating 
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clearly that I do accept Heidegger‘s notions of readiness-to-hand and present-at-
hand.  However, I will suggest that, even with his revolutionary conception of 
Being-in-the-world, Heidegger has missed out or at least dismissed an aspect of 
Being-in-the-world, and yet it is an integral component of our negotiations with the 
world, that the world is where we live.  I will also suggest some modifications to 
another of his terms, that of ek-stasis, the ecstatic nature of Dasein as ‗always 
outside of itself‘.  I shall start by outlining the first criticism, the ‗missed‘ element 
of In-Der-Welt-Sein. 
 
It is interesting that Levinas begins Totality and Infinity with a quote, ―the 
true ‗life, is absent‘, yet we are in the world.‖  He could be read as putting forward 
the idea that whatever Life is, or rather is not, as philosophy and phenomenology 
have yet to understand it.  However, with this quote Levinas indicates the 
possibility that any understanding of Life has to begin in the world.  We can, as 
Levinas does, talk about ourselves as ‗living in the world‘.  Living, however, cannot 
be reduced to our negotiating the world through our engagement with tools that are 
ready-to-hand and avoiding or learning how to use those tools which are present-at-
hand.  Indeed, the idea of ‗Living‘ for Levinas has nothing to do with treating intra-
worldly objects (such as the computer I am using whilst writing my thesis) as 
‗simple tools‘ designed for specific tasks, and as such of little or no importance 
once the task has been completed.  There are engagements with the world and intra-
worldly objects whose nature simply cannot be defined in such terms. That the 
computer exists for ‗the sake of typing my thesis‘ does not exhaust our 
understanding of what it is to live in the world.  In fact, it misses the idea of ‗Living‘ 
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completely.  The claim that I am ‗Enjoying typing up my thesis‘ is a phenomenon 
loaded with affectivity.  Typing my thesis on my computer brings me enjoyment 
and it may bring suffering.  This shows that it is not merely ‗a tool‘, a means to an 
end in fact it should not be understood as a tool at all. Typing up my thesis on the 
computer has an affective component that can be characterised by the fact that I am 
enjoying writing up my thesis: 
 
We live from ―good soup,‖ air, light, spectacles, work, ideas, 
sleep, etc…. These are not objects of representation.  We live 
from them.  Nor is what we live from a ―means of life,‖ as a pen 
is a means with respect to the letter it permits us to write-nor a 
goal of life, as communication is the goal of life.  The things we 
live from are not tools, nor even implements, in the 
Heideggerian sense of the term.  Their existence is not 
exhausted by the utilitarian schematism that delineates them as 
having the existence of hammers, needles, or machines.  They 
are always in a certain measure- and even hammers, needles, 
and machines are-objects of enjoyment, presenting themselves 
to ―taste‖, already adorned, embellished.  Moreover, whereas the 
recourse to the instrument implies finality and indicates a 
dependence with regard to the other, living from… delineates 
independence itself, the independence of enjoyment and of its 
happiness, which is the original pattern of all independence‖. 
(Levinas, 1961/69, p.110)  
 
It is that I enjoy writing my thesis and not that I have negotiated my computer in all 
its readiness-to-hand that is the mark of Living-from-the-world.  Levinas goes on to 
say the following about ‗Life‘: 
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Life is not the naked will to be, an ontological Sorge for this 
‗Life‘. Life‘s relation with the very conditions of its Life 
becomes nourishment and content of that Life.  Life is love of 
life, a relation with contents that are not my being more but dear 
than my being: thinking, eating, sleeping, reading, working, 
warming oneself in the sun.  Distinct from my substance but 
constituting it, these contents make up the worth [prix] of my 
life.  When reduced to pure and naked existence, life dissolves 
into a shadow.  Life is an existence that does not precede its 
essence.  Its essence makes up its own worth [prix]; and here 
value [valeur] constitutes being.  The reality of life is already on 
the level of happiness and in this sense beyond ontology. 
(Levinas, 1961/69, p.112) 
 
Levinas argues that ‗Life‘ is not equivalent to Sorge or Care, which is of course the 
‗Being of Dasein‘.  I believe that here Levinas is hinting strongly towards the idea 
that ‗Life‘ is self-affective.  In his statement ―Life‘s relation with the very 
conditions of its ‗Life‘ becomes nourishment‖ and the essence of that ‗Life‘ Levinas 
is suggesting that ‗Life‘ is self-affective.  Since ‗Life‘ continues to exist or ‗to live‘ 
by the very conditions that make possible, it could be argued that ‗Life‘ (re)creates 
itself through the very act of living, as paradoxical as that seems.  For Levinas ‗Life‘ 
is also ‗beyond‘ ontology; it does not fall under the category of ‗Being‘. 
 
The critique Levinas makes of Heidegger‘s view of intra-worldliness is 
compelling.  He argues against the view that the world conceived merely as a world 
of ready and present objects is fundamental, and he focuses instead on the affective 
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relation.  We ultimately have an affective relationship to what we do ‗in-the-world‘, 
a relationship which is prior to our relationship to worldly activities as object based 
activities.  Any notion of Being-in-the-world must account for this kind of 
engagement; Being-in-the-world must be Living-from-the-world. 
 
By invoking Levinas‘ critique, I am postulating that Heidegger‘s picture of 
Being-in-the-world is missing a notion of Living, where Living should be 
understood as an affective relation to the world.  
 
Henry and the Living Self 
 
However, both Heidegger‘s and Levinas‘ account are ‗worldly‘ and we can 
ask:  is self-experience only an experience we have of ourselves in the world?  self-
experience is also a more intimate phenomena, one that is self as experienced by 
itself. self-experience, that it is to say experiences of my self, what Henry calls ‗The 
living self;‘ where the self is not treated as an object, but where the experience is 
connected to self, without the need for concepts such as subject or object; is not 
possible as long as the world is a concern.  This kind of self-experience cannot be 
experienced by Dasein, for it is simply ‗given‘ to the self rather than experienced as 
‗worldly‘.  It is a far more intimate experience than the world can provide.  As Jean-
Luc Marion states in his work In Excess Studies of the Saturated Phenomena (2002): 
 
Daily life scarcely gives me access to myself; actually, it 
dispenses me from having the desire and even need of it.  For I 
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have passed a tacit accord with myself [moi]:  I will pretend I 
have access to myself, but I will exempt myself from verifying it 
too often so as to be able to deal with my worldly business with 
a free spirit.  Since I am here (or rather there), why burden 
myself with confirming it? (Marion, 2002, p.82) 
 
How can this kind of self-experience be accessed?  One possible way is endorsed by 
Kyoto School scholars, especially Ueda Shizuteru (1926-) and Bret W Davis.  Ueda, 
a pupil of Nishitani follows in the footsteps of the original Kyoto School scholars, 
with their grounding in ideas of pure experience and absolute nothingness.  Davis 
has written extensively on his work.  In his article ‗Letting Go of God for the Sake 
of Nothing‘ which uses much of Ueda‘s work, Davis points out that ‗Ecstasy –in the 
strict sense of ek-stasis literally means a ―standing outside of oneself,‖ which 
implies, as the Japanese term datsuji...literally means, ―a shedding of the [ego] self‘ 
(Davis, 2008, p.224). 
 
What is described above is very similar to Heidegger‘s idea of ecstatic 
Dasein; yet Davis, building on Ueda‘s work on Meister Eckhart, takes this notion 
further. Ueda‘s and Davis‘ original argument was aimed at understanding the nature 
of the relation between the self and God, however I believe they can be adapted to 
suit my purpose, simply by focussing on the self.  In his work Heidegger and the 
Will: On the Way to Gelassenheit (2007) Bret W Davis makes an interesting point 
about the will and the Dasein. Davis argues that there is a duplicity to the will and 
thus the self that he calls ―ecstatic-incorporation,‖ something that Heidegger, 
Levinas and Nishitani all write about.  Ecstatic-incorporation means that the will 
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both reaches out to the world and at least attempts to bring the world into the self‘s 
grasp, if not immanent to it: 
 
There is thus a double movement essential to willing,  ―Willing 
allows ways to bring the self to itself; it thereby finds itself 
beyond itself‖ (63/52)….or as Heidegger writes in his Schelling 
interpretation it is a matter of ―what strives back to itself and yet 
expands itself. (SA 155/128).  In willing, we exceed ourselves 
only to bring this excess into the self: ―in willing we [seek to] 
know ourselves as beyond ourselves; we have the sense of 
having somehow achieved a state of being-master [Herrsein] 
over [something]‖ (NI 64/52). The ekstasis of willing is thus 
always incorporated back into the domain of the subject; the 
will‘s movement of self-overcoming is always in the name of 
expansion of the subject, and in his territory, his power.  Willing 
is, in short, ―being-master-out-beyond-oneself [Uber-sich-
hinaus-Herrsein]‖ (76/53).  I shall call this doubled-sided or 
―duplicitous‖ character of the will: ecstatic-incorporation‖ 
(Davis, 2007, p.9). 
 
Dasein, the subject or human being, because of its existence as a creature that wills, 
is constantly striving forward and then incorporating or appropriating that towards 
which it strives; therefore there is always more to be striven for, which is itself 
incorporated.  As such we should not view Dasein‘s ecstatic nature as fixed, a point 
at which we have arrived, so that once one introduces the idea of the Dasein as 
‗being outside of itself‘ that ‗being outside of itself‘ is simply what Dasein is.  For 
even Heidegger recognised that its ecstatic nature meant that it is always ‗running-
ahead‘.  
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However, what Heidegger does not seem to consider so deeply is the idea 
that because of the very nature of the ecstatic, Dasein could overcome or go beyond 
Dasein as Being-in-the-world (except for the possibility of the death of Dasein).  In 
other words, Heidegger does not consider that there may not be simply one but 
multiple ‗ecstasies‘ of Dasein, that bring the living self into relation with the world, 
both as Being-in-the-world and ‗out-of-the-world‘, where the self returns to itself 
and perhaps returns to other kinds of relations.  I propose that there are multiple 
‗ecstatic movements‘ or ‗ecstasties‘, multiple ‗sheddings‘ each revealing new ways 
or a way of understanding the self. Following the ecstatic movement to ‗shed the 
ego‘ a second ecstatic movement occurs, the shedding of Dasein as Being-in-the-
world, in favour of absolute nothingness or emptiness as this was first theorised by 
Nishitani. 
 
Through this ecstatic movement proposed in the last section, the self moves 
beyond itself qua Being-in-the-world but incorporates itself as present to itself.  
Being-in-the-world is overcome by the self so that all that remains is the self, but a 
self capable of experiencing.  It is Being that is negated in favour of absolute 
nothingness or emptiness.  There is still in essence, a place, a world of sorts, but a 
world of pure experience where the living self experience itself and other 
phenomena without interference from categories.  This is what is described by 
Nishida and Nishitani.  I will now give a more detailed description of the self after 
this ‗shedding of Dasein‘. 
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I wish to advance a conception of the self that has some similarity to 
Henry‘s description of the self in The Essence of Manifestation, and throughout all 
his later works.  For Henry, the self is immanent to itself, it experiences itself.  The 
essence of ipseity is self-affection in that the self affects itself and in that act of self-
affection gives or constitutes the absolute or transcendent subject, which Henry 
calls ‗Life‘. As explained above, for Henry, the self is immanent to itself it 
completely coincides with itself, with no world, no exterior or outside.  Part of 
Henry‘s, ‗refusal‘ of the world and worldly phenomenology rests on the assumption 
that what is to be found in the world are ‗outer‘ objects, the mistake of ontological 
monism.  However, ‗the ‗world‘ of pure experience is not really a ‗world‘ but a 
‗place‘ or basho to use the Japanese term.  Recall that in the ‗place‘ of pure 
experience there are no objects or subjects, inner or outer, so what is experience is 
experienced as immanent to the self, it has not been categorised as in for example 
‗computer‘, nor is it even a mere thing: it is experienced directly by the Self without 
mediation from any kind of outside.  What would it be like to experience 
‗phenomena‘ like this?  To better elucidate such experiences I turn to the thinking 
of the Zen master Dogen Kigen.   
 
Dogen Kigen (1500-53) was a Zen Buddhist and founder of the ‗Soto school‘ 
of Buddhism.  In his work Shobogenzo (The Treasure of the True Dharma Eye)  
Dogen stressed the importance of seated meditation (zazen), which he called ‗just 
sitting‘ (shikan taza)  as the key to enlightenment, for it is by practising ‗just sitting‘ 
that  body and mind are ‗cast off ‘. 
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Dogen believed that of all the methods of seeking enlightenment open to a 
practising Buddhist only just sitting (shikan taza) would allow to achieve 
enlightenment.  He inherited this method from his own Zen Master Nyojo.  The 
‗just‘ singles out a particular way of sitting and it is used to single out the practice 
from other forms of zazen.  Through ‗just sitting‘ Dogen believed one achieves 
illumination because one is ‗Adjusting [one‘s] body and mind‘ before one can 
perform shikan taz.   Dogen advises the following: 
 
…a quiet room is suitable.  Eat and drink moderately. Cast aside 
all involvements and case all affairs. Do not think good or bad.   
Do not administer pros and cons.  Cease all of the movements of 
the conscious mind.  Zazen has nothing whatever to do with 
sitting and lying. (Dogen in Nagatomo, 1992, p.114) 
 
Thus ‗just sitting‘ is not just sitting.  It is an activity which must be learnt.  One 
must train to disengage from the world - putting aside all our worries, ideas, and 
thoughts.   Dogen then requires us to assume the lotus position or some variation 
(provided by a Zen Master) and then: 
 
[T]ake a deep breath, inhale and exhale, rock your body right 
and left and settle into a steady immobile sitting position.  Think 
of non-thinking.   How do you think of not-thinking?  Non-
thinking. This in itself is an essential art of zazen. (Dogen in 
Nagatomo, 1992, p.115) 
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Dogen never makes it clear what ‗non-thinking‖ is or indeed is not, possibly 
because it is something which one is meant to recognise by experiencing it and it is 
not intellectual, although I shall attempt an explanation here. Non-thinking cannot 
be an ‗attitude‘ towards the world, or ‗stance‘ we take on it, because this would 
involve thinking.  Nor can non-thinking be the active engagement with the world 
that Heidegger advanced, because just sitting is achieved when one is disengaged 
from the world. A contemporary of Dogen, Sawaki Kodo gave the following 
description of Soto Zen meditation:  
 
In such a Zen meditation, the residue does not remain even in 
the occurrence of thought or in the hearing of sounds.  Sounds 
are simply heard, and thoughts simply occur and then naturally 
disappear, just like the incoming and outgoing of breath. 
(Sawaki in Nagatomo, 1992, p.119) 
 
The use of the term ‗simply‘ enables us to gain great insights into what is meant by 
non-thinking.   Dogen, read by Sawaki, wants us to see sounds, images and thought 
as simply things that occur, just that and nothing more, they are not the basis for 
deliberative contemplation or conceptualisation.  The sound of a car stopping 
outside as I meditate is not for further investigation - it is simply the sound.  Sawaki 
reminds us of the following quote by Dogen, ―I did not hear thundering sound such 
as this, although, I was aware of it.‖ (Dogen in Nagatomo, 1992, p.120). 
 
Here, Dogen gives expression to how the self experiences the world or place 
directly.  We have already said the self of pure experience is so disengaged from the 
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everyday world, and  immanent to itself, that it experiences ‗phenomena‘ ‗directly‘ 
without the intrusion of categorisation brought in by ‗outside‘.  The self experiences 
the ‗phenomena‘ also as immanent to itself, only this way could it experience them 
without categorisation.  Thus we can be aware of the sound of thunder or the 
tapping of a keyboard but we do not hear it, for ‗hearing‘ would involve 
intentionality and the subject/object split.  Rather the ‗sound of thunder‘ was given 
to the self, and as a given constitutes the self as a self.  It is this kind of subjective 
experience that Heidegger‘s Dasein cannot account for, an experience of self and 
‗phenomena‘ that does not need intentionality or Jemeingkeit, but requires a self 
that is present to itself.  I will now go on to talk about the essence of this Self: the 
self of pure experience. 
 
Ipseity and the Living Self 
 
The essence of ipseity is self-affection: the self affects itself and in that act 
of self-affection gives or constitutes the living self.  The ‗living self‘, a term 
borrowed from Henry is the ‗self that I am‘, by which I meant the self in the first 
person. In this sense it is similar to Descartes‘ cogito.  Where it differs from 
Descartes is that the living self, like Henry‘s transcendental self is immanent to 
itself it completely coincides with itself, with no world, no exterior or outside and it 
is certainly not a substance: selfhood is achieved though an original given 
experience, an experience of radical passivity.  It is because this being given 
through self-affection, and the radical passivity of the given experience, that 
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selfhood is not constituted through some sense of a bare ‗I‘ or ‗me,‘ rather the 
reverse.  As Henry puts it: 
 
Because this engendering of the me in Life‘s Self-affection is 
phenomenological in a radical sense, the coming of the me into 
itself, which rests on the coming of Life into itself, is lived as 
basically passive with respect to this coming of Life.  We have 
seen that the me is what self-affects itself, but since this self-
affection is imposed on it by Life and it is just like that of Life, 
one could say, more exactly, that the ―me‖ is constantly self-
affected.  This character of the Self being self-affected is 
designated by its being put into the accusative: ―me‖.  In the end, 
―me‖ signifies this: for each me, its ipseity does not come from it, 
but inversely, it comes from ipseity. (Henry, 2003, p.135)  
 
The self-affection of the self is not an activity that simply occurs at the original 
constitution of the self, rather self-affection is a process that happens again and 
again, and in so doing (re)constitutes a new living self, the self understood as a ‗me‘, 
who is someone. Just as Levinas describes enjoyment as an activity a ‗pulsation of 
the I‘ self-affection is achieved through the perpetual re-assertion of the Self qua 
absolute nothingness or sunyata.  Remember that for Ueda, absolute nothingness is 
to be understood ‗dynamically‟ as the ‗activity of emptying out‘ (Davis, 2008, 
p.225).  absolute nothingness is itself an ecstatic movement and, just as one ecstatic 
movement ‗sheds‘ the self as Being-in-the-world and constitutes it as a ‗presence to 
itself,‘ another will ‗return‘ it to the world.  As ‗present‘ to itself the living self is 
overcome by absolute nothingness.  It, or rather I, come to the realisation that I ‗am‘ 
or rather am characterised by absolute nothingness.  The self literally ‗overcomes‘ 
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or sheds itself.   After its constitution as a self in the place of pure experience, the 
living self, the ‗me‘ is reconstituted or returned to the world, but with the 
knowledge provided to me by pure experience.  This knowledge is the knowledge 
of non-duality, that there is a way of relating to things and people that need not 
involve intentionality, at least not as Heidegger conceived of it, and that 
appropriation or ‗grasping‘ is not our only way of knowing an object.  As Davis 
rehearses Ueda‘s thoughts ―…the true self realises itself in an ―ekstasis/instasis,‖ a 
standing outside of itself and into a non-dual engagement with other persons, things, 
and events.‖ (Davis, 2008, p.225). 
 
The true self must enter into a non-dual engagement with the world, an 
engagement comprising ‗persons, things, and events‘ and of course, its own self in 
order to allow the subjective character which Jemeinigkeit conceals to be opened up.  
In the final section I will give some indication of how this would look. 
 
The Living Self’s ‘return’ to the World 
 
Before I elucidate the final part of this Zen influenced phenomenology, I 
should clear up a misleading phrase invited by English language usage.  The living 
self does not so much return to the world, rather after its fundamental ‗true‘ way of 
Being-in-the-world is revealed to it in the basho,  it now acts ‗in-the-world‘ in the 
way that it has learned in basho.  But one should not look at Being-in-the-world as 
entering ‗different worlds‘ but rather as different aspects or ways of experiencing 
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the world.  Hence Ueda Shizuteru refers to his conception of the Self-World relation 
as a ‗two layered world‘.  The place of absolute nothingness or the world of pure 
experience revealed to the living self that there is a different and more fundamental 
way of relating to things and people, than intentionality.  However, it would be 
difficult to relate to people and things in exactly the same way as one did in the 
world of pure experience, for there the self was immanent to all things.  The world 
is social, that is to say full of people and things with which we interact, and this 
seems a long way from the world of pure experience.  However, it is possible to 
retain the essence of ‗directly experiencing‘ the world found in the world of pure 
experience, by utilising another notion, the notion of aidagara.  This idea, which 
has its origins in Buddhist thought, is to do with the ‗betweenness of all things‘: the 
idea that ‗I‘ am related to all people and all things.  For example in the tenth and 
final Oxherding picture, a man is shown walking around a market talking with wine 
sellers and butchers and ‗they are all converted into Buddhas‘.  Having learnt about 
sunyata the Oxherder now walks through a market conversing with all, for he now 
realises he is related to all. This idea of relatedness or betweeness was theorised 
most thoroughly by a thinker called Watsuji Tetsurô.  In two famous works Fudo 
and Rinrigaku, inspired by Heidegger he gives a hermeneutical-phenomenological 
analysis of the concept of human being or ningen sonzai. 
 
Watsuji grounds his work in an etymological analysis of the Japanese word 
for ‗human being‘ - ningen sonzai.  He places great significance and philosophical 
weight on this term.  Nin is the everyday term for person or people, whilst gen, 
which can also be read as aida or aidagara, is much more resistant to translation, 
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for it could possibly mean a whole family of concepts - space would be one 
translation, and  interval another.  I choose betweenness, as do the translators of the 
Rinrigaku, Robert E. Carter and Yamamoto Seisaku. 
 
Watsuji is purposely playing with words here.  Nin has to presuppose gen 
since the existence of an individual presupposes the existence of a community.  Nin 
and gen therefore share a dialectical structure, each affirming and negating the other.  
However, for Watsuji, unlike the exponents of Western metaphysics - most notably 
Hegel, the dialectic does not have to be violent.  Harmony should be sought 
between the individual and communal aspects of ningen sonzai, so a double 
negation occurs. The community negates the individual and subsumes her, the 
individual then negates the community and is reconstituted as an individual, but one 
tied to a network of social relations.  Only when one realises that ningen only 
realizes its authentic self within the context of relationships, its aidagara or 
betweenness, does one understand the nature of the individual, the nature of one‘s 
self.   
 
Ningen sonzai, qua human existence, is necessarily a social relationship to 
the world.  It is not enough to say just ‗this is used in order to hit nails‘ or ‗this is 
the workshop‘ but one has to be able to say ‗I am cold in the workshop‘.  That I am 
in the workshop is an aspect of the world that only the individual is concerned with, 
but that it is cold is a social aspect, an aspect of the climate or fudo with which all 
individuals would be concerned.  It is the ‗we‘ not ‗I‘ that feels the cold.  Even that 
statement ‗I feel cold‘ is never truly individual or asocial because in talking about 
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coldness one has made a relationship with the climate, something which all humans 
share.  Thus human beings recognise themselves as selves in relation to the climate, 
and that climate is neither subject nor object, but is something to which all ningen 
sonzai are related by virtue of being ningen sonzai. 
 
Watsuji presents us with a picture of the world or seken where betweenness 
or relatedness is primary.  Seken or world is also by its nature ‗public‘ for the 
original meaning of seken or yo no naka (in the world) is ‗public‘.  Hence as 
Watsjui states ‗The original meaning of the word ningen is seken or yo no naka, 
whose meaning is quite ordinarily understood to connote an extended real of ‗Life‘ 
interaction‘ (Watsuji, 1937/1996, p.145). 
 
Everything has the characteristic of betweenness, of being related to 
something.  This is how Watsuji views an agent‘s relationship to the world and all 
in it.  Watsuji liked to use the metaphor of transportation when explaining this.  
Everyone is on a journey, not only where we are going is important, but also how 
we get there.  I may be talking to some people about Watsuji and (one would hope) 
they are listening, even if my audience is unable to understand, a relation exists 
between us.  And we are all at a seminar; this if nothing else, is what is ‗between‘ 
us all here.  However, one should not mistake that we are all at a seminar as an 
objective fact, but rather one should recognise it as an inter-subjective relationship 
(as Watsuji called it).  This might be a very bad seminar to some and not to others 
but we can all agree that we are at a seminar where someone is giving a paper. 
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Being-Between or Being-in-the-Milieu 
 
What Watsuji is suggesting may sound very like if not identical to 
Husserlian or Heideggerian intentionality, but this is not the case.  Aidagara enables 
intersubjectivity or relations between subjects and things, but despite this aidagara 
is not an act.  For Watsuji, the world is not something which ‗I‘, the subject, 
objectifies or rather treats as an object, although we are subjects, the world is not an 
object in that way for us.  Rather the world is something with which we are 
involved, not through employing intentionality as Brentano, Husserl, and Heidegger 
conceived of it, in which we are agents directing ourselves towards objects.  We can 
utilise Watsuji‘s own example of ‗feeling the cold‘.  Although it is an Intentional 
relation, betweenness is not an act ‗for the sake of‘: 
 
[It] is not a ‗point‘ which establishes a relationship directed at 
the cold, but is in itself a relationship in virtue of its ―feeling‖ 
and it is in this relationship that we discover cold.  The 
intentionality of such a relational structure is thus a structure of 
the subject in relation with the cold.  The fact that ―We feel the 
cold‖ is, first and foremost, an ―intentional experience‖ of this 
kind. (Watsuji, 1927/1961, p.2) 
 
„We‟ and not I ‗feel the cold, we enter into a relationship with the cold, but we do 
not ‗direct‘ ourselves towards the cold, rather we are simply related to it, and we are 
related to it as a community.   
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This is the way that the self now understands its nature as Being-in-the-
world that differs from Heidegger‘s Dasein or ‗towards-which‘, which seems 
mono-directional, as if there the relationship between myself and another is one 
initiated by ‗me‘ and could not be started by ‗them‘. We are all related to all things 
and each other.  It is not that one has to ‗set‘ that relationship up through 
intentionality qua some kind of directedness. Watsuji and I are in agreement with 
Heidegger that we are always already there, but it is not that I am ‗towards‘ another, 
but that we are related to each other, in a milieu or surrounding world and inwardly 
related to our self.  
 
Mineness, the idea that an experience is mine in virtue of it ‗being available 
to me‘ as the ‗towards-which‘ is not the fundamental way I actually experience the 
world.  Whilst I experience the world as part of a community, as a subject my 
experiences can also be personal and have a subjective character that Heidegger 
does not accommodate.  We can now speak of the self being present to itself, 
experiencing itself, as a ‗worldly‘ being.  Just as there is something between myself 
and another, there is a relation between the self and itself.  Experience is given to 
me.  I can feel myself and think my own thoughts, as can every other being to who I 
am connected. 
 
 
 
 
236 
 
The Third Phenomenology: Summary 
 
The phenomenology of self-experience I have offered here is one that 
challenges Heidegger on two fronts.  Firstly, it challenges Heidegger‘s own notion 
of ek-stasis, by showing that, welcome and necessary though that idea is, Heidegger 
did not realise its full potential.  Ek-stasis is not just the nature of Dasein, it is a 
movement. Whilst Heidegger saw it as a ‗movement‘ or ‗beyondness‘ as Dasein‘s 
‗stepping outside of itself‘, what he may have not have recognised, as Ueda did, is 
that this very movement ‗outside of itself‘ would mean that Dasein itself as Being-
in-the-world would be ‗moved beyond‘ to reveal or disclose new ways of 
understanding our nature as human beings or ningen sonzai.  What results from 
such an new understanding, is an understanding of what it means to be a human 
being that moves beyond ontological concerns over ‗Being, since ‗human being,‘ or 
‗Life‘ does not fall under the category of Being.   As Levinas and Ueda point out it 
is not ontological, at least not in Heidegger‘s understanding of ontology, it may 
belong in a different kind of ontology, or it may belong to a different part of 
philosophy all together such as the ethical.   I should make it clear at this point that 
there are some differences between the views of Henry and Levinas concerning the 
notion of ‗Life‘.  For example Henry makes far more use of the Transcendental, 
whereas Levinas does not use that notion at all, however there remain many 
similarities.  Both Henry and Levinas see ‗Life‘ as beyond ontology, as belonging 
to another field, both see ‗Life‘ as self-affective at least some of the time.  Also if 
‗Life‘ has an ‗essence‘ (as one should be careful to use the word essence when 
talking of phenomena ‗beyond‘ ontology) then that essence is affectivity, even 
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though they each define affectivity differently.  Heidegger, who is trying not to talk 
about ‗Life‘ would not necessarily accept any of these definitions, but they are not 
inconsistent or out place in his kind of phenomenology. 
 
This new understanding of ek-stasis, presents us with at least two new ways 
of understanding the self.  Firstly where the self is unified with itself, this offers a 
picture of self-experience where the self is directly experienced, in a way that owes 
much to the idea of pure experience expressed by the Kyoto School.  This is the 
‗true‘ nature of the self, the self that ‗I am‘ or the living self.  This way of 
understanding selfhood offers an account of subjective experience that the 
Heidegger of Being and Time does not supply us with. 
 
However, one cannot stay in this mode of selfhood forever, since in this 
mode the self understands itself as ‗Being‘, it overcomes itself to realise its true 
nature as absolute nothingness, and is ‗returned to the world‘ with this knowledge, 
the knowledge gained in the place of pure experience.  The agent now knows that 
Being is not the most fundamental question or way of understanding humans, and 
that intentionality is not the most fundamental way of engaging with the world.   
Rather it sees everything as interconnected, although again in a much more 
subjective sense than Heidegger would allow.  Heidegger‘s idea of community 
through his concept of Das Man or ‗The One‘ is an impersonal community where 
no particular Dasein‘s need to exist, there is simply ‗The One‘.  At best we relate to 
people and to objects in a mode of ‗towards-which‘, through intentionality, but even 
this places a barrier between myself and the Other, since intentionality is necessary.  
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I must always be searching out ‗something‘ or ‗someone‘ and for a particular end, 
as opposed to just experiencing the world.  Zen Buddhism offers an alternative, to 
Heidegger, in that it offers a view of human beings as intimately connected to each 
other and to all things as individuals.  Regarding the last two ways of understanding 
self-experience (Heidegger‘s and Zen Buddhist) it must be made clear that whilst 
Zen practitioners, would of course say the first is the ‗best way‘ of understanding 
the self, I make no such preference. These two ways must be seen as processes or at 
best as two standpoints or ways of understanding the same phenomena.  To give 
analogy from my own experience, in Kyoto there is a Zen garden at the Roan-ji
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Temple and in this garden there are fifteen stones only fourteen of which can been 
seen at any one time no matter what your vantage point.  Consequently there is no 
‗best place‘ to view the garden there are merely thirteen rocks, only eleven of which 
can be seen, so it would foolish to speak of a ‗best view‘.  Similarly, whilst we wish 
to challenge Heidegger‘s view of self-experience, or rather his lack of a view of 
self-experience, it would be dangerous to suggest that there is a ‗superior‘ 
alternative, although there are of course alternatives. 
 
Finally, my phenomenology suggests that it may be Heidegger‘s starting 
point, his concept of Phenomenon and phenomenology that leaves him unable to 
speak of self-experience in this way, even if he wished to; his later work on 
Gelassenheit and Schelling may suggest he does.  Like many exponents of 
phenomenology both before and after him, Heidegger views the phenomenon as 
                                                 
38
 For a photograph of the garden at Roan-ji with the author of this thesis and his wife highly engaged in the 
search for satori – Enlightenment see the Appendix.  The photograph was taken quite covertly by Keiko Oka, 
photography not being allowed in this particular Zen Temple. 
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‗object‘, ‗world‘ or ‗exterior‘.  This concept of the phenomenon means that any 
phenomen-ology, and study of the phenomenon will also be existentially dis-
stanced, moved away from its goal by having to work within the subject/object split, 
albeit a split Heidegger cannot recognise.  I have suggested that a phenomenology 
with pure experience as its foundation provides the resources for an account of 
subjectivity that Heidegger‘s starting point makes it impossible for him to offer. 
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Conclusion: Is the Meaning of Life Lost? 
 
Preliminary Remarks 
 
This thesis grew out of a certain discontentment with Heidegger‘s idea of 
‗Being-in-the-world‘.  Whilst I agree Heidegger was right to emphasise our nature 
as humans as being ‗world-involved‘, part of the world and not a spectator looking 
in, this certainty seemed to come at price.  The price was that features of ipseity are 
lost.  Whilst Cartesian introspection may be unreliable, it nonetheless provided one 
with a way of accounting for self-awareness or self-knowledge.  What was missing, 
I felt, in Heidegger‘s account, is a provision for  the ‗inner‘ or subjective, for the 
fact that ‗I‘ experienced ‗my‘ thoughts, feelings and emotions, and this was not  
reducible to Being-in-the-world.  Whilst I can only recognise these phenomena 
because I am a public being, part of the world, the having of these phenomena is not 
simply public.  What was missing it seemed was the interiority of the self.  Have we 
arrived at the meaning of being but lost the meaning of life qua selfhood?  If so, I 
am reminded of Nikolai Berdyaev in his The Meaning of the Creative Act 
(1914/1962)
39
 when he stated: 
 
The human spirit is in prison.  Prison is what I call this world, 
the given world of necessity…The true way is not a movement 
left or right in the plane of ―the world,‖ but rather movement 
upward and downward on lines of the ultra-worldly, movements 
                                                 
39
 Russian Existentialist Philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev 1874-1924 
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in spirit and not in ―the world‖.  Freedom from the reactions of 
―the world‖ and from opportunitistic adaptations to it is a great 
achievement of spirit. (Berdyaev, 1914/62, p.11) 
 
For Berdyaev, ―the given world‖ is that which imprisons the self or the spirit, as a 
philosopher one should not enter into relations with the world blindly and so 
willingly as Heidegger does, as it inhibits one‘s freedom.  Whilst Berdyaev‘s 
concerns were religious as well as ontological, he does capture what I want to argue, 
that simply surrendering ‗Man‘ to ‗the world‘ and thereby to Being40 means that a 
part of ‗Man‘ will be lost.  This is not to deny that we, as human beings are part of 
the world, but to insist that how we relate to the world could be described 
differently, in a way that does not rob of the self of those subjective phenomena nor 
deny characteristics of ‗Man‘ which do not pertain to Being as Dasein. 
 
Human Life Through The Early Heidegger 
 
The early Heidegger, the Heidegger preparing and writing the work Being 
And Time, was attempting to capture the essence of human existence, what it is to 
be a human being, in order to answer what he considered the most important 
question in philosophy, the Seinfrage, the question of the meaning of being.  He 
‗deconstructs‘ Descartes and Kant in Being and Time, and in this work and later in 
his career, his critiques of any thinker work on the presupposition that they simply 
have failed to capture what it is to be a human being, to experience life and the 
                                                 
40
 ―Man is essentially this relationship of responding to Being, and he is only this.‖ (Heidegger trans Stambaugh, 
1957/2002, p31)   Even if, as Heidegger states Being is an excess not a limitation, might not there be some 
phenomena that does fall under Being? 
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world as a human being.  In the case of Descartes, in his Nietzsche lectures of 1939, 
Heidegger indicates that despite Descartes not viewing the Cogito as a logical 
syllogism, nonetheless Heidegger‘s understanding of cogito ergo sum as cogito me 
cogitare, ‗I represent myself‘, is an intellectual grasping of the Ego Cogito, and  
suggests a reading of the Cogito as a practical syllogism, which is not as Descartes 
intended it. 
   
I have suggested, through the work of Michel Henry that the interpretation 
of the ego cogito as meaning ‗Man‘ and then Man qua subject, is a status Descartes 
never accorded it in his own life-time. A reading of Descartes was offered using the 
work of Michel Henry, showed that Descartes, far from being a sceptic, actually 
affirms ‗Man‘s‘ existence as a self-affective absolute subjectivity.  Thus Descartes 
did not leave the ‗meaning of the sum undetermined‘ despite Heidegger‘s claim to 
the contrary; the ‗sum‘ is that that ‗I‘ am a thinking thing, born out of an act of self-
affection, it is this self-affection that is the ‗sum‘. 
 
The early Heidegger‘s encounter with Kant is far more ambivalent and far 
less dramatic.  Heidegger cannot, nor does not, at least explicitly, deny any Kantian 
influence in Being and Time, he was educated during the time of the great Neo-
Kantians, Natorp, Rickert and Windelband.  However, he does reject the majority of 
Kant‘s own conclusions, viewing him as nothing more than a modification on 
Cartesian thinking, the Kantian ‗I-think‘ is, for Heidegger, a conception of the self 
as a ground and therefore a subject where ‗things outside of me‘, are re-presented as 
objects. Again I suggest that there are ways of reading Kant to counter Heidegger‘s 
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critique.  Kant does invoke mineness, and introduces the notion of the a priori, and 
Heidegger does acknowledge this.  One of the reasons I offer in chapter four for this 
grudging acknowledgment is that Heidegger, whilst being quite critical towards 
Kant, cannot be too critical, because much of Heidegger‘s own philosophy, the 
notions of Dasein and Jemeingkeit, his ‗existential analytic‘ and the a priori owes 
something to Kant.  Heidegger is inescapably Kantian in spirit.   
 
Heidegger never really interrogates Husserl properly in Being and Time, but 
in work and lectures written prior to Being and Time and immediately after, it is 
clear that Heidegger has two main objections which can ultimately be reduced to 
one, that of Cartesianism. Firstly, Heidegger criticises Husserl‘s allegiance to a 
philosophy of consciousness (although not for positing ‗inner mental contents‘) as 
overly Cartesian and therefore inadequate.  Once again in Husserl, Heidegger finds 
a conception of human beings qua subject which he finds abhorrent. Finally, he 
argues that Husserl‘s Cartesian side leads him to avoid the question of being.  
However, as Henry argues, Heidegger may be right, but his ‗solution‘ to this 
Cartesian virus running through Husserl‘s work is misguided, simply formulating 
‗Man‘ as exclusively Being-in-the-world is for Henry, a mistake. 
 
The respective philosophies of Descartes, Kant and Husserl, all have one 
common denominator; they all fall foul of an allegiance to subjectivity, which will, 
in Heidegger‘s eyes close off the possibility of describing the self and world as it is 
truly is and experienced, as something more intimate, more fundamental, a union 
between human being and world that he calls In-Der-Welt-Sein, ‗Being-in-the-
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world‘.  However, with each thinker I have offered alternative interpretations to 
Heidegger‘s using, for the most part, the thought of Michel Henry.  The purpose of 
these alternative interpretations, whilst I also agree with them as critiques of 
Heidegger, is to cast doubt on Heidegger‘s justification for his project, for the 
question of the meaning of Being.  If alternative interpretations are possible, then 
the ‗need‘ for Being and Time is in doubt.  I attempted to show that Descartes, Kant 
and Husserl could possibly be read as a giving an adequate account of human life, 
albeit by employing the concept of subjectivity which Heidegger wished to avoid. 
 
Human Life in Being and Time 
 
In the fourth chapter I turned to Heidegger‘s Being and Time to evaluate 
whether he had succeeded in providing a satisfactory alternative account with the 
notion of Being-in-the-world, one that shows self and world to more intimately 
connected and avoids the notions of subjectivity and subject/object dualism of 
which he accuses Descartes, Kant and Husserl.  I argued that in his account of 
conscience, Heidegger relapses into a philosophy of subjectivity when describing 
Dasein‘s call to conscience.  I claimed that there are elements of the first person and 
some characteristics of subjectivity in his account of conscience, but far from seeing 
this as a negative aspect of this work, Heidegger could have appropriated it as a 
positive aspect, that if anything Dasein is not subjective ‗enough‘.  However, since 
he chose not to do so, what remains is an ambiguous account of human subjectivity 
as world-involved.  Heidegger‘s need to portray human being as ‗in-the-world‘ 
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means that some element of their ipseity or the liveliness of life as Levinas put it is 
lost.      
 
In the final two chapters I went to show how Heidegger could have 
developed a phenomenology of life by using both the work of the Kyoto School and 
French Phenomenology. The former describe a way of viewing the world and 
conceiving of the self that would seem to show a more fundamental way of 
understanding the self and world than through intentionality, and the latter shifts the 
discussion away from being concerned ultimately with the question of being, 
making  the question the following: What is human life?  
 
Why a Phenomenology of Life? 
 
A Phenomenology of Life is appropriate for two interrelated reasons.  Firstly 
it acts as a corrective to Heidegger‘s anti-subjectivism, a subjectivism that had he 
embraced it, would have aided his account of conscience.  Secondly, it restores to 
the self those phenomenal qualities that the self experiences, that have been lost by 
human beings now being described as a being-in the-world.  A Phenomenology of 
Life cannot deny that we are world-involved beings, but how we relate to the world 
can be more carefully delineated so as not overlook ipseity and the demands of the 
world and the community.  The world need not be a ‗prison‘ as Berdyaev fears. 
Accommodations, for want of a better term, can be made. 
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‗Life‘ here is to be understood phenomenologically, and although I have not 
introduced a scientific understanding of ‗Life‘ into the debate, neither have I 
rejected that discourse.  Biology is literally the study of Life.  There is no reason 
why Biology could not be understood philosophically.  For example, one of the 
basic principles of life could be the possibility of reproduction, cells divide and 
children are born.  Philosophy has an equivalent of this, which was used in this 
thesis, self or auto-affection.  With auto-affection one ‗produces‘ and ‗reproduces‘ 
one self.  These are merely indications, but something has been said about how this 
phenomenology of life would take shape, and I hope to have achieved a beginning 
of such a phenomenology in the final sections of my final chapter.  I draw upon 
those thinkers with a phenomenological background, many having being taught by 
Heidegger but also have a strong allegiance to German Idealism and philosophy of 
life or Lebensphilosophie in attempt to show how Lebensphilosophie and 
Heidegger‘s phenomenology are compatible and that the former can help in the 
development of a phenomenology of Life, a phenomenology I hope to develop 
further in future work. 
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Appendix 
 
 
 
 
 
A couple looking at the rock garden at Ryoan-ji, Kyoto, December, 2005 
Photography by Keiko Oka 
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